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United States nonprofits are governed by boards of directors who have legal 
responsibilities based on the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. Boards, 
along with the chief executive, are held responsible to fulfill these standards which are 
designed to hold nonprofits legally accountable to carry out their tax exempt purpose by 
using organizational resources for the intended purpose, avoid conflict of interest, and 
ensure compliance. However, despite this weighty responsibility and the voluntary nature 
of nonprofits, no standardized process exists to educate nonprofit leaders about their legal 
responsibilities.  
While governance is a key area of nonprofit research, there is limited empirical 
evidence about how nonprofit leaders satisfy legal accountability demands. Using 
quantitative methods, this three paper dissertation establishes baseline data about 
nonprofit leader fiduciary knowledge, source of knowledge, and application of 
knowledge in their governance activities. A survey tool developed for this study yielded 
186 responses from San Diego County nonprofit leaders. Using role and board service as 
the primary demographics, the results show that most nonprofit leaders believe they have 
enough knowledge of the fiduciary duties and frequently use their knowledge in the 
performance of their governance duties. However, when tested for actual knowledge, 
only 41% of board members and 70% of executives passed. When analyzed by board 
service, 56% of those who served on one to four boards in the past 15 years and 31% of 
those who have served on five or more boards passed. Further results show that nonprofit 
leaders were more likely to rely on informal sources of knowledge, such as conversations 
  
with their colleagues and other board members and less on more formalized sources, such 
as board orientations or a board manual, regardless of role or board service. 
Implications of this study point to the need for increased fiduciary duty 
knowledge amongst nonprofit leaders. Furthermore, this study can inform regulators, 
funders, and practitioners to develop standards and fund training to strengthen nonprofit 
accountability. As nonprofit leaders understand their fiduciary duties more fully, they are 
empowered to make decisions about organizational resources that uphold their legal 
responsibilities to carry out the mission. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Nonprofits are woven into the very fabric of American life. On any given day, in 
nearly every community across the United States, people interact with the more than 1.5 
million charitable organizations that provide a variety of programs and services (National 
Center for Charitable Statistics, 2019). Nonprofits enrich our lives socially as well as 
provide critical services that many people depend on. Nonprofits also significantly 
contribute to the national economy by generating more than $1.74 trillion in revenues and 
by employing more than 12.3 million people (United States Department of Labor, 2018; 
National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2018). 
Many stakeholders rely on nonprofits and as such, hold nonprofits accountable to 
carry out their respective missions. As the governance body, boards of directors and the 
chief executive are legally responsible to uphold federal and state mandated fiduciary 
duties designed to ensure that organizational resources (financial, human, physical, and 
intellectual) are used in a manner that fulfills the charitable mission. However, over the 
years we have seen many cases of resources used for purposes other than to fulfill the 
mission. Cases of excessive compensation, conflict of interest, lack of oversight, and 
intentional wrongdoing have been reported in nonprofits of all sizes and that carry out a 
variety of missions. For the cases that are reported, findings often point to boards of 
directors and executives not fulfilling their oversight and management duties either 
because of ignorance, lack of engagement, or conflict of interest.  
Nonprofit leaders are held to high standard of conduct. When stories of nonprofit 
mismanagement and negligence come to light nonprofits are impacted in a variety of 
ways: The public becomes wary of nonprofits, donations decline, reputations suffer and 
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ultimately the mission goes unfulfilled. Yet, the high profile cases highlight what goes 
unreported: the countless nonprofit boards and executives, across the nation, leading and 
managing nonprofits of all shapes and sizes, failing to fulfill their oversight management 
and role. Weak board oversight is an endemic issue that ultimately negatively affects 
those who rely on the goods and services when resources are wasted and the mission goes 
unfulfilled. 
The Challenges of Studying Nonprofit Governance 
Studying nonprofit governance, in terms of legal accountability, is actually more 
challenging than one may think. Nonprofit leaders are expected to fulfill their fiduciary 
duties and are held legally responsible by federal and state agencies. Yet, reports from 
regulators lag by several years, because of privacy rights and lack of resources. 
Furthermore, when information is made available, it is difficult to tease out the specifics 
of the instances or identify penalties or outcomes of the investigations and inquiries. The 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) releases annual reports about nonprofits that have had 
their tax-exempt status revoked, but no information is made available about how many 
nonprofits were investigated or the basis for the investigation. 
When nonprofits are found to have failed in upholding their fiduciary duties, they 
are fined and asked to institute recommendations to support good governance. The 
ultimate penalty nonprofits face for failure to uphold their fiduciary duties is tax exempt 
revocation, however, when the IRS releases how many tax exempt organizations were 
revoked, there is no indication as to what caused the revocation. Was it simple negligence 
such as failing to file required reports? Was it intentional criminal activity? Or, was it 
because of the zone of insolvency–when the organization is no longer financially stable?  
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Although the public is aware of the cases that receive media attention, this type of 
negligence is more common throughout the nonprofit sector. Anecdotally, as a 
practitioner for the past 20 years with experience in all levels of nonprofit organizations 
as an executive, program staff, board member, and consultant, I have interacted with 
countless organizations who struggle with governance issues. What seems to be a 
common thread is that they do not understand, or in some cases are aware of, their basic 
fiduciary duties. For these organizations, their lack of knowledge may not end up in the 
news, but rather is the basis for potentially negative consequences related to poor 
decision-making and lack of engagement.  
Furthermore, in my work as a nonprofit consultant, I have helped many 
organizations regain their tax exempt status due to their lack of legal compliance which 
for some, resulted in their tax status revocation. In all cases, the board expressed that they 
did not know about the reporting requirements and if they knew, they would have done 
what was required. I have often thought that this issue is ripe for research in order to 
better understand where, how, and why governance failures may be happening.  
The Importance of Studying Nonprofit Governance Legal Accountability 
Leading and managing a nonprofit organization has become increasingly more 
complex with the increased demand for services and competition for resources. And, as 
more and more cases of nonprofit mismanagement and wrongdoing are reported, 
important questions about legal accountability are raised for the nonprofit sector and for 
academics. Do nonprofit leaders understand their fiduciary duties? Do nonprofit leaders 
have access to appropriate trainings and tools to learn about their fiduciary duties? Are 
the pressures for performance creating a culture that is more susceptible to negligence 
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and ignorance because nonprofit leaders are focused more on financial sustainability than 
their mission?  
To answer these important and urgent questions, this study explores the 
governance of nonprofits as a major factor driving accountability. While there is 
significant research on nonprofit governance, much of it prescribes that nonprofit leaders 
fulfill a variety of roles (Carver, 1997; Chait, Ryan, & Taylor, 2005; Herman & Renz, 
2000; Holland & Ritvo, 2008; Houle, 1997; Renz, 2010). However, there are very few 
studies focused on what nonprofit leaders know about their basic legal fiduciary 
responsibilities, specifically, 1) nonprofit leader knowledge of fiduciary duties, 2) the 
sources of their fiduciary knowledge, and 3) the application of such knowledge. This 
dissertation provides insights into these issues by collecting baseline data about nonprofit 
leader (board members and executive) knowledge of fiduciary duties, the sources they 
access in learning about their fiduciary duties, and application of fiduciary knowledge in 
the performance of their governance responsibilities. 
As an academic, my goal is to research these issues empirically by developing an 
assessment tool, that others can build upon, that focuses on the basic responsibilities of 
nonprofit leaders as outlined in the fiduciary duties. As a practitioner, my goal is to 
strengthen nonprofit governance by identifying gaps in leader knowledge of fiduciary 
duties. As a pracademic (academic and practitioner), I believe that research in this 
particular area of nonprofit governance will help nonprofit leaders better understand their 
basic fiduciary duties, creating a solid foundation that supports sustainability and success 




Ignorance or Negligence? 
There is limited empirical evidence about how boards actually function (Jackson 
& Holland, 1998). Some of the literature on nonprofit governance tends to be theoretical 
and conceptual (Cornforth, 2012) while other literature is based on for-profit contexts and 
does not necessarily translate to the nonprofit sector. The literature can be prescriptive in 
describing how a nonprofit board should function based on a variety of factors (Miller, 
2002; Ostrower & Stone, 2006). For example, some studies have focused on overall 
leadership (Chait, et al, 2005), relationships between executive management and the 
board (Brown, 2005), and predictors of performance based on board configurations and 
composition (Bradshaw, 2009) while others are related to the characteristics of leaders 
(Riggio & Orr, 2004) and management practices (Helmig, Jegers, & Lapsley, 2004). 
Furthermore, there is a vast body of practitioner literature that provides “how to” advice 
for nonprofits who want to strengthen their boards, but it is usually based on what works 
for a select group of organizations or sub-sector. 
Are nonprofit leaders acting out of ignorance or negligence? I offer that ignorance 
is more likely the root of the lack of fiduciary awareness amongst nonprofit leaders, 
based on my experience in the nonprofit sector. However, there is also an aspect of 
complacency that occurs in boardrooms across the country. Boards are relied upon for 
oversight of the organization, not involvement in the day-to-day. However, because many 
nonprofits are small, their board members take an active role in the daily operations of 
the organization. Larger organizations rely on their boards for more strategy, but as 
organizations grow so does their staff. As organizations recruit professional staff, the 
board becomes overly reliant on the executive and board members become complacent. 
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Boards become complacent when they are not engaged (Chait, et al., 2005). 
Engagement is a key component to the fiduciary duty of care, but based on the results of 
this study, many nonprofit leaders are not aware that showing up to meetings and 
reviewing organizational documents prior to the meeting are legal responsibilities. Chait, 
et al. (2005) identifies this tension by differentiating between a board problem and a 
problem with the board. Board problems are things that are relatively easy to pinpoint 
such as lack of attendance at board meetings. Problems with the board are more subtle 
that typically include lack of purpose. In looking through a legal accountability lens, 
lacking the appropriate knowledge of fiduciary duties is both a board problem for the 
individual board members and a problem with the board given that the individual board 
members collectively make up the governance body and are the ones making decisions 
on behalf of the organization.  
Tensions of Nonprofit Governance 
Looking at the historical roots of how the U.S. nonprofit sector developed, several 
tensions exist today that create challenges in governing nonprofit organizations. Over 
time, the responsibilities for board members and executives have expanded that go above 
and beyond the basic fiduciary duties. Nonprofit leaders of the 21
st
 Century are expected 
to develop strategy, be community advocates, and raise awareness of their organization’s 
mission while overseeing the organization as a whole. Additional roles create additional 
distractions, specifically in the expectation to be accountable to a variety of stakeholders, 
not just regulators. With more responsibilities and more stakeholders to appease, the legal 
responsibilities are often eclipsed.  
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Another factor is the lack of a standardized process to ensure that nonprofit 
leaders understand their basic responsibilities. Without a standardized assessment, 
nonprofit leaders can be ignorant about their roles and responsibilities, specifically their 
fiduciary duties, and serve without consequence. Another factor is the voluntary nature of 
service. Because they are volunteers, nonprofit leaders are given a great deal of leeway 
for negligence. Combined, these issues have caused challenges in holding nonprofits 
accountable for governance and oversight. 
The Voluntary Nature of Nonprofits 
How nonprofits have evolved over time has impacted the evolution of nonprofit 
governance. Some have suggested that as the essential services became more privatized, 
Americans began to rely more heavily on nonprofits, creating “problematic gaps” that 
have become “more glaringly evident” in terms of accountability (Dobkin-Hall, 2003, p. 
26). I offer that these gaps are a result of the convergence of the voluntary nature of 
nonprofits and the regulations concerning the use of public money for a public purpose. 
The U.S. Tax Code requires that all corporate entities tax exempt or not, have a 
governance structure in place to make decisions on behalf of the corporation (Legal 
Information Institute, 2017). For private corporations this is often the shareholders, board 
of directors, or owner(s) who typically have a financial stake in the corporation and are 
given voting power and control of the firm. However, because nonprofit organizations 
resources cannot personally benefit individuals, nonprofits must be governed by 
disinterested parties who typically are volunteers. These individuals are tasked with the 
responsibility to ensure that nonprofit organization resources are available for and 
allocated to fulfill its charitable mission (IRS, 2017a & 2017b).  
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Referred to as boards of directors or trustees, these volunteers have either a 
connection to, or an alignment with, an organization’s mission. As volunteers, board 
members bring with them a variety of skills and backgrounds to the organizations they 
serve. Collectively, these boards are held legally responsible, along with the chief 
executive who is typically paid staff, to ensure that organizational resources are used in a 
manner that fulfills a charitable purpose and to make decisions on behalf of, and to act in 
the best interest of, the organization. Furthermore, given the amount of responsibility that 
board members and executives have, one might assume that nonprofit leaders are 
adequately prepared to fulfill their roles and responsibilities. However, no standardized 
system exists to ensure that board members have the understanding of what they are 
legally responsible for or what their duties entail. And, although nonprofit board 
members are responsible for the financial and moral oversight, many boards lack 
awareness of what those responsibilities actually are (Wright & Millesen 2008).  
Given that board members are volunteers, they go about their roles in a different 
manner than paid employees (Miller & Jablin 1991). Employees typically have some 
training and prior knowledge about their duties when they are hired. In fact, the prior 
knowledge and level of expertise may be the deciding factor for their employment. Yet, 
for board volunteers, there is no expectation of any prior experience (in this case, serving 
on a board), adequate knowledge, or the requirement of a specific skill set (unless sought 
after for financial, legal, or other expertise). Although the voluntary nature of nonprofits 
encourages participation for all, without any criteria for service, the old saying goes, “you 
get what you pay for”. This leniency is reflected in a letter to the editor of the Chronicle 
of Philanthropy that raises red flags about the lack of standards for board service when 
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they stated that, “the tendency is to ‘make allowances’ where non-profits are concerned, 
to give them ‘the benefit of the doubt’”, which “always breeds trouble” (Gibelman & 
Gelman, 2001, p. 62). 
A national survey of nonprofit leaders reported that board chairs gave themselves an 
A- in understanding the organization’s mission and a B in understanding their roles and 
responsibilities (BoardSource, 2017, p. 28 and 47). This dissertation is similar in that 
both board members and executives indicated that they were very familiar with the 
fiduciary duties, understood their organization’s mission, and had enough knowledge to 
carry out their duties. Yet, the results of this dissertation highlight a gap between what 
nonprofit leaders believe they know about their fiduciary duties and what they actually 
know. 
Legal Framework of Nonprofit Governance 
As creations of United States federal and state legislation, nonprofits are corporate 
entities and must abide by federal and state laws and statutes. Nonprofits are 
differentiated from other types of corporate entities by how they are taxed and how 
profits are distributed. Nonprofits are tax exempt entities, which allow for public support, 
such as tax free revenues, government contracts, and charitable donations in exchange for 
providing a charitable, scientific, religious, or educational purpose that benefits the 
public. Because tax exempt entities are private corporate entities designed to generate a 
public benefit, they are prohibited from distributing profits (or any other organizational 
resource) to a select group of individuals, whereas for profit corporations are designed to 
generate wealth for individuals. However, all corporations, regardless of their corporate 
form, must have a governance body in place that ensures compliance with federal and 
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state requirements and that acts as the decision-making body for the corporation. The 
governing body is referred to as a board of directors and for nonprofits, the governance 
body is responsible to ensure that resources are directed to fulfill a public, charitable 
purpose, not benefit a few individuals. 
The Fiduciary Duties of Care, Loyalty, and Obedience 
The duties of loyalty, care, and obedience are the legal fiduciary responsibilities 
of nonprofit leaders that board of directors and executives must adhere to. These 
responsibilities are tied to resources (physical, financial, human, and intellectual) and 
outline expectations of how nonprofit leaders will direct and use its resources to fulfill a 
tax exempt mission. The duties of loyalty, care, and obedience work together, however 
individually, they comprise specific aspects of nonprofit leader fiduciary responsibilities.  
The duty of care relates to how much a nonprofit leader engages in the 
organization they are responsible for governing (Hopkins, 2009). Specific activities that 
fall under this duty include: attending board and other relevant governance meetings, 
reviewing information in advance of meetings, considering all information before voting 
(including executive staff performance, finances, and internal policies), and exercising 
independent judgment. The duty of loyalty requires nonprofit leaders to put the interests 
of the organization above their own personal interests (Hopkins, 2009). Specific activities 
that fall under this duty include: disclosing conflict of interest, maintaining 
confidentiality of organizational information, and ensuring that organizational resources 
are not used for personal gain. The duty of obedience focuses on compliance (Hopkins, 
2009). Nonprofit leaders that are fulfilling their fiduciary duty of obedience adhere to all 
laws, at all levels (e.g. federal, state, county, city). Specific activities that fall under this 
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duty include: abiding by organizational bylaws, submitting required documentation as 
needed such as an annual tax return and, ensuring that all decisions fall within 
organizational policies and fulfill the tax exempt mission. 
Accountability 
Nonprofits are held accountable by a variety of stakeholders: clients, donors, staff, 
and regulators all are invested in the work of nonprofits. Given the many faces of 
accountability, this study focuses on one aspect, legal accountability, which is bounded 
by what nonprofit leaders are legally accountable for. As such, the fiduciary duties of 
care, loyalty, and obedience serve as the foundation for this research.  
Ebrahim (2010) provides a useful accountability framework that is used in this 
study. He offers that organizations can better meet accountability demands when they 
decide what they are accountable for, how they are accountable, and to whom they are 
accountable. Because legal accountability is the focus of this study, each facet of 
accountability is addressed. Nonprofit leaders are legally accountable to know what their 
fiduciary duties are. How they meet legal accountability is through accessing the 
appropriate sources of knowledge to learn about their fiduciary duties. And, finally, to 
whom nonprofit leaders are accountable to are regulators by meeting legal accountability 
in the performance of their fiduciary responsibilities.  
Accountability For What? - Knowledge 
In order to satisfy legal accountability, nonprofit leaders must know what their 
fiduciary responsibilities are, which in turn, serves as a foundation for their governance 
activities. In today’s nonprofit, leaders are asked to do more than just oversee. It seems 
that in the past few decades, board governance has expanded from basic fiduciary duties 
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to expectations that a super hero would have difficulty meeting. Boards are asked to plan 
for the future by setting strategy and casting vision for the organization; be informed 
about external shifts, legislation, and local impacts on their mission; build relationships 
with a variety of stakeholders; and to assess effectiveness while promoting accountability 
(Carver, 1997; Chait, Ryan, and Taylor, 2005; Holland & Ritvo, 2008; Kearns, 1996; 
Renz, 2010). At first glance, these responsibilities would seem feasible given that most 
boards are often made up of accomplished professionals in their fields. Yet, there is 
evidence that, regardless of their professional acumen, many board members have little to 
no experience in the governance aspects of running a nonprofit (Preston & Brown, 2004).  
The lack of understanding and experience is a wide spread issue. Two well-
regarded national studies on board governance, Leading with Intent (BoardSource, 2017) 
and the Stanford Survey on Leadership and Management in the Nonprofit Sector 
(Stanford, 2017) provide evidence about the absence of governance knowledge among 
nonprofit leaders. Leading with Intent reports that board members and executives give 
themselves a ‘B’ when asked to assess their own understanding of board roles and 
responsibilities. When asked about the top challenges facing the nonprofit sector as a 
whole today, nonprofit board members and executives ranked “weak or ineffective board 
governance” in the top three (Stanford, 2017, p. 13).  
Accountable How? – Appropriate Sources of Knowledge 
In order to satisfy legal accountability, nonprofit leaders must access the 
appropriate sources of fiduciary knowledge in order to carry out their governance duties. 
Institutionalism (Scott, 2008) suggests that organizations primarily respond to their 
external environments in order to gain and maintain legitimacy. Processes of coercive, 
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mimetic, and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) explain how 
organizations adopt new practices. Nonprofits may be directly pressured by donors 
(coercive) to change course, they may seek out new answers under conditions of 
uncertainty (mimetic), or they may change as a result of the professionalization of their 
staff (normative).  
Best practices are often a means for nonprofit leaders to satisfy legal 
accountability. Best practices are widely accepted standards developed by nonprofit 
practitioners, scholars, and academics to support various aspects of leading and managing 
nonprofit organizations. For many organizations, best practices fill the void of a missing 
standardized assessment process and become a substitute in efforts to meet demands for 
legal accountability.  
Accountable To Whom? – Performance of Fiduciary Duties 
In order to satisfy legal accountability, nonprofit leaders must apply their 
fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their governance duties. Following the rules is 
the first step in meeting demands and expectations of the various stakeholders that 
nonprofits interact with. Since nonprofit leaders are held legally responsible for their 
decisions, knowing what the fiduciary responsibilities are is critical for any nonprofit 
leader. But reality is far from this ideal, as “boards make decisions based on incomplete 
information, rushed circumstances, gut feelings and experiences rather than the 
formalized method of decision making that the legal model suggests” (Fishman, Schwartz 
& Mayer, 2015, p. 114). Board complacency “appears to be the norm, and action the 
exception” (Holland, 2002, p. 422). These problems suggest a need to “move the 
measurement of board member performance from one that has typically focused on 
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quantity to one that focuses on the quality of individual contributions to the board” 
(Doherty & Hoye, 2011 p. 110).  
Contributions of the Study 
If nonprofit leaders have limited or inaccurate knowledge of their basic fiduciary 
responsibilities, how are they expected to govern, let alone fulfill many of the other 
expectations placed on them for the sustainability of their organizations? Given that the 
literature is scarce concerning what nonprofit leaders actually know about their basic 
fiduciary responsibilities further exploration of this important aspect of management and 
governance is needed. More specifically, research about nonprofit leader knowledge of 
their fiduciary duties.  
As such, this study contributes to both the scholarly and practitioner fields. In 
terms of scholarly contributions, the study is the first of its kind. It pilots an assessment 
tool designed to establish baseline data about the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and 
obedience that tax exempt boards of directors and executives must fulfill in order to 
satisfy legal accountability. Furthermore, the study is focused on individual nonprofit 
leaders: what they know, sources of their knowledge, and the application of knowledge in 
the performance of their fiduciary duties. 
In terms of practitioner contributions, the results of this study identify gaps in 
nonprofit leader knowledge of their fiduciary duties that can be used to educate nonprofit 
leaders, funders, and regulators. The education would focus on how best to address 
specific areas of governance through trainings and other means in order to strengthen 
nonprofit governance. Furthermore, the assessment tool developed for this study fills a 
gap that exists in currently available assessment tools, because it focuses on the legal 
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aspects of nonprofit oversight, specifically the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and 
obedience.  
Design and Methodology 
Based on the purpose of this study, quantitative methods were utilized. Inductive 
descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and hypothesis testing were performed using 
the individual (board member and executive) as the unit of analysis. From this point on, 
nonprofit leader is the term that will be used to describe board members and executives. 
An online survey, developed for this study, was the primary means of data collection.  
Legal accountability in governance is the overarching focus of this study that 
utilizes the three facets of accountability: 1) for what nonprofit leaders are legally 
accountable, 2) how nonprofit leaders meet legal accountability, and 3) to whom 
nonprofit leaders are legally accountable. The purpose for using this framework is to 
operationalize how accountability is expressed as legal accountability via the fiduciary 
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. Nonprofit leader knowledge of fiduciary duties, the 
source of their fiduciary knowledge, and the application of their fiduciary knowledge in 
the performance of their governance duties are the constructs based on specific aspects of 
the fiduciary duties. Although each duty represents a specific aspect of oversight, they are 




Organization of the Study 
The aim of this study is to provide empirical research that is useful to practitioners 
and academics and that is applied and theoretical. Ultimately, as a practitioner, I am 
particularly interested in exploring the gaps in governance that I experience regularly in 
the sector. As an academic, I am interested in developing an assessment tool that can be 
tested further to provide insight into the gaps nonprofit leaders have related to their 
fiduciary responsibilities.  
The premise of this study is that nonprofit leaders who understand their basic 
legal fiduciary duties can perform their fiduciary duties and consequently satisfy legal 
accountability demands. This dissertation is organized around three separate studies, 
preceded by an extensive background and methodology chapter (chapter two) that applies 
to each of the three articles, to avoid redundancies across the articles. The chapters are 
designed to be stand-alone scholarly pieces to submit to academic journals and 
practitioner publications.  
Chapter two provides context in order to lay the groundwork for the purpose of 
this study. Accountability is explored in greater detail along with how the study addresses 
the three facets of accountability: for what, how, and to whom. In addition, details about 
the methodology, limitations, and definitions are included.  
Chapter three focuses on nonprofit leader self reported and actual knowledge as a 
means to satisfy legal accountability for what. The focus is on the first strand of research, 
nonprofit leader (board members and executives) knowledge of fiduciary responsibilities 
as a means to meet legal accountability. The chapter also discusses the nature of the 
nonprofit sector that includes its characteristics, the legal roots of nonprofit governance, 
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and the evolving nature of board expectations. The findings presented in chapter three 
suggest that nonprofit leaders believe they have enough knowledge to govern, but in 
reality, may not have correct knowledge of what their fiduciary duties entail. When tested 
for their actual knowledge of legal responsibilities, only 41% of the board members and 
70% of the executives received a passing score.  
Chapter four focuses on sources nonprofit leader access to learn about their 
fiduciary responsibilities as a means to satisfy the legal accountability how. The chapter 
explores the importance of isomorphic pressures as an explanation as to why nonprofit 
leaders learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. The idea of best practices is presented 
along with the study results which point to nonprofit leaders’ use of informal means, such 
as relying on their professional and personal networks and other board members to learn 
about their responsibilities, more so than formalized best practices such as board manuals 
and orientations.  
Chapter five focuses on the frequency with which nonprofit leaders apply their 
fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their governance duties as a means to satisfy 
legal accountability for whom. The chapter focuses on competencies, the ability to 
perform an activity based on knowledge. Chapter five focuses on performance of 
fiduciary duties to satisfy legal accountability with some discussion about ownership and 
role ambiguity. The results of this chapter indicate that although nonprofit leaders 
respond that they are engaged in their governance duties, their performance is based on 
lack of knowledge of what their actual fiduciary responsibilities are. 
Chapter six summarizes the results of each chapter by drawing out the critical 
issues and gaps in nonprofit governance that this study reveals. With a discussion about 
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how to bridge the divide between research and practice, chapter six highlights the need 
for the two to work in tandem. The chapter also acknowledges the governance challenges 
and opportunities that many nonprofit leaders face. By offering specific ideas and 
pathways for how this research can be applied and studied further in both academic and 





CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND, RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
The United States is fortunate to have a vibrant nonprofit sector, from coast to 
coast, meeting a variety of societal needs. From small grassroots community gardens to 
world-famous art institutions, nonprofit organizations intersect with every walk of life at 
every stage of life. Nonprofits are also a financial force for the country. As of 2015, it is 
estimated that nonprofits contributed $1.74 trillion in revenues to the U.S. economy 
accounting for 5.4 percent of the domestic product (National Center for Charitable 
Statistics, 2018). Given that the U.S. nonprofit sector plays an important role in the 
economy, nonprofits are faced with increased demands for accountability as they are 
relied upon to provide goods and services that benefit society.  
For nonprofit organizations, accountability demands come from various 
stakeholders including funders who want assurances that donations go directly to the 
mission, clients who want safe, reliable services, and governments who expect nonprofits 
to use organizational resources to fulfill a charitable purpose. Given the many facets of 
accountability, this study defines accountability in terms of the legal standards that 
nonprofit boards and executives are responsible to fulfill in their oversight and 
management role as nonprofit leaders. As such, this study is focused on the fiduciary 
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience set forth by state and federal legislation and 
expectations. 
Nonprofit organizations are governed by a board of directors, whose primary 
function is to make decisions about resources (financial, physical, human, and 
intellectual) so that the organization can fulfill its mission. Boards are either beloved or 
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belittled. They are the first ones to receive praise for a job well done and the first ones to 
blame when something goes awry.  
What makes nonprofit board service unique is its voluntary nature. An individual 
agrees to serve in a position that entails a great deal of legal responsibility regardless of 
their qualifications. Some board members bring a great deal of knowledge about their 
role, while others may not fully understand what a board member does. The lack of skill 
combined with a lack of standardized process to ensure that board members are properly 
trained is a recipe for disaster. In a study that explored the socialization of nonprofit 
board members, Castor and Jiter (2013) found that while some board members received 
trainings related to their board service others were completely unaware and woefully 
prepared for board service.  
Boards of directors work in partnership with the chief executive, who makes 
decisions about the day-to-day management of the organization. The executive is bound 
by many of the same legal requirements as boards are, because they are in a position of 
influence and have access to resources. Because of the management function that 
nonprofit executives have, accredited degree and certification programs have been 
developed over the past few decades to provide nonprofit executives with more 
formalized training in management and leadership. These professionalized skills can 
support greater demands for services, navigate increased competition for funding, and 
fulfill the public’s trust (Young, 1999). Although these programs are an important step, 
they still do not provide a standardized system with which to hold nonprofit leaders 




Nonprofits in the News 
When news of a nonprofit scandal breaks, accountability is typically called into 
question. Examples of well-known nonprofit organizations exposed because of financial 
misappropriations and oversight failures such as the United Way, Wounded Warriors 
Project, and Central Asia Institute suggest that nonprofit leaders, board members, and 
executive staff may be asleep at the wheel. Each case highlights how the lack of oversight 
and accountability, specifically by those who were entrusted with organization resources, 
resulted in negative immediate and long-term impacts.  
The United Way 
The United Way provides a lesson in nonprofit accountability and inadequate 
board oversight when details of excessive executive compensation and benefits went 
public (Kearns, 1996). Prompted by an article in the Washington Post in 1992, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Internal Revenue Service began an investigation 
of the United Way of America’s national office (Shapiro, 2011). The article reported that 
William Aramony, the chief executive officer, was receiving $460,000 in benefits and 
compensation, which at the time seemed excessive (Shapiro, 2011). After the 
investigation that culminated in a federal trial, Aramony was convicted on 23 counts of 
felony charges that included fraud, conspiracy, and filing false tax returns. He was 
sentenced to seven years in a federal prison (Shapiro, 2011).  
The investigation revealed that Aramony, the United Way’s chief executive 
officer of nearly 20 years, was spending lavishly on entertainment, travel, and women 
throughout his tenure. But, where was the board? According to Shapiro (2011) the board 
gave Aramony a unanimous vote of confidence a few weeks before Aramony left the 
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United Way amidst the allegations. However, during Aramony’s trial no witnesses from 
the United Way were called either by the defense or the prosecution (Shapiro, 2011). The 
board’s absence at the trial may have been an indication of their absence in the 
boardroom or their desire to not be associated with the scandal. 
Wounded Warriors Project 
Another example of a lack of governance and oversight can be found in the case 
of the Wounded Warriors Project (WWP). What started off as a small program providing 
essential hygiene and personal items to recently returned wounded United States military 
veterans, blossomed into an organization with more than $20 million in revenues in less 
than a decade’s time (Phillips, 2016). Outwardly, WWP was considered the premiere 
veteran’s organizations in the United States garnering the support of celebrities, 
politicians, and well known personalities. However, an internal perspective tells a 
different story with reports of employees being fired or leaving under suspicious 
circumstances, a toxic organizational culture, and an overbearing chief executive with a 
“business-like” mindset that focused solely on raising money (Phillips, 2016).  
In 2016, CBS News reported that WWP’s spending on programs and services was 
much less than similar veterans organizations (Reid & Janisch, 2016). The report alleged 
that rather than spending on its mission, WWP was spending on first class travel and 
extravagant conference experiences for its employees (Reid & Janisch, 2016). Coupled 
with reports of excessive executive compensation, a congressional investigation 
commissioned by U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley, Chair of the Senate Finance and 
Judiciary Committee, was tasked with looking into WWP’s spending (Hegeseth, 2016). 
The report found inaccurate reporting, misuse of donor funds, and a lack of appropriate 
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management policies and procedures. Although the committee found executive 
compensation to be reasonable, it did highlight the excessive use of donor funds on 
employee travel (Grassley, 2017).  
Central Asia Institute 
Finally, the case of Central Asia Institute (CAI) tells a similar story of an 
executive left to his own and a lack of board oversight. CAI grew out of founder Greg 
Mortensen’s desire to help children receive education in remote areas of Pakistan. What 
began in 1996 as a personal mission to build a few schools, transformed into an 
internationally acclaimed organization generating more than $72 million in donations and 
revenues by 2011 (Gose, 2012). As the founder, executive director, and a board member 
of CAI, Mortensen won international fame as the author of Three Cups of Tea and Stones 
Into Schools, both New York Times bestsellers, and was a recipient of $100,000 Nobel 
Prize winnings from U.S. President Barack Obama (Bullock, 2012; Sieff, 2014). While 
CAI was basking in the glory of public fame and success, under the surface the 
organization was falling apart. Mortensen’s lack of skills to be an effective executive was 
compounded by a handful of board members who provided little to no oversight. 
A 60 Minutes news segment (Volz, 2012) opened a Pandora’s Box when it 
reported that Mortensen misrepresented facts in his books, prompting an investigation 
into CAI by the State of Montana Attorney General’s office (where CAI was 
headquartered). The investigation was intended to “determine whether Mortenson and the 
leadership of his organization had violated the law governing nonprofit corporations” and 
“centered on whether CAI’s officers and directors satisfied their legal duties” (Bullock, 
2012, p. 2). What the report revealed was that “the board of directors failed to fulfill 
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some of its important responsibilities in governing the nonprofit charity and that 
“Mortenson failed to fulfill his responsibilities as executive director and as a member of 
the board” (Bullock, 2012, p. 2). These responsibilities centered around excessive 
compensation for book sales, travel and personal expenses, and a lack of oversight 
around internal policies and procedures including conflict of interest, contracts, and 
reimbursements. Ultimately, Mortensen was ordered to pay CAI $1 million dollars and 
was barred from any future financial oversight, either as a board member or executive, 
and requirements for CAI to institute internal controls and management policies and 
procedures to prevent future mismanagement were established. 
The Need for Accountability 
What the United Way, Wounded Warrior Project, and Central Asia Institute cases 
have in common is a lack of oversight at both the board and executive levels. Nonprofit 
leaders are legally required to ensure that all resources (human, financial, physical, and 
intellectual) are used to fulfill the mission. However, as seen in these cases, the board was 
negligent in their oversight of the executive, the executives failed in their management 
responsibility, and little evidence of suitable internal policies and procedures to ensure 
that resources were used appropriately. What these cases provide is a spotlight not only 
on mismanagement, but point to a larger issue: Did these boards know, and understand, 
what they were legally responsible for and if so, would they have acted differently? 
These cases highlight the need for greater accountability and a standardized 
process to ensure that board members and executives are held accountable to understand 
their legal responsibilities. The following explains the legal environment that nonprofits 
must operate within including the requirements for which nonprofit leaders are held 
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accountable, specifically the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. Following 
the discussion related to legal responsibilities, the framework for the study is presented 
which focuses on the three facets of accountability – Accountability for What; 
Accountability How; and Accountability to Whom. Following the discussion on 
accountability, the rationale for the research design of the study is discussed and 
concludes with the methods used. 
Nonprofit Structure and Legal Requirements for Governance 
Nonprofit organizations are governed by volunteers who serve as board members, 
along with senior executive staff, who are typically paid employees. For the purposes of 
this study, the term governance will be used as Cornforth (2012) describes it as the 
“systems and processes concerned with ensuring the overall direction, control, and 
accountability of the organization” (p. 1121). It is the governance of nonprofit 
organizations that nonprofit leaders (board members and executives) are legally 
responsible for carrying out as regulated by state and federal authorities. The following 
provides background about the nonprofit structure that is based on state and federal 
legislation, tax codes, and requirements for tax exempt organizations. 
Nonprofit Structure 
In all fifty states in the United States, corporations are considered private; 
meaning they are separate from government. The same is true for nonprofit organizations 
as they are private corporate entities distinct from government
1
. Although most 
nonprofits are considered private corporations, what separates a private nonprofit from a 
private for-profit corporation is how the profits are distributed and tax exempt status. The 




 In some cases nonprofits are public corporate entities if they are established by governmental legislation, 
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tax exempt status allows for tax free revenues as well as the ability to receive charitable 
donations. According to Hansmann (1980) the non-distribution constraint prohibits 
resources from benefitting an individual or select group of individuals. Therefore, the 
non-distribution constraint suggests that rather than generating wealth for a few, 
nonprofits are designed to benefit the public by meeting a broader societal need. 
The term nonprofit is relatively modern in that it gained traction after World War 
II (Dobkin Hall, 2006). Referenced by lawyers, economists, and legislators it is used 
mainly for tax law purposes in order to classify corporate entities that are not taxed. 
Although the term nonprofit organization is a widely accepted label for charitable 
organizations according to Overton and Frey (2002), the term nonprofit corporation is an 
“artificial creation of a government” (p. xviii) that in reality is used to describe what it is 
not rather than what it is. The technical, legal term that the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) uses to identify a private corporate entity that is excluded from paying taxes on its 
revenues is a tax-exempt organization.  
Tax-exempt status is only obtained if the private corporate entity serves a 
charitable, scientific, educational, or religious purpose as outlined by the IRS, thereby 
aligning with the non-distribution constraint (Fishman, Schwarz, & Mayer, 2015). As 
such, tax exemption allows public support (i.e. charitable donations and tax free revenue) 
to support a public need. The term charitable refers to any activity that “uplifts mankind” 
or that “aims to improve the world” (p. 3), while the term charity refers to the entity 
carrying out the charitable work (Freemont-Smith, 2004). Although nonprofit 
organizations are technically charitable organizations, the term nonprofit has become the 
widely accepted term used to refer to a charitable organization. Other terms used when 
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discussing nonprofit organizations include charity, tax exempt organization, and exempt 
organization. To summarize, nonprofit organizations are private entities that are exempt 
from paying taxes on revenues in order to provide a charitable service to society. For this 
study, the terms nonprofit organization, nonprofit, and tax-exempt organization are used 
interchangeably. 
Legal Standards and Regulations 
Over the years, several federal and state legislative acts have been adopted to 
outline governing expectations for nonprofit organizations. The Model Nonprofit 
Corporation Act (MNCA) is a comprehensive set of statutes developed by the American 
Bar Association in 1964 that outlines the general responsibilities of nonprofit boards of 
directors and trustees (Fishman, Schwarz & Mayer, 2015). Based on the Model 
Corporation Act of 1952, the MNCA provides guidance for a wide variety of nonprofit 
governance functions including filing documents, nominating board members, financial 
provisions, voting procedures, indemnification, and dissolution. It has become a widely 
adopted standard that many states use in their own statutes and laws. Yet even with this 
guidance, many high profile examples of both private and nonprofit mismanagement 
have resulted in the breakdown of public trust and more demands for transparency, 
accountability, and performance. In response, federal and state legislators have enacted 
additional legislation to strengthen the accountability and transparency demands.  
In reaction to the for-profit scandals of the 1990’s such as Enron, Tyco, and 
WorldCom, the U.S. government adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 that 
established new requirements for financial transparency and accountability (Renz, 2010, 
p. 60). Seeing this as the “writing on the wall”, the nonprofit community came together to 
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develop their own set of standards. The first to formalize a set of standards was 
California. Signed into legislation in 2004 the California Nonprofit Integrity Act was 
legislation designed to ensure financial transparency and accountability amongst 
nonprofits (Fishman, Schwarz & Mayer, 2015).  
At the federal level, the U.S. Congress responded to the mismanagement of 
Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in 2007 by its federally chartered charitable agency, the 
American Red Cross (Hopkins, 2009). After a thorough review of the agency, Congress 
made several recommendations in order to strengthen governance that focused on board 
operations, roles, and responsibilities that many nonprofits use today as best practices 
(Hopkins, 2009). More recently, New York enacted the Nonprofit Revitalization act in 
2013 to “reduce unnecessary and expensive regulatory burdens on nonprofits and to 
strengthen nonprofit governance and accountability” (Kelch, 2014, p. 1). What these 
regulations have in common is the expectation that nonprofit governing boards and 
management be held accountable to fulfill their fiduciary duties or legal responsibilities. 
Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty, Care, and Obedience 
The legal requirements that nonprofit leaders (board members and executives) are 
held accountable for are referred to as their fiduciary duties. Fiduciary is based on the 
Latin term fiducia, which means trust and describes persons who are “obliged to act 
unselfishly and to give other persons or institutions the advantage of their knowledge and 
skill” (Fishman, Schwartz & Mayer, 2015, p. 120). It is interesting to note that the 
majority of nonprofit practitioners do not use the formal term fiduciary, but rather refer to 
their oversight role as governance.   
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The basis for all nonprofit legal responsibilities lies in the fiduciary duties of care, 
loyalty, and obedience. Combined, these duties focus on the use of resources and outline 
what nonprofit leaders are responsible for in their oversight role as presented in Table 
2.1. The duties of care, loyalty, and obedience work together, however, individually they 
define specific aspects of governance. For example, the duty of care requires that 
nonprofit leaders be engaged in their role and act in good faith when making decisions. 
The duty of loyalty focuses on conflict of interest and requires nonprofit leaders to act in 
a manner that puts the organization’s interests above their own. Finally, the duty of 
obedience focuses on compliance and requires nonprofit leaders to fulfill all state and 
federal laws that govern the organization.  
Table 2.1  
Nonprofit Leader Fiduciary Duty Responsibilities 
Duty of Care: Engagement, 
Attention, Informed Process of 
Decision-Making 
Duty of Loyalty: Procedural 
Aspects of Transactions and 
Self Interest 
Duty of obedience: Legal 
Compliance 
 Attends board meetings 
 Reviews information in 
advance in preparation for 
board meetings and to 
inform voting 
 Exercises independent 
judgment 
 Regularly reviews 
finances, policies, and 
executive performance 
 Discloses conflict of 
interests and potential 
self-benefit 
 Avoids organization 
resources for personal use 
 Maintains confidentiality 
 Ensures compliance with 
state and federal 
requirements 




 Makes decisions that 
align with tax exempt 
mission 
Source. Hopkins, 2008 
 
Nonprofit Leaders: Board Members and Executives 
Using a legal perspective, nonprofit leaders are the individuals who are held 
legally responsible for how organizational resources are used. These leaders include 
board members and executives who make decisions about how best to use organizational 
resources in order to fulfill a tax exempt mission. Together, they work to accomplish 
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goals and fulfill the mission of the organization in complementary ways; board members 
meet broader governance needs by ensuring that the organization has the appropriate 
resources in place that executives then use in the management of the day-to-day 
operations. 
Board members. Board members are volunteers, although there are some 
organizations that compensate board members, and come from all walks of life. Some 
board members are recruited because they have a specialized skill such as finance, legal, 
or marketing while others are recruited because of their connections in the community, 
which could bring in additional donors. An ideal board member is one who believes in 
the mission of the organization and is willing to give of their time, talent, and treasure.  
Boards are made up of individuals who fill executive positions of president, vice 
president, treasurer, secretary, and as general board members. As of a national survey of 
more than 4,000 nonprofit organizations across the United States in 2017, the average 
board size was 15 members (BoardSource, 2017). In California, private corporations 
must have at least one board member. However, tax-exempt organizations must fill the 
president, secretary, and treasurer offices thus requiring nonprofits to have a minimum of 
three board members.  
Boards meet to provide oversight, make decisions about resources, and approve 
organizational policies and procedures. Renz (2010) sums up the scholarly and 
practitioner literature related to what board members are responsible for with regards to 
governance and oversight functions as presented in Table 2.2. However, it is important to 
note that not all of the recommended functions are tied to the fiduciary duties of care, 
loyalty, and obedience. For example, although it may be helpful for boards to assess 
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board effectiveness, engage with constituents, and lead the organization, technically they 
are not legally responsible for these activities. However, the literature does tell us that if a 
board engages in all of these functions by default they will be fulfilling their roles and 
responsibilities. The duties that are not legal ones have been identified by the researcher 
and are italicized and presented in Table 2.2.  
Table 2.2 
Prescribed Board Responsibilities Related to Fiduciary Duties 
Prescribed Board Responsibility  Addressed in Fiduciary Duties 
To lead the organization No 
Establish policy Yes 
Secure essential resources Yes 
Ensure effective resource use Yes 
Lead and manage the chief executive Yes 
Engage with constituents No 
Ensure and enable accountability Yes 
Assess board effectiveness No 
Note.  Prescribed board responsibilities reprinted from Nonprofit Leadership and 
Management, Renz (2010) p.  131-134. 
 
Embedded within the fiduciary duties is the expectation that boards abide by 
corporate documents including the articles of incorporation, bylaws, and any formally 
adopted internal policies and procedures. The articles of incorporation detail how the 
organization was formed and its purpose. Bylaws are guidelines, as set forth by the 
organization itself, as to how it will conduct the business of the organization and are not 
legally binding until the board adopts and/or amends them. Policies and procedures, once 
formally adopted by the board, detail how decisions about resources are to be made. As 
with policies and procedures, once formally adopted by the board bylaws become a legal 
document that nonprofit leaders must abide by. There have been cases where boards have 
been penalized for not abiding by federal and state laws, bylaws, policies, and procedures 
such as failure to pay taxes, violation of employment laws, conflict of interest, personal 
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benefit, and lack of oversight in general (Fishman, Schwartz & Mayer, 2015; Herman, 
2006; Kearns, 1996). 
According to Renz (2010), individual board member conduct affects the board as 
a whole, because board members are held liable for their individual actions and 
corporately the board is held liable for its actions as an entity. For example, if an 
individual board member has knowledge of a potential conflict of interest regarding a 
contract for services, the board member must inform the board of the conflict in order to 
fulfill their duty of loyalty. If they do not divulge the conflict and the contract is 
approved, they would be held liable for breaching their duty of loyalty. Duty of loyalty 
requires that individuals put the best interests of the organization above their own. 
Conversely, if the board moves forward with the said contract and an individual board 
member financially benefits, thus the conflict of interest, the board would be held liable 
for a breach in their duty of care. The duty of care requires informed decision making and 
if the board asked about finer details of the contract they most likely would have 
discovered the conflict of interest. 
Executives. The most senior executive is usually referred to as the executive 
director (ED) or chief operating officer (CEO). As the most senior executive, they are 
responsible for managing and implementing the day-to-day operations. Typically, 
executives are hired by the board to implement board approved policies and procedures, 
to provide staff and operational oversight, and to serve as the liaison between the board 
and the organization. The executive is relied upon by the board to ensure that the 
organization is using its resources to fulfill its mission. Although board members and the 
executive fulfill distinct roles, many of their functions and duties overlap. For example, 
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board members review organizational reports such as financial statements, program-
related activities, donor relations, and public awareness efforts that are prepared by in 
advance by the executive. Given this overlap, they are both legally held accountable for 
their actions because they are both involved in acquiring, managing, and allocating 
organizational resources.  
Although executives are held to the same legal standards as board members, many 
executives are hired because of their professional experience in management, operations 
and fundraising, not because of their knowledge of fiduciary duties. During my nearly 20 
years as a nonprofit practitioner and consultant, I have yet to attend an interview (either 
as the candidate or as the employer or search consultant) where the legal duties are even 
discussed. Furthermore, many boards do not fulfill their fiduciary duty of care by 
regularly evaluating the performance of the executive. BoardSource (2017) reported that 
the executives themselves graded the evaluation process with a B- (p. 28).  
The traditional hiring process is that candidates are expected to have some prior 
knowledge and experience as a condition for being hired (Miller & Jablin, 1991) and the 
need for experience increases as the level of specialization increases. For example, a 
cashier job has vastly different requirements than a civil or electrical engineer. Yet, for 
many nonprofits, leadership and oversight responsibilities are bestowed upon executives 
without any confirmation that the appropriate knowledge is in place. What is in the best 
interest of the organization (i.e. duty of loyalty) is that the board hires an executive who 
has both professional skills and an explicit understanding of the legal responsibilities 





What is Accountability? 
Accountability has become a frequent topic in all aspects of society. From 
political scandals, to corporate malfeasance, to national and international tragedies, 
people want to know who to hold accountable. Given its prevalence in the world around 
us, the scholarly literature is still searching for a clear definition of accountability since it 
means different things to different people. In terms of nonprofits, some scholars focus on 
the economic, political, or legal aspects of accountability while others point to the need to 
include the public and other stakeholders such as clients and donors (Ebrahim, 2010; 
Holland & Ritvo, 2008; Kearns, 1996; Renz, 2010; Smith, 2014). Koppell (2005) offers 
that where someone is situated, such as the CEO, line staff, or customer, impacts how 
accountability is defined for that particular context. He furthers that accountability should 
be based on the expectations of the relationship itself, such as between the executive and 
the board for example (Koppell, 2005). For the public, accountability focuses on the 
expectations of “organizational performance, responsiveness, and even morality” 
(Kearns, 1996, p. 9). However, Koppell (2005) cautions that “layering every imagined 
meaning of accountability into a single definition would render the concept meaningless” 
(p. 95).  
The variety of perspectives and stakeholders is important to highlight when trying 
to understand accountability for nonprofits. Given that there are nearly two million 
nonprofits in the United States (National Center for Charitable Statistics, 2018) different 
stakeholders rely on the wide variety of programs and services in different ways for 
different reasons. For example, someone without medical insurance depends on a 
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community nonprofit clinic for critical healthcare while a wealthy art patron relies on a 
nonprofit museum to view their favorite masterpieces. Because of this contextual nature 
of accountability, Slim (2002) offers that, “a key part of the process of tailoring the right 
accountability mechanism to the right stakeholders is recognition of context” (p. 11). 
An element of accountability involves answering to a “higher authority” (Kearns, 
1996, p. 7). This type of accountability can be viewed as compliance, which is a reactive 
response to requirements or obligations (Ebrahim, 2010; Holland & Ritvo, 2008; Kearns, 
1996). If legal enforcement entities such as the IRS and a state’s charity oversight agency 
such as an Attorney General are called in to investigate potential breaches of public trust 
and accountability, they refer to the fiduciary duties as the basis for their investigation. 
Therefore, the duties provide a framework for the investigation that focuses on how board 
members and executives made decisions and if those decisions were made in a manner 
that upholds the fiduciary duties. What this means for nonprofits is that legally, they must 
respond and answer to the regulators who hold them accountable to convey their 
effectiveness in their roles and responsibilities. So, the fiduciary duties become the legal 
standard for what the organization is held accountable. 
Accountability can also be described as proactively responding to the needs of its 
constituents (Ebrahim, 2010) as well as how it performs or fulfills its legal 
responsibilities. The duties of care, loyalty, and obedience based in U.S. case law are the 
“legal standards by which all actions taken by directors are judged” (Hopkins, 2009, p. 
13). Many instances where the fiduciary standards have been applied to cases of 
nonprofit mismanagement and negligence are examples of how nonprofit leaders are 
judged (see chapter three). What this means for nonprofits is that they must be both 
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responsive in meeting the demands of the public and responsible for following the 
expectations (i.e. fiduciary duties). Therefore, in looking at legal accountability through a 
fiduciary, legal lens, nonprofits are required to take responsibility for using of 
organizational resources in a manner that fulfill the mission.  
Because accountability has such a wide range of contexts, meanings, and 
mechanisms, knowledge of the basic legal fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience 
is critical in order to meet legal accountability demands. For the purposes of this study, 
accountability is explored through the legal accountability lens: the federal and state 
expectations for nonprofit leader oversight which is the standard by which all nonprofit 
leaders are evaluated against. As such, nonprofit leaders who understand their basic legal 
fiduciary duties can perform their fiduciary duties and consequently satisfy legal 
accountability demands as illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
 




The study focuses on nonprofit leader knowledge, source of knowledge, and 
application of knowledge related to the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience as 
a means to fulfill legal accountability. In looking at the overall design of the study, a 












applied that categorizes accountability into three areas: Accountability for what; 
Accountability how; and; Accountability to whom as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The 
purpose for using this framework is to operationalize how accountability is expressed as 
legal accountability using the framework of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and 
obedience.  
 
Figure 2.2. Framework for Legal Accountability adapted by Ebrahim (2010) The many 
faces of nonprofit accountability. 
 
In terms of legal accountability, the fiduciary duties provide guidance for 
nonprofit leaders to understand what they are legally responsible for in fulfilling their 
governance roles. These duties also provide a standardized measure to assess nonprofit 
governance performance and effectiveness. If nonprofit leaders understand their legal 
duties, roles, and responsibilities, they will make more informed decisions that fulfill the 
tax-exempt mission, leading to better performance and effectiveness.  
Without much research to build that includes data about individual nonprofit 
leader knowledge of their fiduciary duties, this study fills a gap in the literature about 
what board members and executives know about their legal responsibilities 
(accountability for what), the sources they access to learn about their responsibilities 













of their governance activities (accountability for whom). The following section explains 
how the study is embedded in each area of the accountability framework and how the key 
terms are defined including knowledge, source of knowledge, and application of 
knowledge. The rationale is important to lay out up front as it applies to the following 
three chapters that correspond to each of the accountability categories and research 
constructs as presented in Figure 2.2. 
What is Knowledge? 
The study primarily centers on knowledge that has its roots in epistemology: the 
way in which we know or learn. Epistemology considers many complex and dynamic 
concepts of knowledge that can be defined cognitively, practically, theoretically, socially, 
and even spiritually (Greco & Sosa, 1999). For example, a practical definition of 
knowledge would be useful in order to “know” what something may cost in financial 
terms while a socially oriented definition focuses more on how people interpret their own 
experiences that result in “knowledge” (Zagzebeski, 1996). 
This study is utilizing a framework for knowledge originally intended for 
medicine. Although it is based in medicine, it provides utility for the study because 
medical professionals are relied to uphold their Hippocratic Oath, an allegiance to do no 
harm. Nonprofit leaders are also relied upon to do no harm in that they are entrusted with 
public resources for public good. In an effort to measure how cognitive recognition 
translates into behavior, Miller (1990) developed a model intended for clinical 
assessment of medical professionals as illustrated in Figure 2.3. As a means to better 
understand how well medical professionals take what they have learned and apply it in a 
clinical setting, Miller (1990) offers that knowing something does not necessarily mean 
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that someone is able to carry out that knowledge. He identifies a sequence of how 
cognitive knowledge turns into action, which is of particular importance for nonprofit 
leaders because they make decisions about organizational resources (action) based on 
knowledge.  
 
Figure 2.3.  Miller’s Framework for Clinical Assessment.  Reprinted from The 
assessment of clinical skills/competence/performance, Academic Medicine (1990). 
 
What Miller’s (1990) model provides for the study is a framework that parses out 
the different levels of knowledge. As illustrated in Figure 2.3, the first level is the 
“knows” level. Knowing something means that you can recall and articulate specific 
elements.  For example, if someone knows math, they are able to recall and articulate 
mathematical equations, formulas, and so on. The first level of knowing provides the 
foundation for the next level, “knows how.”  
When someone knows how to do something, they activate knowledge into 
competence. For example, the mathematician conveys that they know math by 
articulating specific elements and they demonstrate competence by doing the calculations 




The “shows how” level expresses that performance is a combination of 
knowledge and competence. For example, the mathematician would show how and 
demonstrate performance by accurately solving said equations and formulas. The shows 
level supports the final level, which is “does.” 
The final level is the “does” level that expresses action. Miller (1990) describes 
action in terms of performing knowledge outside of traditional academic settings, in other 
words, with actual patients. So, in looking at the mathematician example, the doing level 
is expressed when formulas and equations are accurately calculated are used in a way that 
translate into a real-world situation such as engineering.  
Study Framework 
As illustrated in Figure 2.4 each level of knowledge creation can be applied to the 
constructs in the study: Knowledge, Source of Knowledge, and Application of 
Knowledge. The first level, the “knows” level, focuses on the first strand of research, 
knowledge of fiduciary duties and corresponds to the facet of accountability for what. In 
this level, the respondents are asked how familiar they are of each of the fiduciary duties. 
This level includes self reported knowledge and actual knowledge described more in the 
following methodology section. The results of nonprofit leader knowledge of their 
fiduciary duties are presented in chapter three.  
The second level, the “knows how” level, focuses on the second strand of 
research, the types of sources nonprofit leaders access in order to learn about their 
responsibilities and corresponds to second facet of accountability, for how. In this level, 
respondents are asked to select from a series of internal and external best practices to 
better understand how they learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. The results of the 
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sources that nonprofit leaders access when learning about their responsibilities are 
presented in chapter four. 
The last two levels, “shows how” and “action,” overlap in that they focus on 
action and performance. For this study, these two levels are combined by focusing on the 
third strand of research, how nonprofit leaders apply their governance knowledge in the 
performance of their governance duties that corresponds with the third facet of 
accountability, for whom. The results of nonprofit leader application of their fiduciary 
duties are presented in chapter five.  
 
Figure 2.4. Knowledge and Study Design. 
 
Accountability for What? 
What follows is an explanation of how the accountability framework is applied to 
the constructs of knowledge, sources of knowledge, and application of knowledge with 
regards to this study. Starting with the first facet of the accountability framework used in 
this study, the following is a discussion about what nonprofits are accountable for. Given 
4th Level: Does  
Chapter 5: Application of Knowledge 
Accountability for whom?  = Performance of Duties 
3rd Level: Shows How 
Chapter 5: Application of Knowledge 
Accountability for whom? = Performance of Duties 
2nd Level: Knows How 
Chapter 4: Sources of Knowledge 
Accountability for how? = Appropriate Knowledge/Best Practices  
1st Level: Knows 
Chapter 3: Familiarity (self-report) and Actual Knowledge 
Accountability for what? = Knowledge of Duties 
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that nonprofits are held accountable by a variety of different stakeholders, legal 
accountability is the most straightforward. Nonprofits provide a charitable service to 
society and their work is subsidized through tax exemption. Because tax exemption is a 
function of legislation that is enforced and regulated by the IRS, the fiduciary duties 
provide tangible guidelines and expectations for oversight and governance. For example, 
it would be relatively simple to determine if a nonprofit leader is fulfilling their duty of 
care by asking how often they attend meetings and if they read the materials in advance 
of meetings. Therefore, if nonprofit leaders can satisfy the legal accountability 
expectations, it could provide a basis to determine if they are fulfilling their fiduciary 
responsibilities. 
In an effort to help nonprofit leaders understand what nonprofits are accountable 
for, Ebrahim (2010) outlines four areas of accountability including, finances, governance, 
performance, and mission. Financial accountability focuses on reports such as profit and 
loss statements, cash flows, audits, and IRS 990 tax returns provide concrete information 
that the public generally understands. For nonprofits to meet financial accountability 
demands, they are making decisions that rely on sound financial reporting, budgeting, 
and policies. They also focus on revenues and expenses and try to demonstrate that they 
use their financial resources to fulfill their mission.  
Performance for accountability is about how tools such as logic models and 
strategic plans support the mission and centers around the idea as Ebrahim stated that, 
“organizations should be held to account for what they deliver” (as cited in Renz, 2010, 
p. 106). For nonprofits who meet performance accountability demands, they use 
organizational processes and tools as a means to identify metrics of success. Nonprofits 
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that focus on metrics and outcomes do so because of pressures by funders and other 
actors to demonstrate performance. However, the idea of performance is riddled with 
complexity as the literature is still trying to determine what type of specific performance 
measures for which nonprofits should be accountable.  
Accountability for the mission is similar to performance for accountability in that 
nonprofits are asked to account for what they were created to do: their mission. 
Nonprofits who meet mission accountability are constantly looking ahead, surveying the 
environment for changes that may impact their work. While this kind of behavior seems 
logical, the downside of focusing on this mission accountability is that it requires 
continual reflection and monitoring which takes time. Ebrahim (2010) suggests that 
nonprofits need to internalize the mission and continually monitor performance, but also 
identifies the need to allow for continual learning and change. 
Governance accountability, according to Ebrahim, focuses on “how the 
organization [boards and executives] raises and spends money, follows donor intent, and 
whether it is in compliance with the law” (as cited in Renz, 2010, p. 105). This 
perspective aligns with the expectations of the fiduciary duties. However, the notion of 
basic oversight has evolved into greater demands of the board as Ebrahim (2010) points 
out that boards are expected to be accountable for more than just financial oversight, but 
also for organizational performance. The broader demands of board members go beyond 
basic resource oversight and include strategic planning, engaging with communities, 
advocating for the organization, educating about the mission, and providing expertise in 
their specialized field. However, as much as this sounds appealing, if a nonprofit leader 
does not have the basic understanding of what they are legally responsible for, any 
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decisions made about strategy and direction will be made out of ignorance rather than 
facts. Accountability for governance, more specifically accountability for legal 
responsibilities, is a critical element needed to meet accountability demands. 
Accountability for What? Knowledge 
Appropriate knowledge of fiduciary responsibilities is how nonprofit leaders can 
fulfill what they are accountable for and satisfy legal accountability. By focusing on the 
basic oversight perspective, accountability for what is demonstrated by nonprofit leader 
knowledge of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Knowledge intersects with the first 
level of “knows” and is the first construct that assesses what nonprofit leaders believe 
they know (i.e. self-reported) about their fiduciary responsibilities and what they actually 
know. Details follow in the methodology section about how knowledge is assessed in the 
survey instrument. 
Accountability How? 
Because nonprofits are accountable to multiple actors for different things Ebrahim 
(2010) discusses how accountability actually occurs. He focuses on five types of 
mechanisms for accountability including reports and disclosure statements, evaluations 
and performance assessments, participation, adaptive learning, and industry self-
regulation. Each type of mechanism is identified as a tool or process and as with 
accountability for what, these tools and processes have both strength and weaknesses 
(Ebrahim, 2010).   
Ebrahim (2010) provides a distinction between tools and processes with regards 
to how nonprofits meet accountability demands. Tools include those things that can be 
used repeatedly, over a period of time. He suggests that disclosure statements and reports 
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and evaluation and performance assessments are tools used as a means for accountability. 
Processes, on the other hand, are broader and multi-faceted such as overall participation 
and adaptive learning that allow nonprofits to focus on the actual work rather than the 
end product. Examples of participation and adaptive learning include activities that focus 
on relationships and stakeholders such as a strategic plan or assessments that allow for 
self reflection and change (Ebrahim, 2010).  
Finally, self-regulation is identified as both a process and tool as a mechanism for 
accountability. Nonprofits that self-regulate as a means to demonstrate accountability 
follow industry standards and other guidelines that ensure compliance. Ebrahim suggests 
self-regulation “refers specifically to efforts by nonprofit networks to develop standards 
or codes of behavior and performance” (as cited in Renz, 2010, p. 110) often referred to 
as best practices. Best practices are standards or codes that nonprofits use for a variety of 
nonprofit management functions such as finances, human resources, marketing, 
fundraising, and programs. They are developed and typically shared through nonprofit 
networks, associations, academic programs, and by funders as a means to standardize 
nonprofit behavior. Nonprofits who demonstrate accountability how utilize and access 
appropriate best practices in order to gain knowledge about their roles and 
responsibilities.  
Accountability How? Source of Knowledge 
In order for nonprofit leaders to satisfy legal accountability how, nonprofit leaders 
must access appropriate sources to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. Miller 
(1990) furthers the idea that in order to measure competence and performance, one must 
not only measure actual knowledge and how it is used, but also how knowledge is 
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acquired. Therefore, the second construct in my study focuses on sources that nonprofit 
leaders access to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. These sources, or best 
practices, are a type of self regulation mechanism that nonprofit leaders use to 
demonstrate accountability how. The best practices are discussed as internal and external 
sources that nonprofit leaders access to learn about their responsibilities, thereby 
intersecting with the second level of “knows how” and competence. Details follow in the 
methodology section about how sources of knowledge are assessed in the survey 
instrument. 
Accountability to Whom? 
Nonprofits are legally held accountable to know about their legal responsibilities 
(for what). How they demonstrate their accountability is by utilizing appropriate sources 
to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities (how). The third leg of the accountability 
stool is to whom are nonprofits accountable?  
As mentioned previously, nonprofits are held accountable by a variety of different 
actors and stakeholders. From the client who receives services to the funder who 
financially supports the organization, it is difficult to isolate any one particular “whom” 
nonprofits are accountable to. Ebrahim and others (Scott, 2000; Ebrahim, 2010; 
Verschuere, et al 2006) suggest that accountability to whom includes an “upward” and 
“downward” relationship. Upward accountability refers to external relationships such as 
with funders, governments and the public. Conversely, internal accountability focuses 
more on internal relationships such as those receiving services and to some extent larger 
communities (Ebrahim, 2010). Another perspective was coined by Koppell (2005) as 
“multiple accountabilities disorder (MAD)” (p. 95). MAD can be seen in the example of 
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a nonprofit membership organization. Membership organizations such the Association of 
Fundraising Professionals (AFP) are held accountable by the national chapter to ensure 
policies and procedures are followed. Concurrently they are accountable to their local 
members, chapter board of directors, and state regulators.  
The upward and downward perspective, along with MAD, suggests that nonprofit 
leader performance could be a mechanism that nonprofit leaders meet accountability for 
whom. As nonprofit leaders apply their fiduciary duty knowledge, they demonstrate 
accountability to multiple stakeholders via their performance.  
Accountability to Whom? Application of Knowledge 
In order for nonprofit leaders to satisfy legal accountability to whom, they must 
demonstrate competence the results in performance of their fiduciary responsibilities. 
Holland and Ritvo (2008) argue that competencies are a combination of “skills, 
knowledge, information, and personal characteristics” that must be practiced in order to 
be considered useful (p. xvii). They go on to explain that competency is linked to 
performance and when appropriate competencies are in place, effectiveness follows 
(Holland & Ritvo, 2008). This aligns with Miller (1990) who establishes that knowledge 
alone is not an adequate measure of performance, but rather suggests that how knowledge 
is actually carried out is a better indicator. Therefore, the third and final construct in my 
study focuses on nonprofit leader application of fiduciary knowledge in their governance 
activities. This performance of duties intersects with the last two stages of “shows how” 
and “does” and demonstrates accountability to whom. The application construct is 
assessed by asking about the frequency of application of fiduciary knowledge in 
oversight activities related to the duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. Details follow in 
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the methodology section about how specifically the construct is assessed in the survey 
instrument. 
Assessment and Measurement Rationale 
The following section provides the rationale for several aspects of the study 
including the assessment tool, the constructs of knowledge (accountability for what), 
source of knowledge (accountability how), and application of knowledge (accountability 
for whom) as illustrated in Figure 2.5. Specific methods follow this rationale section. 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Framework for Legal Accountability. 
 
The Instrument 
There are many scholarly and practitioner tools available for nonprofit 
organizations to assess governance and oversight for accountability purposes. However, 
there is not currently an assessment that focuses solely on the fiduciary duties of care, 
loyalty, and obedience. Furthermore, there is not an assessment that asks individual 
nonprofit leaders specific questions about knowledge of their fiduciary duties. Therefore, 
in order to fulfill the purpose of this study to establish baseline data from individual 
nonprofit leaders, an internet-based survey was developed and determined to be the most 
appropriate assessment tool. 
Legal 
Accountability 
Chapter 3:      
For What? 
Knowledge 
Chapter 4:       
For How?     
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Knowledge 






This rationale to use a survey is based on the need to gather data from a large 
number of individuals in a neutral, comfortable setting. Additionally, a survey approach 
provides the opportunity to gather data confidentially. This is important to consider since 
the questions in the survey itself ask about behavior and knowledge, which can be 
personal or sensitive in nature (Dillman, Smythe, & Christian, 2014). With this concern 
in mind, the respondents were notified that all of their responses would be reported in 
aggregate and no individual responses will be attributed to any specific individual. 
Additional rationale for a survey approach was based on the need to gather data 
that can be quantified to compare and deductively analyze. Furthermore, nonprofit 
organizations widely use and administer surveys meaning that nonprofit leaders are 
accustomed to this type of data collection method. Finally, a survey is a cost-effective 
method to gather responses from a large geographical area such as the San Diego County 
region (Dillman, 2000). 
Knowledge Rationale 
In keeping with Miller’s (1990) framework and to focus on legal accountability, 
questions developed focused on individual nonprofit leaders’ knowledge of the fiduciary 
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. Questions related to the specific aspects of the 
duties are presented in Table 2.3. A full list of questions can be found in the actual survey 
















Legal responsibilities: Regular attendance of board meetings; reviewing 
materials; reviewing finances and policies. 
Duty of Loyalty: 
Procedural Aspects 
of Transactions and 
Self Interest 
Familiarity/overall understanding 
Legal responsibilities:  Use independent judgment; disclosing conflict of 
interest; no personal benefit of organizational resources 
Duty of Obedience: 
Legal Compliance 
Familiarity/overall understanding 
Legal responsibilities: compliance with federal/state regulations 
Bylaw elements: Board positions, terms and voting; nomination and 
election process; executive staff responsibilities 
 
Sources of Knowledge Rationale 
In order to determine what types of sources nonprofit leaders access to learn about 
their roles and responsibilities and how often, assessment questions were developed that 
prompt nonprofit leaders to respond to a series of options based on nonprofit industry 
best practices. Internal sources that were provided by the organization and external 
sources that are available to the general public were included as illustrated in Table 2.4. 
A full list of questions can be found in the actual survey instrument (Appendix #). 
Table 2.4 
Types of Internal and External Best Practice Sources 
Internal Best Practices External Best Practices 





Information conversations with 





arranged by the organization for 
board members 
 
Friends and Family 
(network) 





Application of Knowledge Rationale 
To understand how frequently nonprofit leaders apply their fiduciary knowledge, 
assessment questions were developed that ask how often nonprofit leaders use their 
knowledge of the fiduciary duties in their governance role as presented in Table 2.5. As 
with the knowledge construct, each question focuses on specific aspects of the duties of 
care, loyalty, and obedience. A full list of questions can be found in the actual survey 
instrument. 
Table 2.5 











 Review materials in advance of the board meeting 
 Pay attention to the organization’s resources (e.g. financial, physical, and 
human) 
 Frequently review the organization’s finances and financial policies 
 Attend board meetings 
 Am aware of the executive's performance 
 Participate in the review, discussion, and/or approval of financial policies 
(e.g. annual budget, audit) 
 Exercise independent judgment 
 
 
Duty of Loyalty: 
Procedural Aspects of 




 Disclose conflicts of interest 
 Make decisions that are in the best interest of the organization 
 Avoid the use of organizational resources/connections for personal gain 
 Maintain confidentiality of sensitive organizational information 
 
Duty of Obedience: 
Legal Compliance 
 
 Refer to the mission statement when discussing potential programs and 
services 
 Pay attention to how the organization uses its resources 
(financial/physical/human) to fulfill its mission 
 Board: Understand the Bylaws/Executive:  Read the Bylaws 
 Refer to the organization’s internal policies and procedures when needed 






The purpose of this study is to establish baseline data about nonprofit leader 
fiduciary knowledge, source of fiduciary knowledge, and application of fiduciary 
knowledge. As such, the research methodology was developed by building upon 
extensive practitioner work and academic scholarship. Although the study is exploratory, 
attention was given to develop an instrument that could be replicated and validated in 
other settings to conduct future research. This section outlines the research methods and 
procedures used for this descriptive, quantitative study, which includes the following 
sections: sample, survey deployment, constructs and measurement, and data analysis. The 
assessment tool and forms utilized during the research study can be found in the 
appendices. 
Sample 
The sample for this study was drawn from the population of nonprofit leaders 
from 11,234 nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations located in San Diego County, CA at the 
time of the survey deployment in January 2018 (Nonprofit Institute, 2018). Participant 
eligibility criteria for this study was focused on individuals who were current voting 
board members or the most senior executive staff of a San Diego County nonprofit, tax-
exempt organization. The unit of analysis is the individual nonprofit leader. By law, 
California nonprofit organizations are required to have at least three board positions 
filled: President, Secretary, and Treasurer (California Attorney General, 2017). Using 
three as the minimum number of eligible board participants, the total sample would be, at 
a minimum, 33,702.  
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For the number of eligible executives, the possible amount would be one per 
organization for a total sample of 11,234. Combined, the sample of eligible participants is 
44,936. Of the 218 submitted responses, 189 were deemed viable (less than 1% response 
rate) and therefore included in this study.  
Of the 218 submitted responses, 114 provided either an organization name or 
employer identification number. Of the 114 who provided identifying information, eight 
organizations had more than one response. As such, 18 responses were removed to allow 
for one response, per organization in order to provide descriptive information about the 
sample of 96 organizations. 
Figure 2.6 illustrates the types of organizations represented by sub-sector. The 
most were from arts and culture (22%) and none represented higher education or 
hospitals. Hospitals were represented only in the philanthropic sub-sector (i.e. 
foundations), but not as organizations with a health mission.  
 

















International, Public, Societal Benefit 
Arts and Culture 
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Table 2.6. presents the averages for revenues and age for those organizations that 
provided a means to identify them. On average, the organizations with less revenues were 
those that had International, Public, and Societal Benefit purposes, while larger revenues 
were represented by Human Service purpose organizations. The youngest organizations 
were those that were religious with the oldest as Human Service organizations. 
Table 2.6 















21 $3,927,012 $84,758 $30,100,526 $1,845,848 
Human Service 
(n=15) 
37.1 $35,261,337 $229,118 $383,032,435 $5,824,415 
Education Other 
(n=13) 
16.8 $2,591,179 $174,954 $14,177,868 $808,005 
Arts and Culture 
(n=21) 
25.6 $1,600,113 $103,293 $16,334,715 $620,816 
Religion (n=1) 0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Philanthropic 
(n=8) 
24.0 $9,548,373 $385,731 $40,823,220 $2,205,383 
Environment and 
Animals (n=4) 
25.5 $1,288,904 $178,909 $3,628,745 $1,347,960 
Note: Tax information was available for only 1 of the four religion organizations and the 
one had not filed a tax form yet. Source: Internal Revenue Service Tax Exempt Extract 
2017 tax year. 
 
A purposeful, snowball sample approach was utilized by sending the survey out to 
the researcher’s more than fifty personal and professional contacts and networks via 
email. The contacts represent nonprofit organizations, individuals (nonprofit practitioners 
and volunteers), academic institutions, and organizations in the San Diego region. All 
contacts were asked to take the survey, provided they met eligibility criteria, and to 





Because of the length of the survey (98 questions) the researcher was concerned 
about survey fatigue and as such limited the number of demographic questions to the 
respondent’s role, the number of boards respondents served in the last 15 years, if the 
respondent was the founder of the organization, and the organization’s name or EIN 
number. The demographic question about role was one of the first questions asked (and 
was required to move forward) with board service, founder, and organizational EIN/name 
asked toward the end of the survey. 
Another consideration for the decision to include a minimal number of 
demographic questions was based on the availability of other sources of nonprofit data 
about nonprofit leaders (e.g. gender, backgrounds, and skills) and organizations (e.g. size, 
age, and financial information). Regulatory, practitioner and academic sources such as 
the Internal Revenue Service, BoardSource, GuideStar, Foundation Search, the National 
Center for Charitable Statistics, the Midwest Center for Nonprofit Leadership at 
University of Missouri – Kansas City, and the Lilly Family School of Philanthropy at 
Indiana University are well regarded sources of nonprofit demographic data. Finally, 
because this was exploratory in nature, more demographics could be included in a future 
iteration.  
Of the five demographic questions included, only two are used in this study, the 
respondent’s role within their organization and the number of boards they have served on 
in the last 15 years. The researcher opted not to use the responses for organization EIN 
number or name, because only 96 represented unique organizations. For the founder 
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question, only 19 respondents indicated that they were also the founder. Therefore, no 
analysis by founder or by EIN is included in the study. 
Role is the main demographic variable, because the study focuses on nonprofit 
leaders and because of the nature of the leadership structure inherent in nonprofit 
organizations. Nonprofit organizations are considered corporations and must adhere to 
corporate law, and specifically in California, charitable corporate law.  This law requires 
that all nonprofit boards have at least three members serving as chair/president, treasurer, 
and secretary (California Department of Justice, 2017). Therefore, the rationale behind 
the roles selected was based on the typical leadership structure of a nonprofit 
organization. Most nonprofit organizations also fill the role of vice president, so 
combined with the chair, treasurer, and secretary these four positions serve as the 
executive board committee.  
Other roles included in this study were the executive (i.e. the most senior staff 
member), general board members (not serving in an executive committee position), 
advisory board, and “other.” Participants were asked to select executive staff if they were 
the most senior paid staff for the organization. Two respondents selected “other”, but one 
was re-categorized as an executive staff and the other was re-categorized as a board 
member, based on how they described their role. Three respondents selected the advisory 
or committee member option and are not included in the analysis since these positions do 
not have voting power, reducing the total number of viable responses to 186. 
For this study, respondents were asked to identify their role for the nonprofit 
organization that they chose to focus on when answering the survey questions. In other 
words, if a respondent was a board chair for organization X and an executive director for 
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organization Y, they could choose either role, but all of their answers must be related to 
their capacity in that chosen role for the corresponding tax-exempt organization.  
Regarding the role variable, the researcher initially planned on analyzing the data 
using three categories: Executive (staff), executive committee (President, Vice President, 
Secretary, and Treasurer) and non-executive committee board members. However, 
because of the small number of respondents in some of the executive board positions, the 
distribution was skewed, therefore the respondents were collapsed into two categories: 
Executive and all board members. Using just two categories supported a more robust data 
analysis process and is the basis for analysis throughout the remainder of this study. 
Figure 2.7 presents both sets of samples, first by the two roles board members 
(N=104) and executives (N = 82) followed by the three role configuration, board member 
(N = 52), executive committee (N = 52), and executives (N = 82).  
 
Figure 2.7. Percentages of respondents by two roles (N=184) and three role categories 
(N=184).  
 
Figure 2.8 presents the number of respondents by specific board member roles, 
board chair (N = 36), executives (N = 82), board members (N = 52), board secretary (N = 























Figure 2.8. Percentages of respondents by board role (N=186). 
 
With regards to the variable of board service (number of boards served in the last 
15 years), the rationale behind this particular demographic was to better understand how 
the length of board experience might relate to fiduciary duty knowledge. Although the 
researcher has yet to find any longitudinal research that tracks a nonprofit leaders board 
service, she tapped into her nearly 20 years experience as a nonprofit practitioner and 
hypothesized that if a nonprofit leader had previous board service, they may have a 
greater awareness of fiduciary duties. As presented in Figure 2.9, 49% of the respondents 
have served on one to two boards, 31% have served on three to four boards, 11% have 
served on five to six boards, and 8% have served on more than six boards. Because of the 
skewed distribution, some analysis was performed on a new variable that collapsed the 
four board service categories into only two. Notations are made throughout the 






Board Chair (n=36) 
Board Member (n=52) 
Board Secretary (n=4) 
Board Treasurer (n=8) 





Figure 2.9. Number of boards served on in the last 15 years (N=154). 
 
Survey Instrument 
The survey instrument was developed using some elements from existing board 
assessment tools as well as practitioner and scholarly research related to board 
governance (Alliance for Nonprofit Management, 2017; BoardSource, 2017; California 
Attorney General, 2017; Corporation for National and Community Service, 2017; 
Hopkins, 2009; Jackson & Holland, 2009; Nonprofit Association of Oregon, 2017; 
Overton & Frey, 2002; Schwab Foundation for Social Enterprise, n.d.). Specific 
questions related to the duties of care, loyalty, and obedience that were not available 
otherwise, were developed by the researcher. The survey itself was created in Qualtrics, a 
survey software available free of charge to University of San Diego students.  
During the testing phase, the researcher estimated that that the survey would take 
between ten and 15 minutes. However, after removing 41 responses that were outliers 
(less than 5 minutes and more than 30 minutes) the average amount of time it took for 






1-2 Boards (n=77) 
3-4 Boards (n=49) 
5-6 Boards (n=18) 




Average Amount of Time to Take Survey 
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max 
146 11.27 4.916 5 28.6 
Note. Time is presented in minutes. 41 outliers were removed that took less than 5 
minutes and greater than 30 minutes to complete the survey. 
 
Constructs and Measurements 
The survey instrument was categorized into five main parts, however for this 
study, only three were included. The remaining two are intended for future analysis. The 
three parts were designed to answer the three constructs: (1) Nonprofit leader familiarity 
of fiduciary duties and actual knowledge of duties; (2) What types of external and 
internal sources do nonprofit leaders access to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities 
and; (3) The frequency with which nonprofit leaders apply their fiduciary knowledge in 
the performance of their governance activities. 
Knowledge Construct 
The first part of the survey focused on nonprofit leader fiduciary duty knowledge. 
For this section yes/no/don’t know and four point Likert scale response options from not 
at all familiar to very familiar and disagree to agree were used. Questions included in this 
section allowed for a subjective measurements of familiarity of the fiduciary duties and 
objective measurements of actual knowledge. Respondents were provided with a brief 
description of each of the fiduciary duties and asked to rate their level of familiarity with 
each using a four point Likert scale of not at all familiar to very familiar. As the survey 
progressed, respondents were asked about their level of agreement with specific legal 
responsibilities related to the fiduciary duties, their understanding of the mission, and if 
they believed they had enough knowledge to carry out the organization’s mission (four 
point Likert scale, disagree to agree). 
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As mentioned earlier, knowledge questions can be sensitive and some respondents 
may inflate their answer to appear more socially desirable (Dillman, 2000). With this in 
mind, the researcher included a means to test respondents in order to compare how 
familiar nonprofit leaders believed themselves to be with what they actually knew. Ten 
questions related to legal responsibilities were displayed as a matrix with yes/no answer 
options for a total of ten possible correct answers. Of the ten questions, four were “false” 
questions that if they answered incorrectly, were not given a point. More about how these 
questions were coded and analyzed is included in chapter three. 
Source of Knowledge Construct 
The second part of the survey focused on what types of sources nonprofit leaders 
accessed to learn about their roles and responsibilities. This section included four point 
Likert scale response options from disagree to agree and never to always. Options 
included learning opportunities and tools that were provided by the organization 
(internal) or those that were available to the general public (external). For example, 
internal sources included a board manual or board orientation that a respondent might 
access internally within the organization itself. External sources included options such as 
websites, webinars, workshops and trainings that focused on nonprofit governance and 
oversight. For the internal sources, respondents were given the option to select all that 
apply and for external sources, respondents were given a three point Likert scale option, 
never, sometimes, and always.  
Application of Knowledge Construct 
The final part of the survey focused on subjective measurements related to the 
frequency with which nonprofit leaders applied their fiduciary knowledge in the 
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performance of their governance duties. For example, respondents were asked how often 
they review materials in advance of the board meeting to demonstrate their application of 
the fiduciary duty of care. Respondents were given four point Likert scale response 
options that included disagree to agree and never to always.  
Psychometric Properties 
Prior to deploying the survey, face validity, meaning that at face value “a measure 
appears to make sense” (Vogt, 2005, p. 117), was approached by providing the survey 
instrument to seven nonprofit and research evaluation experts (Dillman, 2000). The 
experts included current and former nonprofit executive directors and board members, 
nonprofit consultants, and academics who provided feedback based on their roles as a 
nonprofit practitioner or researcher. Experts were asked to pay attention to survey aspects 
such as clarity of question, ease of navigation, relevance of answer options, and if the 
questions were focused on the constructs as they beta-tested the instrument prior to 
deployment. The face validity approach also supported content validity to ensure that the 
items included “accurately represent the thing being measured” (Vogt, 2005, p. 59).   
In terms of construct validity, the questions were specifically related to each of 
the constructs being measured, knowledge, source, and application of the fiduciary duties 
of loyalty, care, and obedience. Each construct included questions developed by using 
language and expectations outlined in federal and California state regulations, corporate 
and charitable corporate law. Other sources utilized to develop questions were based on 
the literature and studies focused on board and organizational performance. The construct 
validity approach was helpful in establishing convergent validity as there was overlap 
with some of the literature and studies. 
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In terms of sensitivity, the survey included multi-item scales and yes/no 
responses. Each scale provided face validity in that they corresponded to the duties and 
construct that were measured. For example, because one of the purposes of this study was 
to assess nonprofit leader actual knowledge of fiduciary duties, some questions were 
given a yes or no option as answer options, as if it were an actual test. Additionally, when 
asked about the frequency of application of fiduciary knowledge, the researcher opted for 
a four point Likert scale, rather than a traditional five or seven, in order to eliminate the 
option of a neutral response. Where appropriate, Cronbach’s alpha was computed. 
Data Collection 
Data were collected using an online survey instrument as previously described. 
Prior to deploying the survey, Institutional Review Board approval was acquired from the 
University of San Diego (included at the end of this study). Once approved, a hyperlink 
for the survey was sent electronically to more than fifty personal and professional 
contacts and lists of individuals from San Diego nonprofits that the researcher had either 
consulted with or who have attended events where she had led a workshop or 
presentation. The email invitation to participate is included as (see Appendix B). 
Informed consent was provided to survey participants as the landing page of the survey 
and is included in the survey instrument itself (see Appendix A). Those who agreed to 
consent moved forward to the survey. Those who did not agree to consent were directed 
to a thank you page and were not allowed to take the survey. The survey was in the field 
for five weeks. At least three reminders were sent out during the course of the five weeks 
to those the researcher personally made contact with. It is unknown if those who found 




Data was analyzed using IBM SPSS statistical software and Microsoft Excel. 
Descriptive statistics are used to present a summary of data in a way that identifies 
frequencies, means, medians, and standard deviation. Pearson Correlation analysis and 
Contingency Tables were used to identify relationships between variables.  
After closing the survey, the raw data was downloaded from Qualtrics and 
cleaned by naming each variable, coding answers, and removing any duplicates and 
responses that had no data. During the cleaning process, new variables were added for the 
purposes of collapsing or describing variables. For example, after initial analysis, the role 
variable was collapsed first into three sub-groups (executive, board committees, and 
board members) and then into two sub-groups (executive and board members). 
Additional details are included in the proceeding chapters about the data analysis 
performed. 
Delimitations 
Delimitations are purposeful boundaries applied to a research study. As such, the 
geographic constraints are considered a delimitation. Nonprofit organizations exist in 
nearly every community in the United States, however, the researcher’s nonprofit 
experience is primarily in the San Diego County region. Being in the San Diego region, 
working and consulting for, volunteering at, and engaging with the nonprofit sector for 
nearly 20 years, has allowed the researcher to build a considerable network of nonprofit 
practitioners, researchers, and organizations. As a result, a purposeful decision was to 
conduct this study in this region in order to begin to build the knowledge in a somewhat 
“controlled” environment.  
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Another delimitation to this study is that it focuses only on the legal aspects of 
accountability as they relate to the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. 
Nonprofit leaders are expected to fulfill a wide range of roles and responsibilities 
intended to support fulfilling the mission. As such, the researcher chose to bound the 
study in very narrow terms, in terms of legal accountability, using the fiduciary duties, 
which are widely accepted and recognized standards of conduct and behavior by 
government, practitioners, and academics. Although it is a small piece of the puzzle, it is 
the researcher’s belief that nonprofits who understand their fiduciary responsibilities 
make better decisions, which in turn satisfied legal accountability demands. 
Limitations 
As with all studies there are limitations and this study is no exception. Limitations 
are design flaws and potential weaknesses in the study. For this study, limitations revolve 
around generalizability and replicability, specifically in terms of the sample and the 
survey instrument. The study alone is not enough to determine whether the results would 
be similar in other geographic regions. Without additional testing of the survey 
instrument, the study can only serve as a starting point for future research that points to, 
but not verify, trends or phenomena. 
The first limitation worth noting is related to the sample.  Given that the survey 
was open to any individual that either served as a voting nonprofit board member or as 
the executive located in San Diego County, there is no way of knowing how many 
potential respondents make up the population or to verify that those who responded fit the 
eligibility criteria.  
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The second limitation is the survey instrument itself. It was developed for this 
study and can be improved upon by changing some of the scales and the wording of 
questions. For example, different four point Likert scale options were given for the 
fiduciary duty constructs, executives were given disagree to agree, whereas board 
members were given never to always. Additionally, self reported data can be problematic 
because respondents may want portray themselves in a positive light and not admit what 
they do not know. This aspect of social desirability may have either inflated respondents 
answers or may have prevented other participants from taking the survey if they felt that 
they may not have the appropriate knowledge.  
The instrument can be further improved upon by adding actual measures of some 
of the theoretical frameworks used in this study such as institutionalism, isomorphism, 
and performance that are discussed in chapters four and five. In chapter three, with 
regards to the bylaws questions, without any confirmation that the item was actually in 
the organization’s bylaws, this set of questions is purely exploratory. Furthermore in 
chapter three, for the actual knowledge of the duty of obedience construct, only one 
question was included, ensuring that compliance with state and federal regulations is a 
legal responsibility. For future iterations of the assessment tool, it may be helpful to 
include additional questions related to this construct.  
In chapter five, two different types of answer options were used for board 
members and executives and as such, the results for both roles could not be compared in 
an equal manner. Furthermore, for the duty of obedience construct in chapter five, only 
one question was included that focused on disclosing conflict of interest. For future 
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iterations of the assessment tool, it may be helpful to include additional questions related 
to this construct.  
Although bias can be seen as a limitation, it is also a strength. As mentioned 
previously, the researcher is a practitioner with knowledge and perspective that is useful 
in creating something that benefits practitioners. As such, the study was conducted in a 
way that considered how helpful each piece of data would be for an executive or board 
member. Yet, a limitation would be that as a new academic, the researcher is still learning 
appropriate theories, frameworks, quantitative analysis techniques, and terminology that 
will be used in further research. 
Finally, given the researcher’s nonprofit experience, special attention was paid 
during the design, implementation, or analysis phases of this study to avoid any bias, 
another potential limitation. This was carried out by regular check-ins with colleagues 
and the dissertation chair. Furthermore, no conflict of interest, such as a reporting 
relationship, contract, or any relationship with the researcher was evident that may have 
imparted bias on the research study itself. 
This is a pilot study, and as such there are several changes that need to be made 
prior to another deployment, as mentioned previously and other changes will be made as 
practitioners, academics, and regulators are engaged. There is no one single assessment 
that can adequately measure knowledge, application, and source of fiduciary duties. 
However, what this study does is it begins the conversation about basic responsibilities 
and establishes baseline data with which to build on. Many more studies need to happen 
that include other methodologies including interviews, observation, and pre and post tests 
to name a few.  
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CHAPTER 3: KNOWLEDGE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
The nature of nonprofit governance is one filled with challenges and tensions, 
particularly in terms of legal accountability. For example, federal and state regulations 
provide guidelines as to what nonprofit leaders are responsible for in the governance of 
tax exempt organizations through the legal standards of the fiduciary duties of care, 
loyalty, and obedience, but over time additional expectations have been placed on 
nonprofit leaders. Additionally, nonprofit leaders are expected to perform their duties in a 
manner that upholds their legal responsibilities, but no standardize process exists that 
ensures that they have the basic knowledge of what their responsibilities are. 
Furthermore, while legislation is important in that it mandates certain behaviors and 
requirements, it is reactive and varies depending on the state and the resources available 
for enforcement. Other tensions can be seen in the voluntary nature of nonprofit service. 
Nonprofit leaders are volunteers and as such are given a great deal of leeway in the 
performance of their duties creating tensions between expectation of service and reality. 
Finally, tensions are found in the democratic idea of pluralism that allows people to 
create nonprofits to meet a variety of public needs, resulting in the need for more people 
to fill governance roles in an ever-expanding nonprofit sector.  
Given the many challenges and tensions, the fiduciary duties provide a consistent, 
universal set of standards that all tax exempt organizations must fulfill. Regardless of the 
mission, size, or location, when accusations or concerns of negligence or wrongdoing 
surface, every decision and action nonprofit leaders make will be applied against the 
standards as set forth in the fiduciary duties. In essence, the fiduciary duties level the 
playing field in terms of legal accountability in the performance of governance duties. 
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Ebrahim (2010) suggests that a mechanism of accountability includes knowledge. 
What this study provides is a means to assess the legal dimension of nonprofit 
accountability at the governance level, specifically nonprofit leader knowledge of 
fiduciary responsibilities. The broader purpose of this study is to establish baseline data 
about nonprofit leader knowledge of their fiduciary responsibilities and is categorized 
into three areas: nonprofit leader knowledge of fiduciary duties; the types of sources 
nonprofit leaders access to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities; and application of 
knowledge in nonprofit leaders’ governance activities as illustrated in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Framework for Legal Accountability. 
 
In looking at how knowledge will be measured, Miller’s (1990) model of 
competence, as illustrated in Figure 3.2 provides a framework. The first level, “knows”, 
refers to an individual’s ability to recall specific elements. For this study, knowledge is 
assessed by asking respondents about specific elements of each of the fiduciary duties 
first what they believe they know (i.e. self-reported) and then they are assessed by what 
they actually know.  
Legal 
Accountability 
Chapter 3:      
For What? 
Knowledge 
Chapter 4:       
For How?     
Source of 
Knowledge 







Figure 3.2. Constructs and Legal Accountability adapted from Miller’s framework for 
clinical assessment model in The assessment of clinical skills/competence/performance, 
Academic Medicine, (1990). 
 
This chapter focuses on the first strand of research, nonprofit leader (board 
members and executives) knowledge of fiduciary responsibilities as a means to meet 
legal accountability. The findings suggest that nonprofit leaders believe they have enough 
knowledge to govern, but in reality, may not have correct knowledge of what their 
fiduciary duties entail. I begin this chapter reviewing accountability for what that is 
followed by a discussion about the nature of the nonprofit sector that includes its 
characteristics and the legal roots. Next, a discussion on board governance provides a 
background about the evolution of nonprofit governance with a detailed discussion of the 
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience to provide context about what regulators 
expect of nonprofit leaders. Following the regulation and enforcement aspects, I present 
the results of related to nonprofit leader knowledge of fiduciary duties. Finally, I offer a 
discussion of the results and implications for future research. 
4th Level: Does  
Chapter 5: Application of Knowledge 
Accountability for whom?  = Performance 
3rd Level: Shows How 
Chapter 5: Application of Knowledge 
Accountability for whom? = Performance  
2nd Level: Knows How 
Chapter 4: Sources of Knowledge 
Accountability for how? = Best Practices 
1st Level: Knows 
Chapter 3: Familiarity (self-report) and Actual Knowledge 
Accountability for what? = Knowledge 
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Accountability for What? 
In Ebrahim’s (2010) facets of accountability, four areas are important for the 
discussion of accountability, finances, governance, performance, and mission. Financial 
accountability is typically demonstrated through compliance and disclosure. Submitting 
required reports such as the annual tax return, quarterly employment taxes, and allowing 
the public access to audited financial statements are examples of compliance and 
disclosure. The duty of obedience focuses on compliance and ensuring that the 
organization upholds state and federal laws. As such, organizations that actively comply 
with reporting requirements are fulfilling their legal accountability by upholding their 
fiduciary duty of obedience. 
Performance is another means to meet accountability that focuses on how an 
organization goes about fulfilling its mission. Engaging in a strategic planning process, 
identifying goals, and establishing metrics for success are useful approaches to 
performance. However, performance in and of itself is not an expectation that is outlined 
in the fiduciary duties. The exception to this is in the duty of obedience, which holds the 
board of directors responsible to evaluate the performance of its chief executive. Because 
executives perform the day-to-day operations of the organizations, they are entrusted with 
resources. Therefore, boards who regularly evaluate their chief executive meet the duty of 
obedience and demonstrate legal accountability by ensuring that resources are used to 
fulfill the mission. 
Similar to performance, fulfillment of the mission is a means nonprofits 
demonstrate accountability. Because nonprofit status is given to organizations that meet 
an approved charitable, scientific, educational, or religious purpose, they are provided 
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financial benefits in return, in the form of tax incentives. Tax incentives are a product of 
U.S. legislation which allows tax deductibility for donations made by the public, for tax 
exempt entities classified as c3, and tax free revenues for all tax exempt entities. Because 
donations and tax free revenues reduce the amount of money the IRS can collect, tax 
exempt entities in essence are subsidized by the U.S. government and the expectation is 
that nonprofits use “public” money for public good (i.e. fulfillment of the mission). 
Therefore, nonprofits who can demonstrate that they fulfill their mission satisfy legal 
accountability. 
The final facet of the accountability model is governance which according to 
Ebrahim, focuses on “how the organization [boards and executives] raises and spends 
money, follows donor intent, and whether it is in compliance with the law” (as cited in 
Renz, 2010, p. 105). Each fiduciary duty is geared toward those who oversee and manage 
tax exempt entities and provides guidance that nonprofit leaders can use to support their 
governance activities. As such, the fiduciary duties provide a useful measurement of 
governance.  
Of the four facets, finances, mission, and governance are more relevant to what 
nonprofit leaders are legally responsible for in terms of their fiduciary duties. Because the 
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience focus on how the “owners” of a nonprofit use 
resources in order to fulfill the charitable mission performance is less of a consideration. 
However, performance of the executive is a legal responsibility for the board to fulfill 
their fiduciary duty of obedience, as is discussed later. Although Ebrahim’s (2010) idea 
of performance for accountability is focused on more of an organizational performance, it 
is relevant to the discussion about nonprofit leaders and how they meet legal 
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accountability. As such, nonprofit leaders demonstrate legal accountability by knowing 
the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience to fulfill their governance 
responsibilities.  
Nonprofit Characteristics and Legal Roots 
Characteristics 
What is unique about nonprofits is that they have a great deal of freedom to 
engage in a wide variety of issues. Nonprofits provide programs and services such as 
those relevant to individuals’ religious, cultural, and professional identities; to groups 
affected by certain types of diseases and disorders; to communities in need of 
transformation; and to nations in need of aid. Fishman, Schwarz, and Meyer (2015) 
attribute this freedom to the idea of pluralism which “allows individuals and groups to 
pursue goals that they formulate” (pg. 5). As utopian as pluralism sounds, it has a dark 
side. Given the more than 1.5 million tax exempt entities, there is a current debate about 
the sheer size of the sector. As more and more ideas turn into new nonprofits, 
competition for financial, physical, and human resources increases. 
Pluralism impacts nonprofit governance. Given that all tax exempt entities are 
required to have directors and officers overseeing the organization, typically without 
compensation, the need for people to fill governance roles increases. This might prove 
challenging given that in the 10 year period from 2002 to 2012, the number of nonprofit 
organizations increased 8.6 percent, more than 125,000 organizations (Worth, 2017, pg. 
25). This increase was followed by another jump after the IRS introduced a streamlined, 
shorter version of the 1023 Application for Tax Exemption, (1023 EZ), in 2013 creating a 
deluge of new requests for tax exempt, nonprofit status. Between July and December of 
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2014, on average, the IRS approved 10,000 new applications for tax exemption each 
month (Wyland, 2018).  
Not only did the 1023 EZ potentially create more demand for board members, it 
was also a source of contention. Many nonprofit leaders voiced concerns that the it 
lacked transparency, eroded public trust, and allowed the IRS to fail in their “…primary 
obligation of preventing ineligible organizations and perhaps bad actors from receiving 
and exploiting tax-exempt status for personal gain… with every application processed.” 
(Council of Nonprofits, n.d.). This concern was based on the fact that the new application 
opened the floodgate allowing any and all groups to become tax exempt without any 
explanation as to their governance and oversight processes or assurances against the 
misuse of funds (Council of Nonprofits, n.d.).  
Legal Roots 
At its roots, nonprofits are about people helping people. Throughout history, we 
see many examples of charitable work that spans thousands of years and across multiple 
continents. In the third century BC, the Hebrew tribe of Levi was supported by their 
fellow tribes so that they could perform their priestly duties in the temple (Holy Bible, 
1986). Other examples come from ancient Greece and Rome with wealthy citizens 
supporting civic life through their subsidizing of city infrastructure and municipal 
projects (Robbins, 2006). China enjoyed a long history of charity prior to communism 
with its commitment to helping each other as expressed in an ancient Chinese saying, “to 
have virtuous citizens who are kind to their neighbors, this is a precious treasure for a 
country” (Chan, 2015). Although service to mankind transcends time, culture, religion, 





Century is based more on western traditions of charity and philanthropy, specifically 
English charitable law.  
In 1601, England passed the Statute of Charitable Uses and the Poor Law which 
was a turning point for charitable work in that it articulated the roles and boundaries of 
the British government and the Church of England (Fremont-Smith, 2004; Worth, 2017, 
pg. 21). Up until this time, property was the primary mode of funding charity work and 
with the property owner who had the authority to use it in support of the charitable 
purpose they deemed fit (University of Pennsylvania, 1904). Because religious 
institutions administered most of the charity work, the concern was that the church would 
garner too much power and influence as they acquired more land. As such, the new laws 
offered clarity as to the types of acceptable charitable purposes and established the idea 
that private charity and the state should work in partnership (Fremont-Smith, 2004). The 
new laws also set the tone for accountability with regards to those who were entrusted 
with the resources to fulfill charitable purposes, thereby providing the foundation for 
nonprofit governance regulations of today.  
English law provided the basis for charitable work, but it was the attempted 
takeover of Dartmouth University in 1816 which settled the idea that public work should 
be governed by the public, not the private or government sectors, as well as established 
the role of the state for the oversight in corporate affairs. At the time, English Common 
Law was still important to the young republic because of its focus on corporate property 
rights since the newly adopted U.S. Constitution made no provisions regarding 
corporations. With the lack of legal clarity, coupled with the newfound rights for citizens 
to freely assemble, it seemed “reasonable to argue that nonprofits and their boards were 
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guardians of citizens’ private rights” (Dobkin Hall, 2003, pg. 11). To settle the issue of 
Dartmouth, Chief Justice Marshall decided that a public institution’s mission, or the 
purposes for which they were formed, should determine how they are governed thus 
protecting charitable institutions from legislative interference in their decision-making 
process (Dobkin Hall, 2003). His decision was key in that it framed public policy by 
combining English Charitable Law which protected the rights of corporations and the 
U.S. Constitution which protected the rights of citizens. Combined, Marshall’s decision 
became the basis for nonprofit governance by shaping accountability expectations and 
responsibilities of citizens as corporate owners and directors.  
Nonprofit Governance 
Federal and state regulations require tax exempt organizations to be governed 
individuals. Often referred to as boards of directors or trustees, board members are 
typically volunteers and are tasked with making decisions on behalf of, and to act in the 
best interest of, the organization. Because of the pluralistic nature, nonprofits have the 
flexibility to create boards that reflect their missions. For example, nonprofits who work 
closely with their community may choose to have a board member who represents the 
community or someone who has been a beneficiary of services. Additionally, nonprofits 
may select board members who can provide specialized knowledge or skills if the 
mission focuses on disease prevention, the environment, or advocacy.  
The composition of boards is an interesting area of scholarship that links 
organizational performance to board member expertise, training, and professional 
background (Andersson & Renz, 2009, Tschirhart, et al. 2009). Although boards are 
often made up of accomplished professionals in their fields they may lack experience 
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related to the governance aspects of running a nonprofit (Preston & Brown, 2004). Each 
nonprofit leader brings to their role varying degrees of knowledge and skills and when 
these individuals come together, as the legally responsible oversight body for a nonprofit 
organization, the combined knowledge may or may not be adequate enough to make 
decisions about resource that fulfill their fiduciary duties.  
What creates tension is the requirement for nonprofits to have board members but 
without any standardized assessment to certify board members understand their fiduciary 
responsibilities. And, it seems that there is little to no scholarship that explores the 
fiduciary aspect of governance that either explores nonprofit leader knowledge of 
fiduciary duties or how that knowledge may impact their oversight role. Dobkin Hall 
(2003) offers that, because what boards are responsible for has never been fully spelled 
out, but that they “are often unpleasantly reminded” of their duties (p. 3). These 
reminders have materialized over the past several decades with high profile legal cases 
and news reports of nonprofit mismanagement. Adding to the tension is the evolution of 
board roles and duties over time, contributing to the varying degrees of knowledge. 
Boards in the New World 
With the discovery of the New World, the earliest U.S. settlers built charitable 
institutions such as hospitals, schools, and churches in their new homeland (Fishman, 
Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015). As the colonies grew, so did the need for control as was seen 
in the creation of the first American board by the Massachusetts Bay Company. What 
began as a joint stock trading company created by the English crown to support 
colonization in the New World was taken over by religious leaders in 1631 to establish 
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the first charitable trust and in the process, established the idea of self-governance and 
independence from government (Zeichner, n.d.).  
With the example of the Massachusetts Bay Company, other religiously oriented 
institutions such as Harvard and Yale were instrumental in the development of the 
contemporary nonprofit governance model of today. Harvard’s contribution was 
distinguishing “between the persons who might serve as officials of the corporation and 
their role as officers” by creating two separate governing bodies: one that was self-
perpetuating that focused on the academic issues of the institution and the other made up 
of appointed members who answered to the church and state (Dobkin Hall, 2003).  
Yale was established in 1723 in reaction to Harvard’s increasing liberalism and 
was responsible for creating the collective governing body model. The idea that one body 
was responsible for oversight of the entire institution was warranted because of the belief 
that trustees would act in good faith was based on their duty to God (Dobkin Hall, 2003). 
Although these were significant contributions, there was still the tension of control, 
because many board members were either elected officials, ex officios, clergy, or 
administrators who had a vested interest in the organization. The question then was “who 
should control American culture” (Dobkin Hall, 2003, pg. 17)? 
Boards in the New Era 
As America became industrious and generated wealth, the idea that charitable 
work should be governed by those outside of government, religion or academia was an 
impetus for stakeholder representation. Educational institutions were the first to embrace 
public representation by adding businessmen and lawyers to their boards in an effort to 
woo their financial resources in support of the mission. However, this approach was 
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problematic, because of the stark differences in philosophies between the new and old 
leadership and differences in loyalties and allegiances. Old leadership focused on 
“diffusion of knowledge” whereas business leaders focused on “acquisition of wealth” 
(Dobkin Hall, 2003, p. 19).  
Beginning in the mid-1920’s, U.S. President Hebert Hoover’s modernization of 
government was instrumental in establishing improved governance principles and 
practices. For both private for-profit and public charitable entities, attention was given to 
developing resources to improve board performance and address “issues as 
accountability, conflict of interest, fiduciary prudence, and the duty of loyalty”(Dobkin 
Hall, 2003, p. 20). By the 1940’s, the idea of professionalization was introduced as a 
dimension of corporate stewardship. The taxation and corporate structure of the 
charitable sector began to take shape as well and by the mid-1960’s more than 250,000 
charitable organizations were registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (Dobkin 
Hall, 2003).  
With the growth of the charitable sector concerns over the wealthy having 
influence over elected officials and legislators began to raise red flags as financial 
support for candidates was carried out via their own charitable foundations. The U.S. 
Congress had already set limits on lobbying activities by charitable organizations in the 
Revenue Act of 1934 in that “no substantial part of its activities shall be used to carry out 
propaganda” or “influence legislation”, but Congress enacted even tighter controls with 
the Revenue Act of 1954 that added charitable organizations were prohibited from 
“publishing or distributing of statements for any political campaign on behalf of any 
candidate for public office” (Harris, 2016, p 1). Foundations came under more scrutiny 
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when Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1969 creating specific corporate structure 
and governance rules for private foundations (who funded charitable work) and their 
trustees that were more stringent than their charitable counterparts (who carried out the 
work) (Arnsberger, et al, 2008). More recently, legislation was passed intended to 
improve transparency, accountability, and compliance for all tax exempt entities, but 
mainly at the state level. In California, the Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 and the 
Nonprofit Revitalization Act in New York in 2013 were received with wide support.  
Expectations of Nonprofit Leaders 
The Fiduciary Duties 
Nonprofit law is based in corporate law which is “the body of laws, rules, 
regulations, and practices that govern the formation and operation of corporations and 
regulates legal entities that exist to conduct business” (Legal Career Path, 2018, p. 1). As 
a subsection of corporate law, nonprofit law deals with charitable corporations and 
focuses on decision-makers, in this case board members and executives, and their 
fulfillment of a charitable mission. Corporate law has identified three comprehensive 
duties that directors and managers are responsible for which are also applied to nonprofit 
corporations – the duty of care, loyalty, and obedience. In California, tax exempt entities 
abide by California Charitable Corporate law which applies the fiduciary duty concepts to 
the expectations of officers, either board members or executives, who oversee California 
charities. In California officers are considered fiduciaries which requires them to, 
“control the corporation in a fair, just, and equitable manner” and “refrain from doing 
anything that harms the corporation” (California Department of Justice, 2017, p. 55).  
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The three main duties that nonprofit boards of directors are held responsible for 
are care, loyalty and obedience as presented in Table 3.1. Combined, these duties provide 
guidance related to the expectations of how boards will govern in a manner that ensures 
decisions are made for the organization’s best interest and promote transparency and 
good stewardship of resources. The duty of care requires board members to be actively 
engaged in the organization by attending board meetings regularly, reviewing 
organizational documents, and participating in the decision making process. The duty of 
loyalty requires board members to put the organization’s interests first by avoiding 
conflict of interest and any dealings that may personally benefit a board member. The 
duty of obedience requires board members to comply with state and federal regulations as 
well as with organizational policies and procedures.  
Table 3.1 
Nonprofit Leader Fiduciary Duty Responsibilities 
Duty of Care: Engagement, 
Attention, Informed Process of 
Decision-Making 
Duty of Loyalty: Procedural 
Aspects of Transactions and 
Self Interest 
Duty of obedience: Legal 
Compliance 
 Attends board meetings 
 Reviews information in 
advance in preparation for 
board meetings and to 
inform voting 
 Exercises independent 
judgment 
 Regularly reviews 
finances, policies, and 
executive performance 
 Discloses conflict of 
interests and potential 
self-benefit 
 Avoids organization 
resources for personal use 
 Maintains confidentiality 
 Ensures compliance with 
state and federal 
requirements 




 Makes decisions that 
align with tax exempt 
mission 
Note. Data is a compilation of Fishman, Schwartz & Mayer, 2015; Fremont-Smith, 2004; 
Hopkins, 2009. 
 
Duty of care. The duty of care revolves around engagement and according to 
Hopkins (2009), requires that a director is informed and “discharge his duties in good 
faith, with the care than an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would reasonably 
believe appropriate under similar circumstances” (p. 19). For board members and 
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executives, fulfilling the duty of care means regularly attending meetings, reviewing 
materials prior to meetings, and accessing the right sources of information in order to 
make informed decisions.  
We see a tension in fulfilling the duty of care in terms of accessing the right 
information for organizations with an executive. Both the directors and the executives are 
responsible to make informed decisions based on the appropriate information. However, 
board members tend to defer to and rely on the executive for information outside the 
scope of regular board materials such as financials, minutes, and committee reports. 
Therefore, if the executive is providing information to the board, they are held 
responsible to ensure that the board receives the appropriate information in a timely 
manner and the board is held responsible to ensure that they are receiving the appropriate 
information. There have been cases where the executive intentionally withheld 
information from the board and ultimately, the executive was found liable (see In Re 
Lemington Home for the Aged in Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015, p. 139-142). 
Duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty revolves around conflict of interest and 
according to Hopkins (2002) the basic legal principle is that “the director shall not use a 
corporate position for individual personal advantage” (p. 29). In order for board members 
and executives to fulfill the duty of loyalty they must acknowledge and deal with conflict 
of interests and maintain the confidentiality of organizational information. However, the 
duty of loyalty can be interpreted to mean more than just financially benefiting from 
organizational resources. Jan Masaoka (2010), a widely regarded nonprofit practitioner 
offers a multi-dimensionality approach to conflict of interest that goes beyond a board 
member who might benefit from a contract for services. Potential conflicts of interest 
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could be more subtle such as a board member who also serves on a competitor’s board or 
a board member who receives services as a client (Masaoka, 2010). Conflict of interest 
and private benefit have been cited in numerous court cases where board members and 
executives were found liable (see Alephi v. Diamandopoulus p. 162-168, Church of 
Scientology v. California Commissioner, p. 417-423, Nixon v. Lichtenstein, p. 152-155, 
Madden v. Commissioner, p. 712-718 in Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015) 
Duty of obedience. The duty of obedience revolves around compliance of state 
and federal laws as well as the policies and procedures adopted by the corporation itself 
(Fishman, Schwartz & Mayer, 2015). In order for nonprofits leaders to fulfill their duty 
of obedience, they must ensure that the organization fulfills its charitable purpose, 
submits required reports to state and federal agencies, ensure that taxes are paid (e.g. 
employment), and that internal policies and procedures such as the bylaws are followed. 
Palmiter (2010) recounts that the duty of obedience was the primary focus for 
corporations in their earliest forms, but has received less attention with the rise of 
additional corporate reforms and regulations. However, for nonprofits the duty of 
obedience is essential in that it requires organizations to focus on their charitable mission, 
the very reason they are given the legal tax exempt status. What this means is that 
nonprofit leaders must not engage in activities that are “ultra vires”, those that go beyond 
the scope of their mission (Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015, p. 181). Examples of 
ultra vires activity includes nonprofits that add programs and services that may earn 
additional revenues, but are not essential in the fulfillment of their missions such as 
selling t-shirts or advertising space. This idea of commercialization has been the basis for 
several court cases where directors and executives found liable for failure to fulfill the 
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duty of obedience, (see Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, p. 
537-543 and United States v. American College of Physicians in Fishman, Schwartz & 
Mayer, 2015). 
The Fiduciaries 
For nonprofit organizations, the board of directors and to the same extent the 
executive, fills the primary role of governance and are responsible to ensure that all 
resources are in place and used to fulfill the mission along with compliance of state and 
federal regulations and requirements. Often they are referred to as board members or 
officers, but legally they are collectively referred to as fiduciaries. The root meaning of 
the term fiduciary is trust and as mentioned earlier, English law used the term trustee to 
define the relationship of someone entrusted with the use of property on behalf of a 
beneficiary (Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015). However, nonprofit leaders of today 
are entrusted with a more than just property as they oversee the use of a variety of 
resources to fulfill a charitable mission including financial, physical, human, and 
intellectual.  
There is an assumption that the nonprofit sector can do no wrong and that those 
who serve as nonprofit leaders have special qualities. However, Salamon notes that the 
nonprofit sector is romanticized with a “myth of pure virtue” (as cited in Gibleman & 
Gelman, 2001, p. 63) and that the public places extremely high expectations on nonprofit 
leaders. Fremont-Smith (2004) elaborates on this idea with her notion that since the 
organization is meant to do good the people will do good while Fishman, Schwartz, and 
Mayer (2015) note that “a trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the 
marketplace” (p. 120). Yet, we know that nonprofit leaders are not immune to bad 
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behavior as evident in legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress at the turn of the 19
th
 
Century. The Revenue Act of 1909 introduced language prohibiting any individual from 
benefitting from organizational resources, i.e. private inurement (Arnsberger, et al, 2008) 
which points to the need to curb fraudulent activity of the time that continues to today as 
evident in the stories of nonprofit mismanagement. 
Boards. In the United States, nonprofit organizations must be incorporated and 
registered with both state and federal authorities. As part of the registration process, 
nonprofits are required to include the names of the individuals who will serve in the 
board roles of president, secretary, treasurer and vice president. This sub-set is referred to 
as the executive committee and along with general members are either appointed or 
elected as the fiduciary overseers of the organization depending on how the bylaws 
prescribe the nomination and election process. Although the United States is known for 
its generosity and volunteerism, asking people to spend time to serve on a board of 
directors is sometimes a challenge. A recent national survey (BoardSource, 2017) of 
more than 4,000 nonprofit board chairs and executives, reports that the average board 
size has decreased from 19 in 1994 to 15 in 2017 (pg. 17). The decrease may be 
attributed to organizations proactively reducing the number of board members based on 
the needs of the organization or it may be reactive as a result to the lack of board 
recruitment. However, more than likely, it is a combination of proactive and reactive 
reasons along with a variety of others. 
Beyond the legal fiduciary responsibilities, boards are asked to perform other 
duties such as a fundraiser, community advocate, or industry expert. However, these are 
not legally required as the fundamental duty of a board member is to direct the work of 
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the organization, not engage in the day-to-day activities. In this oversight capacity, the 
primary function of the board is to ensure that the resources are in place and allocated 
such resources, so that the organization fulfills its charitable mission. The fiduciary duties 
establish a solid foundation for board members to fulfill their oversight roles. 
Furthermore, board members who are engaged, understand their legal responsibilities, 
and put the interests of the organization above themselves are poised to fill additional 
roles to fulfill the mission. 
Executives. Executives are considered agents of the organization and are 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the organization, which gives them a 
considerable amount of influence and responsibility. Executives are appointed or hired, 
by the board of directors, report directly to the board, and are relied on by the board for 
information about the organization. Typically, executives are paid staff, but in the case of 
all volunteer organizations, they may serve in the executive capacity without pay. 
Regardless of the compensation arrangement, any individual who has been given 
executive responsibilities to manage the day-to-day activities is bound by many of the 
same requirements as boards and share in the governing responsibilities (FindLaw, 2016; 
Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015).  
Because executives have access to resources, the law pays particular attention to 
their compensation. Executive compensation must be determined prior to employment 
and decided by the board based on comparison of similar organizations, the market, 
organizational needs, and capacity (Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015). Executive 
performance must be evaluated by the board of directors to ensure that governance 
decisions are being carried out by the management. However, according to a national 
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study reported that only 60% of the organizations surveyed conducted annual board 
performance of the chief executive (BoardSource, 2017, p. 52). Conducting performance 
and evaluation of the chief executive ensures that compensation is appropriate and the 
executive is carrying out the mission of the organization which allows both the executive 
and board member to fulfill their fiduciary duties of obedience.  
The Regulatory Environment 
Liability 
Federal and State regulators are aware that nonprofit boards are made up of 
volunteers and serve in unpaid positions and understand that if the legal requirements are 
too burdensome, no one would want to fill the role. An interesting example of the tension 
of the voluntary nature of board service is the case of Pepperdine University. In 1931, 
George Pepperdine donated $3 million of his personal fortune to support the 
establishment of Pepperdine College in Los Angeles. More than a decade later in 1948, 
the college sued its founder when it faced more than $500,000 in debt after a series of bad 
investments made by Mr. Pepperdine while he served as the President of the board. The 
court ultimately dismissed the case, since it was the states’ responsibility to bring charges 
against a charitable entity and because of the lack of evidence that Mr. Pepperdine acted 
in an intentional, illegal manner. Although no one was charged, the Pepperdine case set a 
precedent of leniency toward nonprofit directors who “are essential volunteers, and 
aggressive attempts to enforce their responsibilities are inappropriate and will discourage 
individuals from board service” (Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, p. 127).  
The general expectation is that board members and executives will act on behalf 
of the best interest of the organization. However, sometimes board members and 
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executives make bad decisions either out of negligence or willful intent. Given that board 
members and executives are responsible for organizational resources and serve 
voluntarily, they have a certain amount of protection from liability. At the federal level, 
board members are covered under The Federal Volunteer Protection Act (FVP) that was 
enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1997 to 
[l]imit the liability of volunteers if they meet the following criteria: (1) the 
volunteer was acting within scope of her responsibilities at the time of the 
act or omission: (2) the volunteer was properly licensed, certified, or 
authorized by the appropriate authorities for the activities or practice in the 
state where the harm occurred: (3) the harm was not caused by willful or 
criminal misconduct, gross negligence, or reckless misconduct , or a 
conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual 
harmed by the volunteer: and (4) the harm was not caused by the volunteer 
operating a motor vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other vehicle for which the 
state required an operators license and insurance (Fishman, Schwartz, & 
Mayer, 2015, p. 146). 
 
Nonprofit organizations that have the financial resources to do so can purchase 
directors and officers insurance (D&O). This type of insurance protects the organization 
and provides additional coverage for paid executives. Organizations decide on their own 
how much insurance coverage they need and what they can afford. The FVP and D&O 
insurance are important because they legally allow the use of financial resources (that 
were otherwise intended to support the charitable mission) for indemnification purposes 
to protect the directors and executives. Indemnification is the “payment by an 
organization of a director’s legal costs, judgments, settlements, and other expenses 
arising out of litigation and theoretical legal action from a director’s service to the 
corporation” (Fishman, Schwartz, and Mayer, 2015, p. 147).  
The FVP is based on the law, which protects volunteers from misconduct and acts 
that are not illegal in nature. If a board member is found guilty of committing an illegal 
89 
 
act, the FVP is invalid. The D&O insurance can be used because is an agreement between 
the organization and the insurance company and the organization decides how much 
liability they are willing to realize. With the number of high profile cases of 
mismanagement, more and more nonprofits are looking at D&O insurance as a means to 
protect their organization. The demand is evidenced by Hartford Financial Services 
Group’s recent decision to expand its liability coverage for nonprofits (Business Wire, 
2017). Although the FVP and D&O insurance cannot protect an organization from a 
lawsuit, they are a means to protect and encourage individuals to serve as board members 
and executives given the high degree of responsibility.  
Federal Regulators 
Because nonprofits are corporations, the laws pertaining to their limits and 
purposes are decided by state legislative bodies. However, because they afforded 
exemption from federal taxes, the federal government plays an important regulatory role. 
Fremont-Smith (2004) describes the federal regulation of nonprofits that includes three 
components: (1) the U.S. Congress, that “determines the nature and scope of regulation”; 
(2) the Treasury Department, that prepares proposals for the “promulgation” of 
legislation along with the IRS (a branch of the Treasury) who administers the laws and 
regulations; and (3) the federal courts who “interpret the laws and regulations and 
determine their constitutionality” and “holds the ultimate power” (p. 377). Together, 
these entities work together to ensure that charitable organizations benefit society. 
As a bureau of the Department of the Treasury, the IRS is directed by Title 26 of 
the U.S. Code in order to fulfill its mission of helping American taxpayers to “understand 
and meet their tax responsibilities and enforce the law with integrity and fairness to all 
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(IRS, 2016a, p. 1). As such, it is a key player in the regulation of nonprofits as they are 
often the first to notice irregularities or are asked to look into specific cases of 
mismanagement. All tax exempt entities earning more than $50,000 in annual revenues 
are required to annually report their activities through the Form 990 Return of 
Organization Exempt from Income Tax (IRS, 2016b). If the IRS flags inconsistencies or 
irregularities in the Form 990, they will investigate. Usually, the irregularities are simple 
reporting errors while other times, they are egregious omissions of fact. If the IRS finds 
that a tax exempt organization has breached their fiduciary duties and has just cause, it 
can impose fines, penalties, and revoke tax exempt status. If the IRS finds criminal or 
illegal activities, the case moves to the courts to decide. However, many cases are 
resolved before they go to trial. 
State Regulators 
Each state has their own system to regulate and enforce charitable corporations 
and depending on the resources available, the states will take action first. A recent study 
mapped the regulatory environment for charitable oversight in the United States. The 
study found that the attorney general was the “sole state-level regulator” for 27 U.S. 
jurisdictions while the remaining 24 were bifurcated–divided between the attorney 
general and another state agency
2
 (Dietz, et al, 2017). The attorney general is typically 
responsible for “ensuring the proper use of charitable funds” through regulations and 
enforcement authority (Fremont-Smith, 2004, p. 54). In California, the attorney general is 
responsible for charity regulation, enforcement, and compliance. 
Because of the sheer number of tax exempt organizations, and the lack of 
resources, both the federal and state regulators are unable to investigate all reports of 
                                                 
2
 Jurisdictions include the 50 states and the District of Columbia 
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mismanagement or wrongdoing. Furthermore, for the IRS and state regulators, charitable 
regulation is just a small part of their responsibilities, compared to other areas such as 
consumer protection and corporate negligence (Helge, 2009). Furthermore, there are 
hundreds of thousands of nonprofit organizations with revenues less than $50,000 that the 
federal and state agencies have no way of knowing whether organizations are fulfilling 
their fiduciary duties or not. As such, it is difficult to know the extent of negligence and 
mismanagement in the nonprofit sector. Yet, despite the lack of resources, both the 
federal and state regulators want the same thing: the use of charitable assets to be used for 
charitable purposes. 
Breach of duties. Although we do not know the full extent of mismanagement 
and negligence in the nonprofit sector, there are many examples that provide insight into 
the types of issues that nonprofit leaders should take note of. Gibleman and Gelman 
(2001) surveyed domestic and international print media for charity fraud cases of less 
than $100,000 amongst nonprofit health and human services agencies from 1998 to 2000. 
Their search found 10 instances that occurred in the United States, totaling more than 
$347 million in theft, embezzlement, or mismanagement and in all cases, they discovered 
that, “the ultimate responsibility for the wrongdoing rested with the board” (p. 50). What 
is most telling about their study is their conclusion that although these cases were high 
profile and documented in the media, they were most likely not isolated events, but rather 
an emerging pattern in the sector (Gibleman & Gelman, 2001). 
There are other examples of breaches of the fiduciary duties found in legislative 
cases involving mismanagement of charitable organizations. One such case was Stern v. 
Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses (a.k.a. Sibley Hospital) in 
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1974 that revealed breaches in fiduciary duties by both the board and management. The 
Sibley Hospital case was a class action suit brought by the patients against the hospital 
alleging that finances were mismanaged and used to personally benefit the trustees. The 
case revealed that the board treasurer, Donald Ernst, had set up several investment 
accounts using hospital funds that he maintained exclusive control over. Although the 
board had between 25 and 30 trustees it seemed that most of the decisions were being 
made by Ernst and the hospital administrator, John Orem. The case was ultimately 
dismissed, but the trustees were held liable for mismanagement, self interest, and conflict 
of interest (Fishman, Schwartz, & Mayer, 2015).  
Knowledge Results 
In terms of measuring knowledge, the study focuses on how familiar nonprofit 
leaders are with the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience (self-reported) and an 
assessment of their actual knowledge. The questions used in the survey are presented 
followed by reliability, then results of nonprofit leader familiarity with fiduciary duties 
by role and by number of boards served in the past 15 years (board service), followed by 
actual fiduciary duty knowledge by role and by board service and finally, and finally a 
comparison of familiarity and actual knowledge by role. 
Self Reported Knowledge 
Survey questions. In order to assess knowledge of fiduciary responsibilities, 
respondents were given a brief description of each of the duties of care, loyalty, and 
obedience and were asked to rate their familiarity of each one using a 4-point Likert scale 
(Not at All Familiar, Slightly Familiar, Moderately Familiar, and Very Familiar). To get 
a sense of overall understanding of their fiduciary roles, respondents were asked two 
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additional questions: 1) if they believe they have enough knowledge to carry out their 
responsibilities and; 2) if they understood the organization’s mission. For these two 
questions, respondents were given a 4-point Likert scale (Disagree, Somewhat Disagree, 
Somewhat Agree, and Agree) for answer options. 
Reliability. Reliability for the familiarity of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, 
and obedience scale that consisted of three items was performed. The scale was found to 
be very reliable (α = .82) with each item in the same direction. Most items appeared to be 
worthy of retention, resulting in a decrease in the alpha if deleted. Table 3.2 provides 
descriptive data for the fiduciary duties. 
Table 3.2 
Descriptive Data for Familiarity of Fiduciary Duties for All Roles 
Fiduciary Duty 
N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
Care 184 3.8 4 .545 1 4 
Loyalty 183 3.8 4 .487 1 4 
Obedience 183 3.7 4 .606 1 4 
 
Results: Familiarity and Understanding by Role 
Respondents were asked questions about how familiar they are with the fiduciary 
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience, if they understood their organization’s mission, 
and if they had enough knowledge to carry out their responsibilities. First, the results are 
presented by role then by board service for how familiar they are with the fiduciary 
duties, their understanding of their organization’s mission, then if they have enough 
knowledge to carry out their responsibilities. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the means of how familiar nonprofit leaders are about the 
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience by role. Descriptive data for the means for 
the fiduciary duties for board members is presented in Table 3.3 and for executives in 
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Table 3.4. Board members are moderately or very familiar with the fiduciary duties of 
care (N = 104, M = 3.7), loyalty (N = 103, M = 3.8), and obedience (N = 103, M = 3.6). 
Similarly, executives are moderately or very familiar with the fiduciary duties of care (N 
= 82, M = 3.9), loyalty (N = 82, M = 3.9), and obedience (N = 82, M = 3.9).  
 
Figure 3.3. Means of nonprofit leader familiarity of fiduciary duties by role. 
 
Table 3.3  
Descriptive Data for Means of Familiarity of Fiduciary Duties for Board Members 
Fiduciary Duty 
N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Care 104 3.7 4 .655 1 4 
Loyalty 103 3.8 4 .536 1 4 
Obedience 103 3.6 4 .733 1 4 
 
Table 3.4  
Descriptive Data for Means of Familiarity of Fiduciary Duties for Executives 
Fiduciary Duty 
N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Care 82 3.9 4 .333 3 4 
Loyalty 82 3.9 4 .409 1 4 
Obedience 82 3.9 4 .318 3 4 
 
As presented in Table 3.5, board members somewhat agreed to agreed that they 

















understood the organization’s mission (N = 94, M = 3.9). Similarly, executives somewhat 
agreed and agreed that they had enough knowledge to carry out their responsibilities (N = 
82, M = 3.8) and agreed that they understood the organization’s mission (N = 82, M = 
3.9). 
Table 3.5  
Descriptive Data for Overall Understanding of Fiduciary Responsibilities by Board 
Members and Executives 
 
Questions N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
“As a board member, I…”       
Have enough knowledge to carry 
out my responsibilities 
95 3.6 4 .608 1 4 
Understand the organization’s 
mission 
94 3.9 4 .436 1 4 
“As an executive, I…”       
Have enough knowledge to carry 
out my responsibilities 
82 3.8 4 .404 2 4 
Understand the organization’s 
mission 
82 3.9 4 .191 3 4 
 
Results: Familiarity and Understanding by Board Service 
Figure 3.4 presents the means of how familiar nonprofit leaders are about the 
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience by board service. Nonprofit leaders who 
have served on one to four boards are moderately or very familiar with the fiduciary 
duties of care (N = 126, M = 3.8), loyalty, (N = 126, M = 3.8), and obedience (N = 126, M 
= 3.7). Similarly, nonprofit leaders who have served on five or more boards are also 
moderately or very familiar with the fiduciary duties of care (N = 31, M = 4.0), loyalty, 
(N = 31, M = 4.0), and obedience (N = 31, M = 3.9). Descriptive data for nonprofit leader 




Figure 3.4. Means of nonprofit leader familiarity of fiduciary duties by board service. 
Note. The 1-2 board and 3-4 board categories were collapsed into a new category, 1-4 
boards. The 5-6 board and 6+ board categories were collapsed into a new category, 5-
6/6+ boards. 
 
Table 3.6  
Descriptive Data of Nonprofit Leader Familiarity of Fiduciary Duties by Board Service 
 
Fiduciary Duties of Care N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
1-4 boards 126 3.8 4 .518 1 4 
5-6/6+ boards 31 4 4 0 4 4 
 
Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty       
1-4 boards 126 3.8 4 .510 1 4 
5-6/6+ boards 31 4 4 0 4 4 
 
Fiduciary Duty of Obedience       
1-4 boards 126 3.7 4 3.701 1 4 
5-6/6+ boards 31 3.9 4 3.897 3 4 
Note. The 1-2 board and 3-4 board categories were collapsed into a new category, 1-4 
boards. The 5-6 board and 6+ board categories were collapsed into a new category, 5-
6/6+ boards. 
 
Significance by Role 
Board members and executives are both legally responsible to uphold the 

















H1: Board members and executives have the same familiarity about each of the 
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. 
Table 3.7 presents the results of an independent t test conducted for familiarity of 
the duty of care for board members (N = 104, M = 3.7, SD = .599) and executives (N = 
82, M = 3.9, SD = .343); for the duty of loyalty for board members (N = 104, M = 3.8, SD 
= .534) and executives (N = 82, M = 3.9, SD = .416); and for the duty of obedience for 
board members (N = 104, M = 3.6, SD = .731) and executives (N = 82, M = 3.9, SD = 
.315) . There was a significant difference in board member and executive means for Care: 
t(184) = 16.570, p = .053 and Obedience: t(184) = 51.302, p = .001, but not for  or 
Loyalty: t(184) = 7.321, p = .146 (at the .05 significance level). Therefore, the hypothesis 
is not supported as there is significance between the means for board members and 
executives for the duties of care and obedience, but not for the duty of loyalty.  
Table 3.7 
Independent-sample t-Test Descriptive Data and Analysis for the Familiarity of Duties of 
Care, Loyalty, and Obedience by Role 
Fiduciary 
Duty 
Role N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
F t df P Sig. (2 
tailed) 
Care     16.570 -1.950 184 .000 .053 
 Board 
Member 
104 3.7 .599      
 Executive 82 3.9 .343      
Loyalty     7.321 -1.462 183.980 .007 .146 
 Board 
Member 
103 3.8 .534      
 Executive 82 3.9 .416      
Obedience     51.302 -3.402 184 .000 .001 
 Board 
Member 
103 3.6 .731      





Significance by Board Service 
Regardless of the number of boards nonprofit leaders have served on, they are 
legally responsible to uphold the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Nonprofit leaders have the same familiarity about each of the fiduciary duties 
of care, loyalty, and obedience regardless of the number of boards they have 
served on in the past 15 years. 
As such an independent samples t test was run to test for any significance between 
the nonprofit leaders who have served on four boards or less and those who have served 
on five or more boards. Table 3.8 presents the results for familiarity of the fiduciary duty 
of care for nonprofit leaders who have served one to four boards (N = 126, M = 3.8, SD = 
.515) and those who have served on five or more boards (N = 31, M = 4, SD = .180); for 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty for nonprofit leaders who have served one to four boards (N 
= 126, M = 3.8, SD = .512) and those who have served on five or more boards (N = 31, M 
= 4, SD = .180); and for the fiduciary duty of obedience for nonprofit leaders who have 
served one to four boards (N = 126, M = 3.7, SD = .648) and those who have served on 
five or more boards (N = 31, M = 3.9, SD = .301). There was a significant difference in 
board service for Care: t(155) = 17.887, p = .055, Loyalty: t(155) = 11.354, p = .110, and 
Obedience: t(155) = 13.268, p = .089 (at the .05 significance level). Therefore, the 
hypothesis is not supported as there is significance between the means for nonprofit 
leaders who have served on four boards or less and those who have served on five or 




Independent-sample t-Test Descriptive Data and Analysis for the Familiarity of Duties of 
Care, Loyalty, and Obedience by Board Service 
Fiduciary 
Duty 
Role N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
F t df P Sig. 
Care     17.887 -1.933 155 .000 .055 
 1-4 boards 126 3.8 .515      
 5-6/6+ boards 31 4.0 .180      
Loyalty     11.354 -1.606 155 .001 .110 
 1-4 boards 126 3.8 .512      
 5-6/6+ boards 31 4.0 .180      
Obedience     13.268 155 .089 .000 .089 
 1-4 boards 126 3.7 .648      
 5-6/6+ boards 31 3.9 .301      
Note. The 1-2 board and 3-4 board categories were collapsed into a new category - 1-4 




As explained in the previous section, respondents were asked about their 
familiarity of the fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and obedience. In this section, results 
are presented that illustrate what respondents actually know about their fiduciary 
responsibilities.  
Survey questions. Respondents were given 19 questions in order to test their 
actual knowledge of fiduciary duties. Actual knowledge means demonstrating accurate 
knowledge by answering the questions correctly. Eight questions focused on items 
typically found in organizational bylaws and 11 questions were focused on specific 
aspects of each of the fiduciary duties. Of the 19 questions, eight questions were either 
not legal responsibilities or items typically included in bylaws to “test” respondents’ 
ability to accurately answer. Respondents were given the option to answer “yes”, “no”, 
and “don’t know” (for bylaws only). For each correct answer, respondents were given a 
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“1” and for each incorrect answer, respondents were given a “0”. The highest possible 
score is 19. 
Respondents were asked eight questions about what items were included their 
organization’s bylaws. The items included are those typically found in nonprofit bylaws 
with the exception of five that are not. The purpose of asking about bylaws was explore 
how many nonprofit leaders may have read their bylaws which is an aspect of fulfilling 
the fiduciary duty of obedience, knowing how the organization should conduct its 
decision making process. Next, respondents were to asked 11 questions related to legal 
responsibilities (required by federal and state law) of nonprofit boards and executives. 
Three comprise the duty of care, three comprised the duty of loyalty, and one comprised 
the duty of obedience. Of the 11 questions, four of were not legal responsibilities. All 
questions are presented in Table 3.10. 
By role. Table 3.9 presents the results of board members and executive actual 
knowledge of their fiduciary responsibilities. Actual knowledge is a combination of the 
11 legal responsibilities and the eight bylaws questions for a total possible score of 19. A 
70% standard was applied to determine if respondents passed, since it is considered a 
passing grade (i.e. a “C”) for most academic institutions. Overall, 54% nonprofit leaders 
scored a passing grade (N = 186). For board members, 41% scored a passing grade (N = 
104) while 70% of the executives (N = 82) scored a passing grade. 
Table 3.9 
Descriptive Data for Passing Score of Actual Knowledge of Legal Responsibility by Role 
 N % 
Passed Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Board Members 104 41% 15.3 16 1.20 14 19 
Executives 82 70% 15.9 15.5 1.28 14 19 
All Roles 186 54% 15.6 15.5 1.28 14 19 
Note.  Passing score based on 70%, 14 out of 19 possible points. 
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As presented in Table 3.10, when looking at specific aspects of fiduciary 
knowledge, the results show that nonprofit leaders have a range of actual knowledge. For 
example, in terms of legal duties, 82% of nonprofit leaders (N = 170) knew that 
frequently reviewing the organization’s finances and financial policies was a legal 
responsibility; 97% (N = 172) knew that disclosing conflict of interest was a legal 
responsibility; and 96% (N = 171) knew that ensuring compliance with state and federal 
regulations was a legal responsibility. Conversely, only 30% (N = 171) knew that 
reviewing board meeting materials prior to the board meeting was a legal responsibility 
and only 51% (N = 171) knew that regular attendance of board meetings was a legal 
responsibility. 
With regards to the bylaws questions, 99% of nonprofit leaders knew that board 
service positions, terms, and voting power (N = 164) were in the bylaws; 76% knew that 
executive staff roles and responsibilities were included in the bylaws (N = 159). 
Conversely, only 46% (N = 146) knew that financial accounting procedures were not in 
the bylaws and only 60% (N = 156) knew that the board’s expected financial commitment 





Questions and Descriptive Data about Legal Responsibilities by All Roles 
Questions N % Correct 
Duty of Care Responsibilities   
1. Regular attendance of board meetings 171 51% 
2. Reviewing board meeting materials prior to the board meeting 171 30% 
3. Frequently reviewing organization’s finances and financial 
policies 170 82% 
Duty of Loyalty Responsibilities   
4. Disclosing potential conflicts of interest 172 97% 
5. Using independent judgment when making decisions about 
organizational resources 172 65% 
Duty of Obedience Responsibilities   
6. Ensuring that individual board members, staff, or donors do 
not use organizational resources for personal reasons 171 94% 
7. Ensuring compliance with state and federal regulators 171 96% 
Not a Legal Responsibility   
8. Developing a strategic plan 168 78% 
9. Managing the day-to-day activities of the organization 170 87% 
10. Developing collaborations and partnerships with other 
organizations 169 86% 
11. Developing performance indicators for program effectiveness 164 78% 
Bylaws Items   
12. Board service positions, terms, and voting power 164 99% 
13. Board nomination and election process 161 94% 
14. Executive staff roles and responsibilities 159 76% 
Not Bylaw Items   
15. Financial accounting procedures 146 46% 
16. Donor relations strategy 138 83% 
17. Organizational strategic plan 151 68% 
18. Board’s expected financial commitment 156 60% 
19. Annual operating budget 157 69% 
Note. Percentage correct based on the number of respondents that correctly answered 
each question.  
 
Table 3.11 presents the specific aspects of fiduciary knowledge results by role. 
When analyzed by role, the results show that board members and executives vary in their 
actual knowledge. For board members and actual knowledge of their legal 
responsibilities, 80% (N = 95) knew that frequently reviewing the organization’s finances 
and financial policies was a legal responsibility; 95% (N = 97) knew that disclosing 
conflict of interest was a legal responsibility; and 96% (N = 96) knew that ensuring 
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compliance with state and federal regulations was a legal responsibility. Conversely, only 
34% (N = 96) knew that reviewing board meeting materials prior to the board meeting 
was a legal responsibility and 50% (N = 96) knew that regular attendance of board 
meetings was a legal responsibility. 
With regards to the bylaws questions, 99% of board members (N = 91) knew that 
board service positions, terms, and voting power were in the bylaws; 97% knew that the 
board nomination and election process was included in the bylaws (N = 88). Conversely, 
only 38% (N = 77) knew that financial accounting procedures were not in the bylaws and 
52% (N = 85) knew that the board’s expected financial commitment was not included in 
the bylaws. 
For executives and legal duties, 100% (N = 75) knew that disclosing conflicts of 
interest was a legal responsibility and 99% (N = 75) knew that ensuring that individual 
board members, staff, or donors do not use organizational resources for personal reasons 
was a legal responsibility. Conversely, only 25% (N = 75) knew that reviewing board 
meeting materials prior to the board meeting was a legal responsibility and 53% (N = 75) 
knew that regular attendance of board meetings was a legal responsibility. 
With regards to the bylaws questions, 99% of executives (N = 73) knew that 
board service positions, terms, and voting power were in the bylaws; 90% knew that the 
board nomination and election process was included in the bylaws (N = 73). Conversely, 
only 55% (N = 69) knew that financial accounting procedures were not in the bylaws and 






Questions and Descriptive Data about Legal Responsibilities by Role 
Questions Board 
N 






Duty of Care Responsibilities     
1 Regular attendance of board meetings 96 50% 75 53% 
2 Reviewing board meeting materials prior to the 
board meeting 96 34% 75 25% 
3 Frequently reviewing organization’s finances 
and financial policies 95 80% 75 85% 
Duty of Loyalty Responsibilities     
4 Disclosing potential conflicts of interest 97 95% 75 100% 
5 Using independent judgment when making 
decisions about organizational resources 97 65% 75 64% 
Duty of Obedience Responsibilities     
6 Ensuring that individual board members, staff, 
or donors do not use organizational resources 
for personal reasons 97 90% 75 99% 
7 Ensuring compliance with state and federal 
regulators 96 96% 75 97% 
Not a Legal Responsibility     
8 Developing a strategic plan 94 69% 74 89% 
9 Managing the day-to-day activities of the 
organization 96 79% 74 97% 
10 Developing collaborations and partnerships 
with other organizations 95 79% 74 95% 
11 Developing performance indicators for 
program effectiveness 91 75% 73 82% 
Bylaws Items     
12 Board service positions, terms, and voting 
power 91 99% 73 99% 
13 Board nomination and election process 88 97% 73 90% 
14 Executive staff roles and responsibilities 88 83% 71 68% 
Not Bylaw Items     
15 Financial accounting procedures 77 38% 69 55% 
16 Donor relations strategy 68 78% 70 87% 
17 Organizational strategic plan 80 54% 71 83% 
18 Board’s expected financial commitment 85 52% 71 70% 
19 Annual operating budget 84 58% 73 81% 
Note. Percentage correct based on the number of respondents that correctly answered 




By board service. Table 3.12 presents the results of nonprofit leaders by board 
service actual knowledge of their fiduciary responsibilities. The actual knowledge is a 
combination of the 11 legal responsibilities and the eight bylaws questions for a total 
possible score of 19. A 70% standard was applied to determine if respondents passed, 
since it is considered a passing grade (i.e. a “C”) for most academic institutions. When 
analyzed by board service, 56% of those who have served on one to four boards scored a 
passing grade (N = 126) and 31% of those who have served on five or more boards 
scored a passing grade (N = 31). 
Table 3.12  
Descriptive data for passing score of actual knowledge of legal responsibility by board 
service 
 N % 
Passed Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
1-4 Boards 126 56% 15.7 15.5 1.27 14 19 
5-6/6+ Boards 31 31% 15.5 15.5 1.34 14 19 
Note.  Passing score based on 70%, 14 out of 19 possible points. The 1-2 board and 3-4 
board categories were collapsed into a new category - 1-4 boards. The 5-6 board and 6+ 
board categories were collapsed into a new category - 5-6/6+ boards. 
 
Table 3.13 presents the specific aspects of fiduciary knowledge results by board 
service. When analyzed by board service, the results show that actual knowledge of legal 
duties decreases the more boards that nonprofit leaders serve on. For example, in terms of 
legal duties, 53% of nonprofit leaders who have served on one to four boards (N = 125) 
knew that regularly attending board meetings was a legal requirement compared to 42% 
of those who served on more than five boards (N = 31). Ninety nine percent of those who 
served on one to four boards (N = 126) knew that disclosing potential conflicts of interest 
was a legal requirement compared to 87% of those who have served on five or more 
boards (N = 31).  
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The opposite occurred in terms of knowing what items were not legal 
responsibilities. For example, 76% of the nonprofit leaders who served on one to four 
boards (N = 122) knew that developing a strategic plan was not a legal responsibility 
compared to 90% of those who served on five or more boards (N = 31) while 85% of 
nonprofit leaders who served on one to four boards (N = 123) knew that developing 
collaborations and partnerships with other organizations was not a legal responsibility 
















Boards   
% Correct 
Duty of Care Responsibilities     
1 Regular attendance of board meetings 125 53% 31 42% 
2 Reviewing board meeting materials prior to the 
board meeting 125 33% 31 23% 
3 Frequently reviewing organization’s finances 
and financial policies 124 87% 31 71% 
Duty of Loyalty Responsibilities     
4 Disclosing potential conflicts of interest 126 99% 31 87% 
5 Using independent judgment when making 
decisions about organizational resources 126 68% 31 55% 
Duty of Obedience Responsibilities     
6 Ensuring that individual board members, staff, 
or donors do not use organizational resources 
for personal reasons 126 94% 31 87% 
7 Ensuring compliance with state and federal 
regulators 125 97% 31 97% 
Not a Legal Responsibility     
8 Developing a strategic plan 122 76% 31 90% 
9 Managing the day-to-day activities of the 
organization 124 86% 31 94% 
10 Developing collaborations and partnerships 
with other organizations 123 85% 31 97% 
11 Developing performance indicators for 
program effectiveness 119 77% 30 87% 
Bylaws Items     
12 Board service positions, terms, and voting 
power 116 98% 31 100% 
13 Board nomination and election process 115 91% 31 100% 
14 Executive staff roles and responsibilities 114 74% 30 80% 
Not Bylaw Items     
15 Financial accounting procedures 104 45% 31 45% 
16 Donor relations strategy 96 85% 30 83% 
17 Organizational strategic plan 107 68% 29 72% 
18 Board’s expected financial commitment 113 57% 30 73% 
19 Annual operating budget 111 71% 31 65% 
Note. The 1-2 board and 3-4 board categories were collapsed into a new category - 1-4 





Actual Knowledge of Each Duty 
By role. Table 3.14 presents and Figure 3.5 illustrate the results of nonprofit 
leaders with a passing score of actual knowledge of each of the duties of care, loyalty, 
and obedience by role. A passing score was given if they answered each question in each 
duty construct correctly (see Table 3.11 for list of questions in each construct by role). 
For board members, 59% (N = 104) passed the duty of care, 25% (N = 104) passed the 
duty of loyalty, and 90% (N = 97) passed the duty of obedience. For the executives, 59% 
(N = 82) passed the duty of care, 18% (N = 82) passed the duty of loyalty, and 99% (N = 
75) passed the duty of obedience 
Table 3.14 
Percentage of Actual Knowledge of Fiduciary Duties by role  
Role N % Passed 
Board Members   
Care 104 59% 
Loyalty 104 25% 
Obedience 97 90% 
Executives   
Care 82 59% 
Loyalty 82 18% 
Obedience 75 99% 
Note. Passing score based on answering each question in each construct correctly. 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Percentage of nonprofit leader actual knowledge of fiduciary care, loyalty, 






















Board service. Table 3.15 presents and Figure 3.6 illustrates the results of 
nonprofit leaders with a passing score of actual knowledge of each of the duties of care, 
loyalty, and obedience by board service. A passing score was given if they answered each 
question in each duty construct correctly (see Table 3.13 for list of questions in each 
construct by board service). For nonprofit leaders who have served on one to four boards, 
25% (N = 126) passed the duty of care, 67% (N = 126) passed the duty of loyalty, and 
94% (N = 126) passed the duty of obedience. For those who have served on five or more 
boards, 23% (N = 31) passed the duty of care, 52% (N = 31) passed the duty of loyalty, 
and 87% (N = 31) passed the duty of obedience 
Table 3.15 
Percentage of Actual Knowledge of Fiduciary Duty by board service  
 N % Passed 
1-4 boards   
Care 126 25% 
Loyalty 126 67% 
Obedience 126 94% 
5-6/6+ boards   
Care 31 23% 
Loyalty 31 52% 
Obedience 31 87% 
Note. Passing score based on answering each question in each construct correctly. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Percentage of nonprofit leader actual knowledge of fiduciary care, loyalty, 






















Familiarity vs. Actual Knowledge 
Figure 3.7 illustrates presents the comparison of how familiar nonprofit leaders 
say they are with the fiduciary duties and their actual knowledge of specific aspects of the 
fiduciary duties for board members and Figure 3.8 illustrates the comparison of how 
familiar nonprofit leaders say they are with the fiduciary duties and their actual 
knowledge of specific aspects of the fiduciary duties for executives. Familiarity is 
presented by the means based on a 4-point Likert scale (Not at All Familiar, Slightly 
Familiar, Moderately Familiar, Very Familiar) and the actual knowledge score is based 
on the percentage who received a passing score of at least 70% for the 11 legal 
responsibilities and the eight bylaws questions. Overall, 41% of board members and 70% 
of the executives received a passing score for actual knowledge. 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Means of familiarity of duty of care, loyalty, and obedience compared to the 
percentage of actual knowledge of overall fiduciary care, loyalty, and obedience for 
board members.  
Note. The dotted line represents the percentage (41%) of board members (care N = 104, 
loyalty, N = 103, and obedience, N = 97) who received a passing score of 70% or better 
for the 19 questions about legal responsibilities and bylaws. Percentage for chart plotting 
was determined by calculating the proportion of 41% of 4 (the maximum mean score), 
which is 1.6. 
 













Figure 3.8. Means of familiarity of duty of care, loyalty, and obedience compared to the 
percentage of actual knowledge of overall fiduciary care, loyalty, and obedience for 
executives. 
Note. The dotted line represents the overall percentage (70%) of executives (care N = 82, 
loyalty, N = 82, and obedience, N = 75) who received a passing score of 70% or better for 
the 19 questions about legal responsibilities and bylaws. Percentage for chart plotting was 















In this study, when nonprofit leaders were asked how familiar they were with the 
duties of care, loyalty, and obedience, the results indicate that they were moderately to 
very familiar. However, when they were tested for their actual knowledge of the legal 
responsibilities, only 41% of the board members and 70% of the executives received a 
passing score. What follows is a discussion about the gaps between familiarity and actual 
knowledge, first by the executives, then by the board members, and lastly by board 
service. 
The Gaps: Familiarity with Duties and Actual Knowledge 
Executives 
In terms of understanding their organization’s mission and having enough 
knowledge to carry out their responsibilities and overall familiarity with the duties of care 
(M = 3.9), loyalty (M = 3.9), and obedience (M = 3.9), executives responded with a great 
deal of familiarity. And, although it was expected that executives would be more familiar 
with the duties of care, loyalty, and obedience than board members, the hypothesis was 
partially supported for the duty of loyalty (even though it was found to not be statistically 
significant) and for the duty of obedience, but not for the duty of care. For the duty of 
care, the results for the executives and board members were the same (M = 3.9).  
Duty of obedience. The duty of obedience focuses on compliance and ensuring 
that the mission is fulfilled. Because executives are in charge of the day-to-day 
management of the organization, these results are not surprising. Most executives are 
aware of, and often responsible for carrying out, annual reporting requirements such as 
the Form 990 annual tax return as well as work with the bookkeeper, auditor, and board 
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to ensure items are submitted in a timely manner. Additionally, executives are intimately 
involved with the financial aspects of the organization and are responsible for providing 
information to the board. This explanation is supported by the specific legal 
responsibility results. Ninety nine percent of the executives knew that their legal 
responsibility was to ensure that staff, donors, and board members not use organizational 
resources for personal reasons while 97% of executives knew that compliance with state 
and federal regulators was a legal responsibility. 
Bylaws. Bylaws are related to the duty of obedience in terms of compliance. 
Bylaws outline how the organization will conduct its business and once adopted, bylaws 
are legally binding. Nearly all of the executives correctly identified that board service 
positions, terms, and voting power (99%) and board nomination and election processes 
(90%) were included in their organization’s bylaws. These results are not surprising, 
given that boards utilize bylaws particularly for the nomination process. Executives are 
usually asked to serve on the nominating committee to provide technical guidance to 
committee members. And, conversely executives may want to serve on the nominating 
committee to get a sense of who may be a potential board member, in other words, who 
their next boss might be. 
Only 68% of the executives correctly identified that executive staff roles and 
responsibilities were included in the bylaws. This is surprising given that the bylaws 
outline overall authority of the executive related to signing contracts, finances, and bank 
access. For executives, it would be imperative to know how much formal authority they 
have and how their relationship with the board is legally defined.  
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Duty of care. The duty of care focuses on paying attention and being engaged by 
making informed decisions. What is surprising with the results is the lack of actual 
knowledge that executives have about the legal responsibilities related to the duty of care. 
Only 53% of the executives correctly identified regular attendance of board meetings as a 
legal responsibility and only 25% correctly identified reviewing board meeting materials 
prior to the board meeting as a legal responsibility. These are relatively low percentage. 
However, 85% of the executives correctly identified frequently reviewing the 
organization’s finances and financial policies as a legal responsibility. Although this 
number is greater than the other two, there is room for improvement. 
It is not surprising to see that executives are more knowledgeable about their 
financial responsibilities given that more executives correctly identified reviewing 
financial materials as a legal responsibility. However, what is surprising is how little they 
understand the legal basis for board engagement. It would seem that if executives 
understood that regular attendance of board members in board meetings and reviewing 
materials prior to the board meeting were actual legal responsibilities, they may see 
increased board engagement. However, the gap is that the executives do not seem to 
understand themselves that these are legal responsibilities. 
Duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty focuses on conflict of interest and putting the 
interests of the organization above the interests of the individual. While it seems that all 
of the executives (100%) correctly identified disclosing potential conflicts of interest as a 
legal responsibility, only 64% correctly identified the need to use independent judgment 
when making decisions about organizational resources as a legal responsibility. The 
conflict of interest results are not surprising, because conflict of interest is a widely 
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discussed topic in the nonprofit sector and there are many practical tools available to 
address. However, what is surprising is the low percentage of executives who do not 
know that independent judgment is a legal responsibility. This may be explained by the 
executives’ assumption that focusing more on conflict of interest deters board members 
putting their personal interest above the organization. Or, it may be explained by the 
nature of board service. Given that board members are volunteers, executives may have 
an assumption that board members have altruistic intentions for service. In either case, it 
is important for the executive to know that conflict of interest is a means to ensure that 
the duty of loyalty is fulfilled, however, board intentions, which are followed by actions, 
are also subject to legal standards. 
Board 
In terms of understanding their organization’s mission and having enough 
knowledge to carry out their responsibilities and overall familiarity with the duties of care 
(M = 3.7), loyalty (M = 3.8), and obedience (M = 3.6), for the most part, board members 
were familiar. In terms of actual knowledge, overall 41% of the board members surveyed 
received a passing score for their actual knowledge of their legal responsibilities. The 
duty of obedience received the highest score (90%), followed by the duty of care (59%), 
then the duty of loyalty (25%). To explore the gap between the familiarity with the 
fiduciary duties and actual knowledge, what follows are specific aspects of each of the 
duty of care, loyalty, and obedience constructs that are worth exploring.  
Duty of obedience. The duty of obedience focuses on compliance and ensuring 
that the mission is fulfilled. Although the duty of obedience was the least familiar duty 
amongst board members, in terms of legal responsibilities, it was the most correct. Ninety 
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percent of the board members knew that their legal responsibility was to ensure that staff, 
donors, and board members not use organizational resources for personal reasons while 
96% of board members knew that compliance with state and federal regulators was a 
legal responsibility. A possible explanation for this is that board members know that they 
have to file tax returns, pay payroll taxes, and submit annual reports, but they may not 
understand these as actual legal responsibilities. Furthermore, they may not refer to these 
activities as related to the duty of obedience. 
Bylaws. Bylaws are related to the duty of obedience in terms of compliance. 
Bylaws outline how the organization will conduct its business and once adopted, bylaws 
are legally binding. Nearly all of the board members correctly identified that board 
service positions, terms, and voting power (99%) and board nomination and election 
processes (97%) were included in their organization’s bylaws. These results are not 
surprising, given that boards utilize nominating committees for board succession. The 
majority of nominating committees are made up of board members and it is common 
practice to refer to the bylaws to ensure that they are following the appropriate steps in 
nominating new board members. 
Duty of care. The duty of care focuses on paying attention to the work and being 
engaged by making informed decisions. What is surprising with these results is the lack 
of actual knowledge that board members have about the legal responsibilities related to 
the duty of care. Only 50% correctly identified regular attendance of board meetings as a 
legal responsibility and only 34% correctly identified reviewing board meeting materials 
prior to the board meeting as a legal responsibility. These are relatively low percentages. 
However, 80% correctly identified frequently reviewing the organization’s finances and 
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financial policies as a legal responsibility. Although this number is greater than the other 
two, there is room for improvement. 
It is not surprising to see that board members are more knowledgeable about their 
legal financial responsibilities given that financial reports are a primary agenda item at 
board meetings. However, what is surprising is how little they understand that attending 
board meetings is a legal responsibility, but that it is necessary in order to engage in the 
decision making process, another legal responsibility. When decisions cannot be made, 
because of a lack of quorum, the organization suffers. When the work of the organization 
suffers, board members can be found liable for a breach of their fiduciary duty of care 
and obedience. 
Duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty focuses on conflict of interest and putting the 
interests of the organization above the interests of the individual. While it seems that 
most of the board members (95%) correctly identified disclosing potential conflicts of 
interest as a legal responsibility, only 65% correctly identified the need to use 
independent judgment when making decisions about organizational resources as a legal 
responsibility. The conflict of interest results are not surprising, because conflict of 
interest is a widely discussed topic in the nonprofit sector and there are many practical 
tools available to address. However, what is surprising is the low percentage of board 
members who do not know that independent judgment is a legal responsibility. This 
might be explained by the assumption that board members have the best interests of the 
organization as a priority, but may lack the awareness that this is based in their legal 
responsibilities. Or, it may be explained by the executive’s role of informing the board 
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and making recommendations about organizational direction resulting in reliance on, and 
deference to, the executive. 
By Board Service 
Overall, nonprofit leaders who have served on one to four boards had a high 
degree of familiarity with the duty of care (M = 3.8), loyalty (M = 3.8), and obedience (M 
= 3.7). Similarly, nonprofit leaders who have served on five or more boards also had a 
high degree of familiarity of the duty of care (M = 4.0), loyalty (M = 4.0), and obedience 
(M = 3.9), partially supporting the hypothesis that familiarity with fiduciary duties 
increases as board service increases based on the differences between the means of the 
familiarity of the duty of obedience between nonprofit leaders who serve on more boards 
as statistically significant. 
However, for nonprofit leaders who have served on one to four boards, 25% 
received a passing score for their actual knowledge of the duty of care, 67% for duty of 
loyalty, and 94% for the duty of obedience. For those who have served on five or more 
boards, 23% received a passing score for the duty of care, 52% for the duty of loyalty, 
and 87% for the duty of obedience. To explore the gap between the familiarity with the 
fiduciary duties and actual knowledge, what follows are specific aspects of each of the 
duty of care, loyalty, and obedience constructs that are worth exploring.  
Duty of obedience. The duty of obedience focuses on compliance and ensuring 
that the mission is fulfilled. The results show that as board service increases, actual 
knowledge decreases. This is supported by the results of nonprofit leader actual 
knowledge of legal responsibilities when analyzed by board service. For nonprofit leaders 
who have served on one to four boards, 94% correctly identified that not using 
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organizational resources for personal benefit was a legal responsibility compared to those 
who have served on five or more boards (87%). Yet when ensuring compliance with state 
and federal regulations, the percentages of nonprofit leaders who correctly identified 
ensuring compliance with state and federal regulations was legal responsibility was the 
same, regardless of board service (97%). This is a curious result because it is assumed 
that an increase in board service, translates into an increase of knowledge. However, what 
may be happening is that nonprofit leaders may be concurrently serving on multiple 
boards, thus diluting their ability to absorb new knowledge. A 2016 study of 2,300 U.S. 
nonprofit board members revealed that for those who sit on more than one board, on 
average, they serve on four additional boards (Russell Reynolds Associates, 2016). 
Bylaws. Bylaws are related to the duty of obedience in terms of compliance. 
Bylaws outline how the organization will conduct its business and once adopted, bylaws 
are legally binding. There were slight increases in actual knowledge as board service 
increased. Nonprofit leaders who have served on one to four boards correctly identified 
that board service positions, terms, and voting power (98%); board nomination and 
election processes (91%); and executive staff roles and responsibilities (74%) were 
included in their organization’s bylaws. Compared to the nonprofit leaders who have 
served on five or more boards 100% correctly identified that board service positions, 
terms, and voting power; 100% correctly identified board nomination and election 
processes; and 80% correctly identified that executive staff roles and responsibilities 
were included in their organization’s bylaws. These results are not surprising based on 
the possible explanations described previously. 
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Duty of care. The duty of care focuses on paying attention to the work and being 
engaged by making informed decisions. What is surprising with these results is the 
decrease in actual knowledge as board service increases. For nonprofit leaders who have 
served on one to four boards, 53% correctly identified regular attendance of board 
meetings as a legal responsibility compared to 42% of those who have served on five or 
more boards. Thirty three percent of nonprofit leaders who served on one to four boards 
correctly identified reviewing board meeting materials prior to the board meeting as a 
legal responsibility compared to 23% of those who have served on five or more boards. It 
is difficult to explain these results, because it is expected that more board service would 
translate into greater understanding of legal responsibilities. However, if nonprofit 
leaders are not given the opportunity to fully understand their responsibilities they bring 
their lack of knowledge with them to other boards they serve on. 
Duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty focuses on conflict of interest and putting the 
interests of the organization above the interests of the individual. Again, when analyzed 
by board service, we see a decrease in knowledge as board service increases. For 
nonprofit leaders who have served on one to four boards 99% correctly identified 
disclosing potential conflicts of interest as a legal responsibility compared to 87% of 
those who have served on five or more boards. And, 68% of the nonprofit leaders who 
have served on one to four boards correctly identified the need to use independent 
judgment when making decisions about organizational resources as a legal responsibility 
compared to 55% of those who have served on five or more boards.  
The conflict of interest results are surprising, because on the one hand, conflict of 
interest is a widely discussed topic in the nonprofit sector and there are many practical 
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tools available to address. And, on the other we would expect this percentage to be 
similar for those who have more board service, not decrease. Again, the decrease in 
knowing that independent judgment is a legal responsibility as board service increases is 
perplexing. More research is needed to better explore this area. 
Implications 
This study highlights the need for greater awareness of fiduciary responsibility 
knowledge and competence amongst nonprofit leaders. Overall, nonprofit leaders can use 
the results of this study to identify areas where greater awareness and knowledge is 
needed to support governance. Specifically the duty of care is an area that both 
executives and board members need to understand better. Showing up to meetings is the 
first step in fulfilling the legal responsibilities as a board member and executive. 
However, based on the results, many board members and executives do not understand 
that this is a legal responsibility and as such, most likely do not make attendance a 
priority. As board members attend meetings, they become more engaged in their 
oversight role and better informed about the organization’s needs. Greater engagement 
strengthens their governance function and by default will meet legal accountability in 
fulfillment of the organization’s mission. 
The results of this study can also impact legislators and regulators. Given that 
legislators outline the expectations of nonprofit governance, they can use the results to 
understand gaps in what is expected and what is enforced. Because the fiduciary duties of 
care, loyalty, and obedience are expectations for all nonprofit leaders, regardless of 
organizational size, purpose, or location, they can be used as a basis to develop a 
standardized process that assesses a nonprofit leader’s readiness for service. In turn, the 
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assessment can be used during the orientation process to ensure that their board is made 
up of leaders that know their legal responsibilities. Furthermore, an assessment would 
help organizations use their resources to address specific gaps to deter mismanagement 
and wrong doing, whether negligent or willful.  
Finally, the results of this study can impact those who consult with and provide 
professional services to nonprofits such as lawyers. Consultants are often hired to help 
with technical and systemic issues that nonprofits face. For governance issues, 
consultants can use the results of this study to support their recommendations as based on 
legal responsibilities for legitimacy. Furthermore, lawyers who may provide legal counsel 
can use the results of this study to address the basic legal responsibilities in a manner that 
nonprofit leaders can understand.  
Future Research 
This chapter reveals a gap between self reported and actual knowledge amongst 
nonprofit leaders both by role and board service. While this study is exploratory, in that it 
pilots an assessment tool and seeks to establish baseline data for future research, it 
highlights the need for greater awareness of fiduciary responsibility knowledge and 
competence. Additional empirical use of the assessment tool developed for this study will 
add not only to the nonprofit literature but also to the nonprofit law literature. 
Additionally, future qualitative research may help to uncover the underlying reasons why 





CHAPTER 4: SOURCE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY KNOWLEDGE 
Nonprofit regulations hold nonprofit leaders responsible for the oversight of tax 
exempt organization resources. However, apart from these guidelines, there are no 
standardized systems to determine if leaders have the appropriate knowledge nor to 
assess whether the source of their knowledge is credible. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that many board members and executives lack the appropriate knowledge about their 
fiduciary responsibilities (see chapter three). The broader purpose of this study is to 
establish baseline data about nonprofit leader knowledge of their fiduciary 
responsibilities, sources of knowledge, and application of knowledge in the performance 
of their fiduciary responsibilities. The purpose of this chapter is to inductively establish 
what internal and external sources (or best practices) nonprofit leaders (board members 
and executives) access to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. The results provide 
key insights into how to address the knowledge gap.  
How Nonprofit Leaders Learn About Their Fiduciary Duties 
Nonprofits utilize many of the widely-accepted industry standard best practices to 
learn about their fiduciary responsibilities including accounting, marketing, program 
delivery, and fundraising resources and tools. For example, accounting best practices 
support financial management while fundraising best practices provide guidance about 
how to build a donor base. Yet, with the numerous standards available, what this study 
reveals is that nonprofit leaders prefer to access informal, socialized learning 
opportunities more than other formalized sources.  
With regards to internal sources that are provided by their own nonprofit 
organizations, the sources nonprofit leaders utilize most, in order to learn about their 
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fiduciary responsibilities, are informal conversations with board members and staff rather 
than formal board trainings, educational opportunities, or a board manual. The high 
reliance on informal sources of learning is the same when analyzed by role and board 
service. With regards to external sources nonprofit leaders access to learn about their 
fiduciary responsibilities, the findings show some differences between board members 
and executives in the type of external resources that are utilized. When analyzed by role, 
board members tend to utilize webinars, websites, print media and academic and 
certification programs more than executives. However, when analyzed by board service, 
there is a slight increase in reliance on websites for nonprofit leaders who have served on 
six or more boards in the past 15 years. These results contribute to the development of 
nonprofit leader trainings that suggest a more interactive, personable approach may be 
what is needed in order to ensure that nonprofit leaders have the necessary knowledge to 
fulfill their fiduciary duties. 
In chapter three, results were presented about nonprofit leader knowledge of their 
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience as a means to meet legal accountability 
for what. What the results revealed is that nonprofit leaders think they know more than 
they actually do. After comparing how familiar board members reported they were with 
the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience, only 41% of the respondents received 
a passing grade of “C” or better compared to executives at 70%. This chapter builds on 
chapter three by focusing on the source of knowledge as a means to satisfy legal 





Figure 4.1. Framework for Legal Accountability. 
 
Additionally, this chapter focuses on the second level of Miller’s model of knowledge 
assessment (1990), the “knows how” level, and the second construct of this study—the 
types of sources nonprofit leaders access in order to learn about their responsibilities, as 
illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
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Following is a discussion about the external dynamics, pressures, and demands 
that nonprofit leaders face by applying theoretical framework of institutionalism and 
isomorphism with some focus on effectiveness and performance. Next, is the idea of best 
practices as widely accepted sources that nonprofit leaders access to learn about their 
fiduciary responsibilities. After discussing best practices, the results of the types of 
sources, both internal and external to the organization that nonprofit leaders use to learn 
about their fiduciary roles are presented. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion 
about the results and future research. 
External Dynamics, Demands, and Pressures 
Theories of the nonprofit sector identify external dynamics that compel nonprofit 
leaders to demonstrate legal accountability that include funders, governments, and the 
public.  
Institutionalism 
Looking at nonprofit governance through an institutionalist lens provides insight 
into how nonprofit leaders behave. For clarification, the theory allows for a broad 
definition of institutions that includes any entity that has been formally created, either 
socially constructed or legally formed, that has a certain degree of legitimacy. For the 
purposes of this study, I am focusing on nonprofit organizations as an institution and 
more specifically, nonprofit leaders (board members and executives) within nonprofit 
organizations.  
Institutionalism emerged as an alternative to rational theories that focused on 
technical aspects of organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). By the mid-20
th
 century, it 
became a popular framework for political scientists and sociologists as a means to 
127 
 
understand the changing environments that organizations were faced with by focusing on 
how organizations respond to their environments for legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Scott, 2008). A variation of institutionalism, neoinstitutionalism, gained traction as 
more attention was given to decision-making, practices, and structures that institutions 
adopted for legitimacy (Scott, 2008). Today, many contemporary scholars apply 
neoinstitutionalism and according to Jepperson, neoinstutionalism is “one of the most 
empirically developed forms of institutional analysis” (as cited in Berger & Zelditch, 
2002, p. 229). 
Institutionalism posits that institutions are diverse social structures that operate 
within, and are influenced by, three connected, yet separate, “pillars”, regulative, 
normative, and cultural-cognitive (Scott, 2008). The regulative pillar relates to legal 
standards and restrictions that institutions must pay attention to. The normative pillar 
underscores the role of values and norms that society expects institutions to operate 
within. Finally, the cultural-cognitive pillar focuses on the socially constructed meaning 
that institutions provide. Together, these pillars provide a framework that helps us 
understand how institutions contribute to a sense of meaning and purpose to society and 
in return institutions gain legitimacy. 
For the purposes of this study, the focus is on the regulative pillar to align with 
legal accountability as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) offered that “the existence of a 
common legal environment affects many aspects of an organization’s behavior and 
structure” (p. 150). Externally, tax exempt organizations are regulated by federal and 
state governments and are bound by requirements, that if not adhered to, could result in 




An example of a neoinstitutionalist approach comes from organizational and 
management scholars Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (1983). The pair identified the 
paradox of growth differentiation and moved away from institutionalism’s focus on 
heterogeneity and added an isomorphic lens of similarity. They concluded that rather than 
trying to understand what makes organizations different, it is better to look at what makes 
them the same and what environmental factors contribute to their increased similarities 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This aspect of institutionalism was coined institutional 
isomorphism, which has become a widely accepted framework with which to study 
nonprofits (Ashworth, et al., 2007; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Verbruggen, et al., 
2011). 
Institutional isomorphism draws on classical institutionalism in that it focuses on 
how organizations respond to their environments in order to gain legitimacy.  Coupled 
with the isomorphic element that identifies how organizational processes or structures 
increasingly converge, isomorphism explains that as organizations respond to external 
pressures, rules, norms, and sanctions they become more similar over time (Bromley & 
Meyer, 2017; Miller-Millesen, 2003; Van Puyvelde, 2016). Therefore, nonprofit 
organizations behave in a manner that aligns with isomorphism when they adopt 
procedures, structures, and policies that are used by their colleagues, which provides a 
certain degree of legitimacy (Miller-Millesen, 2003).  
Within isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) discussed three specific 
distinct, yet interrelated, mechanisms that work together: coercive, mimetic, and 
normative. Similar to the regulatory pillar in institutionalism mentioned earlier, coercive 
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isomorphism focuses on consequences and sanctions resulting from unmet expectations, 
real or perceived (Miller-Millesen, 2003). These expectations are particularly important 
when looking at how nonprofits address funding and legal pressures. Examples of 
nonprofits behaving in a coercive isomorphism manner are found when organizations 
give their large donors preferential treatment (e.g. VIP seating at events, exclusive 
recognition, a seat on the board, etc.) for fear of losing funding. Other examples of 
coercive isomorphism include organizations giving the public access to audited 
statements and tax returns on their websites to promote transparency. Another example of 
coercive isomorphism can be found in Miller-Millesen’s (2003) example of  local 
chapters or affiliates who are expected to behave according to their national charters and, 
if not adhered to, may result in the local chapter dissolving or bifurcating from the 
national entity thus losing legitimacy. 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when there is a level of uncertainty that an 
organization might not know how to face (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This type of 
uncertainty could be related to market fluctuations, changing client needs, or the loss of 
resources (financial, physical, human, or intellectual). When uncertainty occurs, 
organizations look to other organizations that they perceive are more successful and 
adopt similar processes, policies, and structures as their own (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Miller-Millesen, 2003). Although this may seem like a perfectly good approach, the 
problem is that often organizations are reactive in the face of uncertainty and adopt 
practices and policies without regard as to how relevant or useful they might be for their 
own particular organization. This is an example of decoupling; when the adaptations 
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contradict internal efficiency needs to gain legitimacy, which will be discussed in more 
detail later in the results section (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017).  
I have seen decoupling in action as a nonprofit consultant, particularly in my work 
with boards. One particular example comes to mind when I was working with an animal 
rescue organization who was applying for tax exempt status. When we discussed how 
their programs would operate, they insisted on implementing an identical program that 
another animal rescue organization was offering, because they thought that it would 
generate the same type of funding. What they failed to consider was how different their 
organization was and how to develop a program that suited their situation. Even after I 
encouraged them to take the time necessary to ensure a successful program, they chose to 
move forward with their original plan. This is similar to Zucker’s conclusion that “actions 
are taken in a specific way just because they have become an accepted way of 
accomplishing them” (as cited in Miller-Millesen, 2003, p. 536), which resonates with 
mimetic isomorphism behavior.  
Normative isomorphism typically occurs when there is the need for 
professionalism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Miller-Millesen, 2003). An example of 
normative isomorphism pressures can be found in the growth of the nonprofit academic 
programs over the past few decades (Carpenter, 2011; Mirabella, 2007). The need for 
professionalization, fueled by donor demands for transparency and accountability in the 
face of scandals and misappropriations, and the overall increased demands for programs 




The Role of Best Practices 
In building on the previous discussion of the external dynamics, demands, and 
pressures that impact legitimacy, I offer that isomorphism helps to explain how best 
practices support nonprofit leader accountability by understanding their fiduciary roles 
and responsibilities. Holland (2002) sums up the tension of accountability by suggesting 
that the literature’s definitions of accountability overlap and the issue is not just about 
how to define it, but also how to uphold or meet. Because of the lack of a standardized 
system that assesses organizational effectiveness, accountability, or performance not 
much is known about the inner-workings of nonprofit governance. As such, Ebrahim 
(2010) offers that in a mechanism nonprofits use to meet the accountability demands is 
self-regulation—or best practices since best practices tend to be practitioner or industry-
based in that they are developed to meet the immediate, practical needs of an 
organization.  
Examples of best practices can be found in for profit and nonprofit literature as a 
means to support performance, accountability, and effectiveness (Ebrahim, 2010; O’dell 
& Grayson, 1998). Herman and Renz (2000) offered that the “prescriptive literature 
suggests that boards using a greater number of recommended board practices will be 
more effective” (p. 156). However, Ebrahim (in Renz, 2010) offered that although there 
has been an increase in industry-wide standards developed over the past few decades, 
there is limited empirical evidence that they actually work. 
The term best practice is commonplace in the nonprofit sector. As a means to help 
leaders and organizations meet the expectations of the wide variety of stakeholders from 
governments, funders, and the public, best practices are in ample supply. Nationally 
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recognized organizations including BoardSource, GuideStar, and Foundation Center 
along with state attorney generals, the IRS, and national nonprofit associations have all 
developed best practices for a myriad of organizational uses. Examples of best practices 
can be seen in all aspects of nonprofit management. Financial best practices can be seen 
in the use of policies and procedures that support efficient accounting such as balance 
sheets, cash flow statements, and profit and loss statements. Commonly used fundraising 
best practices are gift acceptance policies and capital campaigns. Other operational areas 
such as marketing, technology, program service delivery, and human resource 
management also have a variety of best practices that organizations utilize. Herman and 
Renz (2008) referred to Keehley, Medlin, Longmire, and McBride’s seven criteria to 
determine if an approach or process is a best practice. The criteria includes, “be 
successful over time, show quantifiable gains, be innovative, be recognized for positive 
results, be replicable, have relevance to the adopting organization and not be linked to 
unique organizational characteristics” (p. 405), however, Herman and Renz (2008) note 
that they had not found any best practices that remotely meets this criteria. 
Holland’s (2002) observation of how best practices are created resonates with 
Herman and Renz (2000; 2008) who discussed the nuances related to studying nonprofit 
organizations. Because of the myriad of theoretical frameworks applied to nonprofits, 
Herman and Renz (2000; 2008) offered that the most useful way to look at nonprofits is 
through a social constructionist lens, which is used in institutionalism and isomorphism. 
Using this perspective, social constructivism may explain how best practices are the 
means by which organizations satisfy legal accountability how. The social constructivist 
perspective offers that discovery is less about finding what works and more about 
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inventing something that works (Herman & Renz, 2000). Therefore, best practices are 
socially constructed tools and guidelines developed by nonprofit practitioners, academics, 
and regulators as a means to support legal accountability and gain legitimacy. 
However, a social constructivist lens of best practices poses a dilemma. On the 
one hand, Miller (2002) concludes that, despite the differences amongst nonprofit boards, 
there is a widely accepted set of best practices that when used, “converge on a set of 
board roles and responsibilities characteristic of good governance” (p. 430). On the other 
side, because of a wide range of best practices available, for example in governance, 
Holland (2002) offered that the lack of standardized measures makes it difficult to 
determine if a board is effective (i.e. legitimate) in their oversight role because the impact 
is hard to measure. To address this dilemma and in support of the neoinstitutionalist 
perspective, Bromley and Meyer (2017) suggested that what allows common practices to 
become standardized is that they are based in the society’s norms—or “codes of conduct” 
(p. 946). These codes are ingrained in the cultural model that focuses more on the public 
good rather than in production efficiencies or formalized expectations by external actors 
(Bromley & Meyer, 2017). As such, best practices have become socially constructed 
proxies in lieu of standardized assessments in the nonprofit sector.  
Accessing Knowledge to Meet Demands and Pressures 
Coercive, mimetic, or normative isomorphic pressures were not measured in this 
study. Rather, institutionalism and isomorphism is used as a framework where coercive, 
mimetic, and normative pressures coalesce in explaining how nonprofit leaders accessing 
sources of fiduciary knowledge is a means to gain legitimacy, particularly when meeting 
legal accountability. What is being measured, however, are the types of sources that 
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nonprofit leaders access when learning about their fiduciary responsibilities and how the 
sources may be coercive, mimetic, normative, or a combination of all three.  
Sources of Fiduciary Knowledge - Results 
In looking at external demands for legitimacy and to satisfy legal accountability, 
the use of best practices is useful. For nonprofit leaders, governance best practices focus 
on all aspects of organizational oversight including fiduciary responsibilities. Nonprofit 
leaders were asked which best practices they accessed in order to learn about their 
responsibilities, specifically internal and external sources as presented in Table 4.1. 
 Typically, nonprofit leaders have access to a wide variety of opportunities both at 
no cost and for a fee, in a variety of settings, for a variety of governance topics. The list 
of options in was developed after a review of practitioner, academic, and industry 
resources as well as from personal experience as a nonprofit executive and board member 
(Brown, 2007; Herman & Renz, 2000; Independent Sector, 2017; Nonprofit Association 
of Oregon, 2016; Schwab Foundation for Social Enterprise, 2012). For example, Brown 
(2007) highlighted that one particular best practice, a board orientation, seemed to 
prepare leaders to address change and meet governance pressures. Informal conversations 
with colleagues as an internal best practice and externally with networks does not 
necessarily align with any of the isomorphic pressures, however it is included because of 





Table 4.1  
Internal and External Best Practices Resources 














by the organization for 
board members 
Friends and Family 
(network) 
Internal Best Practices External Best 
Practices 
Board Manual Certification/Degree 
programs 
 
Internal Sources of Knowledge 
The following presents the results of the types of internal sources nonprofit 
leaders access in order to learn about their responsibilities. First, the results are presented 
by role then by board service. 
By role. When asked about what internal sources nonprofit leaders used to help 
them learn about their roles and responsibilities, respondents were asked to check all that 
applied from the four options listed (see Table 4.1). The results, presented in Table 4.2, 
show that all of the resources were accessed, however, 79% of board members and 80% 
of the executives relied more on informal conversations than any other internal resource. 
Following informal conversations, board members (N = 104) accessed board manuals 
(56%), educational opportunities (38%), and orientations (48%); while executives (N = 





Descriptive Data for Percentages of Types of Internal Sources Nonprofit Leader Access 
by Role 






Board Member 104 48% 79% 38% 56% 
Executive 82 42% 80% 48% 48% 
Note. Categories were not mutually exclusive percentages were calculated by dividing the 
number of responses for each option by the total number of responses for each role.  
 
By board service. The results are similar when analyzed for board service as 
shown in Table 4.3. Regardless of the number of boards served on in the past 15 years 
informal conversations is the source of knowledge most accessed for each category of 
board service (1-2 boards: N = 79, 86%; 3-4 boards; N = 48, 94%; 5-6 boards N = 16, 
100%; and 6+ boards N = 14, 93%). However, there are some differences worth noting. 
Nonprofit leaders who have served on six or more boards (N = 14) rely more on board 
orientations (79%) and educational opportunities (64%) than those who have served on 
fewer than six boards (N = 143). While those who have served on one to two boards (N = 
79) in the past 15 years tended to access the board manual more (59%) than the board 
orientation (44%). These results show that although informal conversations are relied on 
the most regardless of the number of boards served on, those who have served on six or 
more boards (N = 14) access more formal best practices (board orientation = 79%; 





Descriptive Data for Percentages of Type of Internal Sources Nonprofit Leader Access by 
Number of Boards Served 
Number of 
Boards 






1-2 79 44% 86% 42% 59% 
3-4 48 58% 94% 56% 63% 
5-6 16 44% 100% 38% 50% 
6+ 14 79% 93% 64% 57% 
Note. Categories were not mutually exclusive. Percentages were calculated by dividing 
the number of responses for each option by the total number of responses for number of 
boards served.  
 
External Sources of Knowledge 
The following presents the results of the types of external sources nonprofit 
leaders access in order to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. First, the results are 
present by all roles and all boards served, then by role, and finally by board service (the 
number of boards served in the past 15 years). 
As mentioned previously, for the internal source questions respondents were 
given the option to check that all apply. In hindsight, a multi-item scale for each internal 
source should have been used instead. For the external sources, a three-point Likert 
option (Never, Sometimes, and Always) was provided, which allowed Cronbach’s alpha 
for reliability. The external source scale consisted of five items and was found to be 
moderately reliable (α = .65) with each item in the same direction. Most items appeared 
to be worthy of retention, resulting in a decrease in the alpha if deleted, except for two 
items: networks and academic/certificate programs. Deleting networks would increase the 
alpha to α = .722 and deleting academic/certificate programs would decrease the alpha to 





Descriptive Data for External Sources for Fiduciary Duty Knowledge for All 
Respondents 
 
External Sources N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min. Max. 
Websites 154 2.2 2 .946 1 
Webinars 154 1.7 2 .800 1 
Print 154 1.8 2 .852 1 
Network 154 1.8 2 .852 1 
Programs 154 1.6 2 .891 1 
 
All roles and all board service. Table 4.5 presents the results by all roles and 
Table 4.6 presents the results by board service. Figure 4.3 illustrates that although all of 
the resources were accessed similarly, nonprofit leaders accessed websites the most 
regardless of role (N = 154, M = 2.2, SD = .946) or number of boards served (N = 155, M 
= 2.0, SD = .587) than other external resources. Websites are followed by print media, 
such as magazines and journals (Role: N = 154, M = 1.8, SD = .852; Boards Served: N = 
114, M = 1.8); then networks (i.e. friends and family; Role: N = 154, M = 1.8; Boards 
Served: N = 150, M = 1.7); then webinars (Role: N = 154, M = 1.7; Boards Served: N = 
153, M= 1.7); and finally programs (e.g. certification and degree; Role: N = 154, M = 1.6; 
Boards Served N = 152: M = 1.5). However, webinars are the same for role and board 
service. 
Table 4.5  
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Access of External Sources to Learn about Fiduciary 
Responsibilities by All Roles 
External 
Source N Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Websites 154 2.2 2 .946 1 3 
Webinars 154 1.7 2 .800 1 3 
Print 154 1.8 2 .852 1 3 
Network 154 1.8 2 .852 1 3 





Table 4.6  
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Access of External Types of Sources to Learn about 
Fiduciary Responsibilities by Board Service 
External 
Source N Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Websites 155 2.0 2 .587 1 3 
Webinars 153 1.7 2 .616 1 3 
Print 114 1.8 2 .626 1 3 
Network 150 1.7 2 .636 1 3 
Programs 152 1.5 1 .664 1 3 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Means for Frequency of Access of External Sources Types of Sources to 
Learn about Fiduciary Responsibilities by All Role and All Boards Served. 
 
By role. When analyzed by role, Table 4.7 presents and Figure 4.4 illustrates the 
results that board members accessed websites the most (N = 90, M = 1.9, SD = .589) 
followed by their networks (i.e. friends and family; N = 89, M = 1.8, SD = .691); then 
print media, such as magazines and journals, (N = 89, M = 1.6, SD = .562); then webinars 
(N = 89, M = 1.5, SD = .586). Academic and certificate programs are the least accessed 
by board members (N = 89, M = 1.4, SD = .615). For executives, they too accessed 
websites the most (N = 72, M = 2.2, SD = .537). However, the second most accessed 
external source for executives was print media (N = 72, M = 2.0, SD = .617) followed by 




















= 69, M = 1.7, SD = .696), and finally networks (N = 68, M = 1.6, SD = .547) accessed 
the least. 
Table 4.7  
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Access of External Sources to Learn about Fiduciary 




Role N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Websites Board 90 1.9 2 .589 1 3 
 Executive 72 2.2 2 .537 1 3 
Webinars Board 89 1.5 2 .586 1 3 
 Executive 69 1.9 1 .601 1 3 
Print Board 89 1.6 2 .562 1 3 
 Executive 72 2.0 2 .617 1 3 
Network Board 89 1.8 2 .691 1 3 
 Executive 68 1.6 2 .547 1 3 
Programs Board 89 1.4 2 .615 1 3 
 Executive 69 1.7 1 .696 1 3 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Means for Frequency of Access of External Sources Types of Sources to 
Learn about Fiduciary Responsibilities by All Role. 
 
By board service. Table 4.8 presents and Figure 4.5 illustrates the results when 
analyzed by the number of boards served, those who have served on six or more boards 
access websites the most (N = 14, M = 2.2, SD = .579) compared to those who have 

















Websites Webinars Print Media Network Cert/Deg. 
Programs 




media, such as journals and magazines, are accessed the same by those who have served 
on three or more boards (3-4 Boards: N = 8, M = 1.9, SD = .652; 5-6 Boards: N = 16. M = 
1.9, SD = .500; and 6+ Boards: N = 14, M = 1.9, SD = .663) with slightly less than those 
who have only served on one to two boards (N = 76, M = 1.7, SD = .620). Webinars seem 
to be accessed the most as board service increases (1-2 Boards: N = 75, M = 1.6, SD = 
.620; 3-4 Boards: N = 48, M = 1.7, SD = .651; 5-6 Boards: N = 16, M = 1.8, SD = .577; 
and 6+ Boards: N = 14, M = 1.9, SD = .535) for a mean difference of .4 between 1-2 
boards and 6 or more boards.  
Table 4.8 
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Access of External Types of Sources to Learn about 





Boards N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Websites 1-2 77 1.9 2 .579 1 3 
 3-4 48 2.1 2 .606 1 3 
 5-6 16 2.1 2 .574 1 3 
 6+ 14 2.2 2 .579 1 3 
        
Webinars 1-2 75 1.6 1 .620 1 3 
 3-4 48 1.7 2 .651 1 3 
 5-6 16 1.8 2 .577 1 3 
 6+ 14 1.9 2 .535 1 3 
        
Print 1-2 76 1.7 2 .620 1 3 
 3-4 8 1.9 2 .652 1 3 
 5-6 16 1.9 2 .500 1 3 
 6+ 14 1.9 2 .663 1 3 
Network 1-2 74 1.7 2 .677 1 3 
 3-4 47 1.7 2 .623 1 3 
 5-6 15 1.8 2 .561 1 3 
 6+ 14 1.6 1 .646 1 3 
Programs 1-2 75 1.4 1 .605 1 3 
 3-4 48 1.7 2 .724 1 3 
 5-6 16 1.6 1 .629 1 3 




Figure 4.5. Means of Frequency of Access of External Types of Sources to Learn about 
Fiduciary Responsibilities by Number of Boards. 
 
External source and number of boards served and role. To analyze the 
patterns of the type of external sources accessed by number of boards served, the 
following are contingency tables for each of the five external sources (websites, 
webinars, networks, print media, and degree/certificate programs). While controlling for 
board service, the following includes my hypothesis for each external source and the 
results. 
Websites. Given the normative pressures to professionalize, nonprofit leaders who 
have more board service experience would be encouraged to professionalize. This 
pressure might expose them to a wider variety of training opportunities and therefore 
know more about websites that focus on governance. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: When controlling for the number of boards served, it is expected that board 
member and executive consultation of external websites to learn about fiduciary 
































As presented in Table 4.9, when looking at how often board members and 
executives access external websites, board members increase their access of external 
websites the more boards they serve on (1-2 boards: N = 46, 61%; 3-4 boards: N = 28, 
61%; and 5-6/6+ boards: N = 13, 62%). Executives also increase their use of external 
websites, however, there is a slight dip once they serve on 3-4 boards (1-2 boards: N = 
28, 50%; 3-4 boards: N = 19, 43%; and 5-6/6+ boards: N = 15, 62%).  
Based on these results, board members and executives consult external websites 
to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities increases as board service increases and, 
therefore, supports the hypothesis. 
Table 4.9 
Percentage External Website Source by Number of Boards Served and Frequency 
 











Never 39% 50% 39% 37% 38% 38% 
Sometimes/ 
Always 
61% 50% 61% 63% 62% 62% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N 46 28 28 19 13 13 
Note.  Sometimes and Always responses were collapsed into Sometimes/Always and 5-6 
Boards and 6+ Boards were collapsed into 5-6/6+ Boards because of small Ns and to 
reduce instability issues with data. 
 
Webinars. Similar to websites, given the normative pressures to professionalize, 
nonprofit leaders who have more board service experience would be encouraged to 
professionalize. This pressure might expose them to a wider variety of training 
opportunities and as such have a greater awareness of webinars available about 
governance. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
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H2: When controlling for the number of boards served, it is expected that board 
member and executive consultation of external webinars to learn about fiduciary 
responsibilities, increases as board service increases. 
As presented in Table 4.10, when looking at how often board members and 
executives access external webinars, board members increase their access of external 
websites the more boards they serve on (1-2 boards: N = 45, 38%; 3-4 boards: N = 29, 
52%; and 5-6/6+ boards: N = 14, 57%). Executives also increase their use of external 
resources the more boards they serve on (1-2 boards: N = 30, 67%; 3-4 boards: N = 19, 
74%; and 5-6/6+ boards: N = 15, 87%).  
Based on these results, board members and executives consult external webinars 
to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities increases as board service increases and, 
therefore supports the hypothesis. 
Table 4.10  
Percentage External Webinar Source by Number of Boards Served and Frequency 
 








Never 62% 33% 48% 26% 43% 13% 
Sometimes/ 
Always 38% 67% 52% 74% 57% 87% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N 45 30 29 19 14 15 
Note.  Sometimes and Always responses were collapsed into Sometimes/Always and 5-6 
Boards and 6+ Boards were collapsed into 5-6/6+ Boards because of small Ns and to 
reduce instability issues with data. 
 
Print media. Given the normative pressures for professionalization, it is expected 
that executives would access external print media more than board members. As 
executives gain more knowledge and experience in their roles they become more familiar 
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with the journals, magazines, and other print media relevant to their field and mission. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: When controlling for the number of boards served, it is expected that 
executives consult external print media to learn about fiduciary responsibilities at 
a higher rate than board members at all levels of number of boards served on. 
As presented in Table 4.11, when looking at the rate that executives access 
external print media compared to board members, executives access external print media 
at a higher rate (1-2 boards: N = 31, 83%; 3-4 boards: N = 19, 84%; and 5-6/6+ boards: N 
= 15, 80%) than board members. Board members access external print media at a lower 
rate than executives (1-2 boards: N = 45, 40%; 3-4 boards: N = 29, 62%; and 5-6/6+ 
boards: N = 14, 78%).  
Based on these results, executives consult external print media sources to learn 
about their fiduciary responsibilities at a higher rate than board members and, therefore 
supports the hypothesis. 
Table 4.11  
Percentage External Print Media Source by Number of Boards Served and Frequency 
 








Never 60% 17% 38% 16% 21% 20% 
Sometimes/ 
Always 40% 83% 62% 84% 79% 80% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N 45 31 29 19 14 15 
Note.  Sometimes and Always responses were collapsed into Sometimes/Always and 5-6 
Boards and 6+ Boards were collapsed into 5-6/6+ Boards because of small Ns and to 




Networks. While there are no isomorphic pressures to base the hypothesis on, it is 
my personal experience newer board members consult their friends and family in order to 
learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. Therefore, the hypothesis is: 
H4: When controlling for the number of boards served, it is expected that board 
members who have served on 1-2 boards consult their external networks at a 
higher rate than board members who have served on three or more boards in order 
to learn about fiduciary responsibilities. 
As presented in Table 4.12, when looking at the rate that board members who 
have served on 1-2 boards access external networks compared to board members who 
have served on three or more boards, they consult their networks about the same (1-2 
boards: N = 46, 61%; 3-4 boards: N = 28, 61%; and 5-6/6+ boards: N = 14, 64%).  
Based on these results, board members who have served on 1-2 boards consult 
their external networks to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities at the same rate as 
those who have served on 3-4 boards, but less than those who have served on 5-6/6+ 
boards, and therefore does not support the hypothesis. 
Table 4.12 
Percentage External Networks Source by Number of Boards Served and Frequency 
 








Never 39% 50% 39% 37% 36% 36% 
Sometimes/ 
Always 61% 50% 61% 63% 64% 64% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N 46 28 28 19 14 14 
Note.  Sometimes and Always responses were collapsed into Sometimes/Always and 5-6 
Boards and 6+ Boards were collapsed into 5-6/6+ Boards because of small Ns and to 




Certificate and degree programs. Similar to websites and webinars, given the 
normative pressures to professionalize, nonprofit leaders who have more board service 
experience would be encouraged to professionalize. This pressure might expose them to a 
wider variety of training opportunities and may lead them to access long-term trainings 
such as certificate and degree programs. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5: When controlling for the number of boards served, it is expected that 
executive consultation of external certificate and degree programs to learn about 
fiduciary responsibilities, increases as their board service increases. 
As presented in Table 4.13, when looking at how often executives access external 
certificate and degree programs, the rate increases the number of boards they serve on (1-
2 boards: N = 30, 40%; 3-4 boards: N = 19, 63%; and 5-6/6+ boards: N = 14, 71%). 
Based on these results, executives consultation of external certificate and degree 
programs to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities increases as their board service 
increases and, therefore, supports the hypothesis. 
Table 4.13 
Percentage External Certificate and Degree Programs Source by Number of Boards 
Served and Frequency 
 








Never 78% 60% 55% 37% 57% 29% 
Sometimes/ 
Always 22% 40% 45% 63% 43% 71% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N 45 30 29 19 14 14 
Note.  Sometimes and Always responses were collapsed into Sometimes/Always and 5-6 
Boards and 6+ Boards were collapsed into 5-6/6+ Boards because of small Ns and to 





Sources and Actual Knowledge 
Using the results from chapter three, nonprofit leaders whose actual knowledge of 
fiduciary duties that received a passing grade was analyzed with the frequency they 
accessed internal sources. The following are the results. 
Internal sources. When analyzed by role, Table 4.14 presents and Figure 4.6 
illustrates the results for internal sources that nonprofit leaders whose actual fiduciary 
knowledge score was a “C” or better accessed to learn about their fiduciary 
responsibilities. Board members (N = 73), accessed board orientations (59%), followed 
by board manuals (56%), then informal conversations (54%), and finally educational 
opportunities (51%). For the executives, whose actual fiduciary knowledge was a “C” or 
better (N = 61), they accessed educational opportunities (49%) the most followed by 
informal conversations (46%), then board manuals (46%), and lastly orientations (41%). 
Table 4.14 
Descriptive Data for Nonprofit Leaders with a Passing Score for Knowledge and the 
Type of Internal Sources Access by Role 








73 59% 54% 51% 56% 
Executive 61 41% 46% 49% 46% 
Note. Categories were not mutually exclusive. Percentages were calculated by dividing 




Figure 4.6. Percentage of Nonprofit Leaders with a Passing Score for Knowledge and the 
Type of Internal Sources Access by Role. Note. Categories were not mutually exclusive. 
Percentages were calculated by dividing the number of responses for each option by the 
total number of responses for each role.  
 
When analyzed by number of boards served, Table 4.15 presents and Figure 4.7 
illustrates the results for internal sources that nonprofit leaders whose actual fiduciary 
knowledge score was a “C” or better accessed to learn about their fiduciary 
responsibilities. Informal conversations are the most accessed for all categories of board 
service (1-2 boards: N = 79, 86%; 3-4 boards: N = 48, 94%; 5-6 boards: N = 16, 100%; 
and more than six boards: N = 14, 93%). Educational opportunities are the least accessed 
source for nearly all of the categories board service, except for those serving on more 
than six boards (1-2 boards: N = 79, 42%; 3-4 boards: N = 48, 56%; 5-6 boards: N = 16, 




























Descriptive Data for Nonprofit Leaders with a Passing Score for Knowledge and the 
Type of Internal Sources Access by Board Service 
Number of 
Boards 






1-2 79 44% 86% 42% 59% 
3-4 48 58% 94% 56% 63% 
5-6 16 44% 100% 38% 50% 
6+ 14 79% 93% 64% 57% 
Note. Categories were not mutually exclusive percentage were calculated by dividing the 
number of responses for each option by the total number of responses for each category 
of board service. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Percentages for Nonprofit Leaders with a Passing Score for Knowledge and 
the Type of Internal Sources Access by Board Service. Note. Categories were not 
mutually exclusive. Percentages were calculated by dividing the number of responses for 
each option by the total number of responses for each category of board service. 
 
Discussion 
This chapter presented the results of what types of internal and external sources 
(best practices) nonprofit leaders (board members and executives) access to learn about 
their fiduciary roles and responsibilities to demonstrate legal accountability. While this 






















Orientation Informal Educational Manual 
1-2 Boards (n=79) 
3-4 Boards (n=48) 
5-6 Boards (n=16) 
6+ Boards (n=14) 
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data for future research, it highlights the need for a greater awareness of fiduciary 
responsibility knowledge.  
Internal Sources 
Despite their role or the numbers of boards they have served on the past 15 years, 
nonprofit leaders relied more on informal conversations to learn about their fiduciary 
duties more than any other internal best practice. The results resonate with a small-scale 
study by Castor and Jiter (2013). The authors interviewed twenty six board members with 
a variety of board service backgrounds to better understand board member roles and 
responsibilities via socialization. The majority of those interviewed shared that they 
learned about their roles and responsibilities informally, through observation and 
“osmosis”. One member went so far to say that they learned by “the seat of their pants” 
highlighting the informal nature of board training (Castor & Jiter, 2013, p. 88).  
Because of the social nature of nonprofits, in that most of the services and 
programs provided involve interacting with people, it should not come as a surprise that a 
“mirroring” effect could occur in the organization itself. As organizations interact with 
their clients, providing programs, services, and education, the behavior of its leaders also 
requires a certain level of personal engagement as well as transfer of knowledge and best 
practices amongst themselves. More research is needed to further explore this idea, 
however, recognizing the social nature of nonprofit leadership may help support trainings 
that focus on mentoring such as “board buddies” and orientation workshops that are more 
interactive and less procedural and formal in nature. 
After informal conversations with colleagues, board members and executives 
accessed board manuals similarly. After manuals, board members accessed educational 
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opportunities then board orientations; while executives, particularly those who have 
served on more than six boards in the past 15 years, accessed board orientations then 
educational opportunities. However, executives who have served on one to two boards 
accessed the board manual over the board orientation. One possible explanation for these 
results could be that nonprofit leaders with more board tenure might prefer attending an 
orientation to ask specific questions about an organization that might not be otherwise be 
included in a board manual. Conversely, nonprofit leaders with less board tenure seem to 
rely on the board manual more than orientation, which may be attributed to convenience, 
reviewing a board manual can be done on their own time rather than attending a board 
orientation. Or, it could be that nonprofit leaders who are new to board service believe 
that the board manual is more important because it is a more detailed version of an 
orientation. 
The use of more formalized best practices is also the case for nonprofit leaders 
who scored a “C” or better in terms of their actual fiduciary knowledge, regardless of 
their role. The use of a board orientation was discussed when Brown (2007) found that 
although the orientation process was moderately utilized (2.8 out of 5-point Likert scale) 
after applying a structural equation model, he found a strong relationship between board 
orientation and board performance. However, when analyzed by number of boards 
served, nonprofit leaders who scored a “C” or better for their actual fiduciary knowledge 
accessed informal sources the most. This is puzzling, because one might expect that those 
with more accurate knowledge would use more formalized best practices. However, in 
this study this does not seem to be the case.  
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These results raise important questions about the quality of fiduciary knowledge. 
The informal nature that nonprofit leaders access to acquire their knowledge may be 
inferior to other more established best practices such as a board orientation, board 
manual, or educational opportunities provided by the organization. This might indicate 
that the behavior is decoupled from how the leaders meet external demands for 
accountability and legitimacy. De-coupling is the proposition that organizations decouple 
(separate) when they say one thing and do another (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017). So, 
although organizations can demonstrate to external stakeholders, such as regulators, that 
they have best practices available, what this study found is that nonprofit leaders do not 
access the more established best practices. From a legal accountability perspective, if 
nonprofit leaders are relying on informal conversations with one another, how can the 
accuracy of the information be verified? 
External Sources 
Regardless of the role or number of boards served, overall nonprofit leaders 
accessed external websites the most to learn about their fiduciary duties. Following 
websites are print media, networks, and certificate and degree programs. Without any 
previous studies to build on, these differences may be attributed to the availability (e.g. 
online access to webinar providers or print media subscriptions) or awareness of the 
available sources. In looking at the isomorphic pressures that may compel nonprofit 
leaders to access certain resources, what follows is a discussion about the hypothesis and 
findings of analyzing external sources and controlling for board service. 
Websites. My hypothesis, that board members and executives consult external 
websites to learn about their fiduciary responsibilities increases as board service increases 
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was supported. Based on the normative pressures to professionalize, nonprofit leaders 
who have a great deal of board service experience would be encouraged to 
professionalize. As noted in the results, although executives overall increased their access 
of external websites the more board service they gained, there was a slight dip once they 
serve on three to four boards. One possible explanation for this is that after a few boards 
under their belt, executives may feel that they have enough knowledge to fulfill their 
responsibilities. Once they go beyond four boards, they may serve on an entirely new 
organization and learn that they have more to learn. However, without more research, this 
is just a theory. 
Webinars. The hypothesis, it is expected that board member and executive 
consultation of external webinars to learn about fiduciary responsibilities, increases as 
board service increases was supported. Based on normative pressures to professionalize, 
it was hypothesized that the more board service results in a greater awareness of the 
webinar resources available that focused on governance training. Executives consistently 
increased their access of webinars the more boards they serve on. For board members, 
there is a noticeable increase in access of webinars after serving on at least two boards. 
Board members who serve on three to four boards, they access webinars 14% more than 
those who have served on less than three boards. More research is needed to understand 
why this is. 
Print media. The hypothesis, it is expected that executives consult external print 
media to learn about fiduciary responsibilities at a higher rate than board members at all 
levels of number of boards served on was supported. The mimetic pressures that cause 
nonprofits to adopt similar practices that other nonprofits utilize can be seen in the types 
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of resources nonprofit leaders utilize. As executives interact with their colleagues on a 
regular basis, they become more familiar with the journals, magazines, and other print 
media relevant to their field and mission.  
What is interesting to note about these results is that although executives accessed 
external print media at a higher rate than board members, executive access decreased the 
more boards they serve on (1-2 boards: 83%; 3-4 boards: 84%; and 5-6/6+ boards: 80%), 
whereas board members increased their access with increased board service (1-2 boards: 
40%; 3-4 boards: 62%; and 5-6/6+ boards: 79%). These results may point to board 
members experiencing the same normative pressures that executives do. And, the results 
may suggest a saturation point that executives reach in terms of how much print media 
might be available. However, further research is needed. 
Networks. The hypothesis, it is expected that board members who have served on 
1-2 board consult their external networks at a higher rate than board members who have 
served on three or more boards was not supported. This hypothesis was harder to 
categorize in any of the isomorphic pressures and was meant to be purely exploratory in 
nature. The reasoning was that newer board members might be shy to ask their 
organizations for more information and would feel more comfortable with their peers. 
However, the results show the opposite: the more experience board members (1-2 boards: 
61%; 3-4 boards: 61%; 5-6/6+ boards: 64%) and executives (1-2 boards: 50%; 3-4 
boards: 63%; and 5-6/6+ boards: 64%) have, the more they consult their external 
networks. These results may be explained by the informal, social nature that nonprofit 
leaders learn about their fiduciary responsibilities. As presented earlier in this chapter, 
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nonprofit leaders tend to rely more on conversations with their colleagues rather than 
formal governance best practices. However, more research is needed to fully explore. 
Certificate and degree programs. The hypothesis, it is expected that executive 
consultation of external certificate and degree programs to learn about fiduciary 
responsibilities, increases as their board service increases, was supported. The normative 
pressures to professionalize was the basis for this hypothesis given that executives who 
want more legitimacy would be most likely to pursue some sort of academic or certificate 
program to demonstrate competency and skill.  
What is interesting to note about these findings is that board members rate of 
accessing external certificate and degree programs also increases as board service 
increases (1-2 boards: 22%; 3-4 boards: 45%; and 5-6/6+ boards: 43%). The amount 
nearly doubles from 1-2 boards (22%) to 5-6/6+ boards (43%). This could be because 
nonprofit leaders who serve on more boards are exposed to the many faces of nonprofit 
management and leadership, therefore, would be interested in learning more about how 
best to govern and monitor the organizations they serve as a board member for. Again, 
more research is needed to better understand why. 
Implications 
The results contribute to the need for a standardize process of accountability by 
developing nonprofit leader trainings using established best practices. The study 
highlights the need for more interactive, personable approaches to best practices to ensure 
that nonprofit leaders have the necessary and appropriate knowledge to fulfill their 
fiduciary duties. Along with the suggestions mentioned previously, opportunities abound 
for regulators to work in partnership with nationally recognized nonprofit organizations 
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such as BoardSource, National Council of Nonprofits, and state nonprofit associations 
such as California Association of Nonprofits and the Minnesota Council of Nonprofits to 
develop best practices that assist nonprofit leaders fulfill the fiduciary duties.  
Other opportunities to increase fiduciary awareness and knowledge for nonprofit 
leaders include funders. Funders have the ability to support trainings and workshops to 
strengthen their grantees by providing incentives and additional grant money as part of 
grant programs. An example of this is found in a partnership between the City of San 
Diego and the Nonprofit Institute at the University of San Diego. Using community and 
business development funds, the City of San Diego funds a two-day intensive Nonprofit 
Academy, free of charge, to any tax exempt organization located in the City of San 
Diego. The academy includes sessions related to the various aspects of leading and 
managing a nonprofit organization including governance (City of San Diego, n.d.).  
Finally, nonprofit leaders can use the results of this study to develop best practices 
that board members and executives will access more frequently. Given the informal 
nature of the types of best practices nonprofit leaders access more frequently, means to 
learn about fiduciary responsibilities should have a personal element included. As 
mentioned before, the idea of board buddies may support nonprofit fiduciary knowledge 
development. However, it is important to ensure that the board buddy has the appropriate 
knowledge to begin with.  
Future Research 
This study highlights the need for more research around the contextual nature of 
best practices and how they support legal demands for accountability and pressures for 
legitimacy. Additional usage of the assessment tool developed for this study can develop 
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empirical evidence related to accountability, fiduciary knowledge, and individual 
nonprofit leaders. Furthermore, continued use of the assessment would strengthen the 
empirical research around institutionalism and nonprofit governance. 
Qualitative research would be a logical next step to this study. Asking nonprofit 
leaders more in depth questions about the types of best practices they use and why may 
provide additional insight into the contextual nature of nonprofits and other best practices 
that may be accessed that are yet to be discovered. And, finally, there is the opportunity 
to perform additional quantitative analysis, such as regression and more correlation tests 
with the data collected for this study. Looking at the data in multiple ways may reveal 
new results. 
The following chapter builds on these findings by presenting results about how 





CHAPTER 5: APPLICATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY KNOWLEDGE 
Nonprofits are held accountable by a variety of stakeholders. In terms of legal 
accountability, nonprofit leaders are responsible to perform their governance oversight 
duties in a manner that upholds federal and state expectations. As such, nonprofits are 
legally held accountable to know what their legal responsibilities are (what). How they 
fulfill accountability is by accessing appropriate sources, or best practices, to learn about 
their fiduciary responsibilities (how). The third leg of the accountability stool is 
demonstrated when nonprofit leaders apply their fiduciary knowledge in the performance 
of their governance activities to meet legal accountability demands (whom). 
A national survey of nonprofit leaders reported that 71% of the executives and 
74% of the board chairs agreed or strongly agreed that the majority of their board was 
actively engaged in overseeing and governing the organization (BoardSource, 2017, p. 
20). The results of this study found that board members and executives indicated that 
they applied their fiduciary knowledge frequently in the performance of their duties 
meaning that they are more engaged than the national statistics. Yet, the results of this 
study highlight a gap between nonprofit leader performance of their duties and their 
actual knowledge of what those duties entail. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that 
according to Stanford (2017) 56% of the organizations surveyed rated board governance 
as the most challenging area of strategic leadership. 
In this study, when nonprofit leaders were asked about the frequency with which 
they applied their fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their duties, the results 
indicate a high frequency in that they most of the time or always (for board members) or 
somewhat agree and agree (for executives). However, when they were tested for their 
160 
 
actual knowledge of the legal responsibilities, only 41% of the board members and 70% 
of the executives received a passing score. These results point to two issues: 1) what 
knowledge are nonprofit leaders using in the performance of their duties and; 2) if they 
lack the appropriate knowledge, how might their decisions be impacted? 
This chapter focuses on nonprofit leader application of fiduciary knowledge in the 
performance of their governance activities as a means to meet the legal accountability for 
whom, as illustrated in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1. Framework for Legal Accountability. 
 
In order for nonprofit leaders to meet demands for accountability by regulators, 
they must demonstrate competence in the performance of their fiduciary responsibilities. 
Holland and Ritvo (2008) argued that competencies are a combination of “skills, 
knowledge, information, and personal characteristics” (p.  xvii) that must be practiced in 
order to be considered useful. They go on to explain that competency is linked to 
performance and when appropriate competencies are in place, effectiveness follows 
(Holland & Ritvo, 2008). The idea of competency aligns with the last two levels of 
Miller’s model of knowledge assessment (1990), the “shows how” and “action” levels, 
which emphasizes the performance or action as illustrated in Figure 5.2. Miller (1990) 
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establishes that knowledge alone is not an adequate measure of performance, but rather 
suggests how knowledge is performed is a better indicator.  
 
Figure 5.2. Constructs and Legal Accountability. 
 
The premise of this chapter is that legal accountability is demonstrated when 
nonprofit leaders fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities in the performance of their 
governance duties. The chapter begins with a discussion about to whom nonprofit leaders 
(board members and executives) are accountable to, specifically state and federal 
regulators. After the discussion about accountability to whom, performance, 
effectiveness, and efficiency are explained followed by ownership and role ambiguity. 
Then, the results of how frequently nonprofit leaders apply their knowledge of their 
fiduciary responsibilities in the performance of their governance activities is presented. 
The chapter ends with a discussion about the results and future research.  
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What is Accountability? 
As prevalent as the idea is, accountability is a complex, multi-dimensional 
concept that means different things to different people. Koppell (2005) offers that where 
someone is situated impacts how accountability is defined and suggests that 
accountability should be based on the expectations of the relationship itself. 
Accountability used in a more popular view, focuses on the public’s expectations of 
“organizational performance, responsiveness, and even morality” (Kearns, 1996, p. 9). To 
further define to whom are nonprofits accountable, Kearns suggests that an element of 
accountability involves answering to a “higher authority” (1996, p. 7), which results in 
compliance in reaction to requirements or obligations (Ebrahim, 2010; Holland & Ritvo, 
2008; Kearns, 1996).  
Accountability can also be described as proactively responding to the needs of its 
constituents (Renz, 2010) and, given the multi-dimensionality, each constituent has 
differing expectations for what accountability looks like. Ebrahim (2010) discusses 
accountability in terms of internal dimension and external dimensions. The internal 
dimension focuses on motivation or responsibility whereas the external dimension is 
more about obligation (Ebrahim, 2010). Given the many explanations of accountability, 
Koppell (2005) cautions that “layering every imagined meaning of accountability into a 
single definition would render the concept meaningless” (p. 95).  
Accountability to Whom? 
Because nonprofits are held accountable by a variety of stakeholders, Ebrahim 
(2010) and others (Scott, 2000; Verschuere, et al., 2006) suggest that in order to tease out 
to whom nonprofits are accountable, an upward and downward perspective is useful. 
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Upward accountability refers to external relationships with funders, governments, and the 
public whereas downward accountability focuses on internal relationships with clients, 
staff, and volunteers (Ebrahim, 2010). In a nonprofit context, upward and downward 
relationships identify the many different stakeholders and the varying degrees of 
accountability demands they face.  
For example, when using a legal or regulatory perspective, nonprofits have an 
upward relationship with state and federal agencies and are accountable to fulfill their 
fiduciary responsibilities, but a downward relationship would focus on having the 
appropriate human resource policies in place for staff. However, other stakeholder 
perspectives may not be as cut and dry. The public, for example encompasses both an 
upwards and downwards relationship. Upwardly, the public, (i.e. the general population) 
has an expectation that nonprofits use donations for the missions. In a downward 
relationship, the public (i.e. individuals) expects nonprofit to carry out their mission, but 
are more personally invested since they rely on the programs and services that meet their 
specific needs.  
Similar to Ebrahim’s (2010) upward and downward idea, Kearns (1996), offered 
two ways that nonprofits perform for accountability, explicit and implicit. Explicit 
accountability focuses on how nonprofits perform their work in order to meet legal, 
regulatory, or contractual standards (Kearns, 1996). Implicit standards are harder to 
define, because they relate to societal norms and beliefs about public interest and trust 
(Kearns, 1996). The upward and downward perspective takes into account the multiple 
demands for accountability, while the explicit and implicit idea adds a performance 
element to how accountability is actually carried out. 
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Koppell (2005) identified how multiple stakeholders add levels of complexity in 
his “multiple accountabilities disorder (MAD)” (p. 95). MAD acknowledges that 
although there are many stakeholders to consider, they must be considered 
simultaneously. An example of MAD can be seen in Ronald McDonald House Charities 
(RMHC), a nonprofit organization with chapters around the United States and around the 
world whose mission is to provide a “home away from home” for families with critically 
ill children. The national headquarters holds each of the local chapters accountable to 
ensure that policies, procedures, McDonald’s corporate licensing and branding, as well as 
program protocols are followed. However, concurrently, the local chapter is accountable 
to their local funders, partner hospitals, and city and state regulators.  
Ebrahim (2010) suggested that multi-dimensionality creates challenges for 
nonprofit leaders in deciding not only what they should be accountable for, but also to 
whom. Holland (2002) echoes this challenge by adding that not much is known about 
how nonprofit leaders really “deal with accountability” (p. 412). Therefore, parsing out to 
whom nonprofit are accountable is no easy task. However, the upward and downward 
perspective, along with MAD, suggests that how nonprofit leaders perform their 
governance duties could be a mechanism that helps to meet multiple accountability 
demands from multiple stakeholders. As such, legal accountability can be demonstrated 
through the performance of the duties of care, loyalty, and obedience, because these 
duties provide a legal basis for what is expected of nonprofit leader oversight. 
Additionally, the duties are based in United States case law are the “legal standards by 
which all actions taken by directors are judged” (Hopkins, 2009, p. 13) which become the 
standard by which all tax-exempt organizations will be judged, if necessary. What this 
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means for nonprofits is that in order to satisfy legal accountability, they must be both 
responsive in meeting the demands of the public, using public resources for a public 
benefit and responsible for following the rules, their fiduciary duties). Therefore, in 
looking at legal accountability through a fiduciary, legal lens, nonprofits are required to 
perform their duties in a manner that fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities.  
Performance as Accountability 
Performance is an area that has gained considerable attention in the nonprofit 
literature over the past few decades. As with accountability, performance is also complex 
and multi-dimensional. Although there are varying perspectives of what performance 
means, scholarship has come to an agreement that, at some level, demonstrating 
accountability and meeting performance demands impacts effectiveness (Berman, 2006; 
Light, 2004; Preston & Brown, 2004; Renz, 2010; Salamon, 2012). The following section 
discusses performance as a means to address legal accountability to whom and 
establishes nonprofit leaders as “owners” or “stewards’ of their organizations. As 
stewards, they are held accountable for upholding their fiduciary responsibilities as they 
perform their governance duties.  
Knowing what the fiduciary responsibilities are is critical for any nonprofit leader, 
because most of the decisions nonprofit leaders make in their governance activities 
should be based in the duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. Jackson and Holland (1998) 
developed an assessment tool to measure board performance that included six dimensions 
(contextual, educational, interpersonal, analytical, political, and strategic), which they 
identified as having a positive impact on board performance. The educational dimension, 
how well boards were informed about their responsibilities, was considered to be one of 
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the strongest dimensions with which to assess board performance (Jackson & Holland, 
1998). Chapter three provides insight into the gap between nonprofit leaders familiarity 
with the fiduciary duties compared to their actual fiduciary knowledge, which can affect 
nonprofit leaders’ performance of their fiduciary duties. However, having a level of 
knowledge or competency is just the first step to fulfilling fiduciary duties, because 
applying that knowledge in the performance of governance activities is a critical next 
step. 
What is Performance? 
Performance is traditionally discussed in the literature as a means for 
effectiveness and efficiency. It is a broad term that connotes meeting a standard either 
real or perceived. This study does not measure performance, effectiveness, or efficiency, 
but rather uses nonprofit leader performance of their governance duties as a means to 
measure their legal accountability. As such, this study looks at how nonprofit leaders 
apply their fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their fiduciary duties. But, before 
further explanation of how performance is applied in this study, a little bit about how 
performance and accountability intersect follows. 
Using Ebrahim’s (2010) framework of internal and external demands for 
accountability, as mentioned previously, helps in explaining how accountability intersects 
with performance. Given that the external dimension of accountability is more about 
obligation whereas the internal dimension focuses on motivation or responsibility 
externally, it could be said that nonprofits are obligated to the media, state and federal 
regulators, as well as the public. These external actors have a great deal of influence on a 
nonprofit’s reputation, for better or worse, and have a captive audience with which to 
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highlight nonprofits who veer away from expectations as seen in recent examples of 
nonprofit mismanagement as mentioned earlier, Wounded Warrior Project, Central Asia 
Institute, and United Way. Examples of other external actors monitoring nonprofit 
performance are charity watchdogs such as Charity Navigator, Guidestar, Better Business 
Bureau, and the National Center for Charitable Statistics. These watchdogs give scores to 
nonprofits, usually around financial, transparency, and governance data collected from 
annual IRS 990 tax returns. The ratings are intended to provide a stamp of approval and 
are available to the public. However, each watchdog varies as to how they calculate their 
ratings (Smith, 2014; Worth, 2017) contributing to the contextual nature of accountability 
and performance. 
Looking at the internal dimensions of accountability board members and 
executives come to mind as those who in theory, would be motivated by responsibility. 
As the primary governance body, responsible for oversight and management of the 
organization, it is the board and the executive who bear the brunt of mismanagement and 
wrongdoing. Given the earlier examples of nonprofit mismanagement, the common 
thread in each of the scandals was the governance and executive bodies’ lack of fiduciary 
care and oversight of human, physical, or financial resources. Once the stories went 
public, the organizations suffered from tarnished reputations resulting in decrease in 
donations and public trust. Furthermore, it was the external legal stakeholders, the IRS, 
the State Attorney Generals, and the U.S. Congress, that stepped in to hold nonprofit 




Performance for Legal Accountability 
Hatry suggests that the primary use of performance measurements are “to 
establish accountability” (as cited in Positer, 2008, p. 13). Poister (2008) offered that the 
regulatory accountability mandates from the past few decades are the foundation for 
much of the performance discussions of today. The federal government began the push 
for performance and accountability when in 1993 the Government Performance and 
Results Act (GPRA) was passed requiring government agencies to develop goals and 
objectives to demonstrate performance (Positer, 2008, p. 17). In 2010, the GPRA was 
revised, resulting in the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act 
(GPRAMA) that added new goal-setting and performance measurement processes 
applicable to multiple agencies, increased internet reporting measures, and more 
accountability for goals (Positer, 2008; Brass, 2012). Because many nonprofits have 
contracts for service with government agencies, particularly health and human service 
organizations, it is no surprise that we now see performance measurement and 
effectiveness permeated throughout the nonprofit sector.  
In a for-profit context, the shareholders and government are constantly engaged 
with each other to ensure accountability either through quarterly reports, consumer 
complaints, or via other agencies such as the Occupational Safety Health and 
Administration (OSHA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. We have seen the swift response to breaches of trust in the 
for-profit sector in the corporate malfeasance in the 1990’s (e.g. Enron, Tyco, 
WorldCom). In 2002, the U.S. Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley to demand greater 
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corporate transparency and accountability as well as an increase of performance 
expectations in an effort to curtail corporate corruption.  
Conversely, nonprofits can go for many years under the radar without any 
indication of mismanagement or wrongdoing. Only in the past decade or so has attention 
been given to reforming nonprofits. The most recent examples are the Nonprofit Integrity 
Act of California in 2004 and the Nonprofit Revitalization Act instituted in New York in 
2013. Both pieces of legislation were intended to increase transparency and 
accountability in the charitable sector by requiring organizations to adopt and implement 
specific processes and policies. In a sense, the new legislation could be considered 
negative accountability, a mechanism to show lack of performance by highlighting 
breaches in fiduciary duties when reporting activities in the annual 990 tax return 
(Swords, 1997). 
Performance as Ownership 
In the nonprofit sector, the term “ownership” is a foreign term. However, as 
foreign as the term may be, ownership is an important concept that intersects with 
accountability and performance when discussing governance. There is a large body of 
literature related to corporate and nonprofit board governance as ownership based in 
economic, political, and sociological theories, with a focus on for-profit theories around 
control, ownership, and wealth creation (Coule, 2015; Forbes & Milliken, 1998). As 
such, ownership is used in this study as a means to show how accountability begins with 
those who have the most “ownership” of an organization as discussed by nonprofit 
scholars (Carver in Kearns, 1998; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Renz, 2004). In other 
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words, those who have a responsibility for and who make decisions on behalf of the 
organization itself are expected to perform their responsibilities.  
According to Renz (2004) a board of directors is a structure with which the 
activity of governance takes place. Nearly all formalized organizations have structures in 
place where governance activities occur. In for profit corporations, owners are typically 
the individuals who serve on the board of directors or who are stockholders 
(shareholders) that have decision-making authority on behalf of the organization. Board 
members can be shareholders, executives, or even founders who have a common 
material, or financial, interest in organizational performance (i.e. maximizing profits). As 
such, it is clear that for profit boards and shareholders are the owners. 
For nonprofit organizations, ownership cannot be defined solely by who 
financially benefits based on the nondistribution constraint as developed by Hansmann 
(1980). The nondistribution constraint explains that nonprofits do not distribute earnings 
in a manner that financially benefits an individual, but rather their earnings benefit 
society as a whole through its “output” (i.e. mission). Similar to for-profit corporations, 
nonprofit corporations have boards of directors and executives who are given authority to 
make decisions about organizational resources. It is within this structure that nonprofit 
boards are held accountable for their performance as they make decisions that affect the 
overall performance of an organization. Therefore, one might say that boards are in fact a 
type of “owner” since their decisions impact fulfillment of the mission, organizational 
performance, and accountability. Using this line of thought for this study, nonprofit 
leaders are the owners. This is primarily because they have the most decision-making 
authority and, by default, function as the most likely legal accountability mechanism.  
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Role Ambiguity and Governance 
Nonprofit leaders are the individuals who are collectively held legally responsible 
for how organizational resources are used. These leaders include board members and 
executives who make decisions about how best to use organizational resources in order to 
fulfill a tax-exempt mission. Together, they work to accomplish goals and fulfill the 
mission of the organization in complementary ways: Board members meet broader 
governance needs by ensuring that the organization has the appropriate resources in place 
that executives then use in the management of the day-to-day operations.  
Renz (2010) sums up the scholarly and practitioner literature related to what 
board members are responsible for with regards to governance and oversight functions as 
presented in Table 5.1. However, it is important to note that not all of the recommended 
functions are tied to the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. For example, 
although it may be helpful for boards to engage with constituents, technically they are not 
legally responsible for this specific activity. The duties that are not legal ones have been 
identified by the researcher and are italicized.  
Table 5.1 
Prescribed Board Responsibilities Related to Fiduciary Duties 
Prescribed Board Responsibility Addressed in Fiduciary Duties 
To lead the organization No 
Establish policy Yes 
Secure essential resources Yes 
Ensure effective resource use Yes 
Lead and manage the chief executive Yes 
Engage with constituents No 
Ensure and enable accountability Yes 
Assess board effectiveness No 
Note.  Prescribed board responsibilities reprinted from Nonprofit Leadership and 




Given the wide variety of expectations for board members to fulfill, Wright and 
Millesen (2008) explore the idea of how nonprofit board role ambiguity affects 
organizational performance. Their study, which surveyed 447 executive directors and 249 
board members, suggested that when board members do not have a clear sense of their 
role, ambiguity occurs (Wright & Millesen, 2008). Their study also suggested that “board 
members often think they understand their roles, even when the chief executives do not 
[think that boards understand their own roles]” (Wright & Millesen, 2008, p. 330).  
The sense of ambiguity was also evident in a study by Doherty and Hoye (2011) 
that focused on nonprofit sports organizations. Their study builds on previous research 
that suggested board members are faced with conflicting expectations, which may 
contribute to ambiguity or a lack of understanding of what their roles entail (Doherty & 
Hoye, 2011). Although the authors acknowledged the multi-dimensional nature of 
gauging board performance in that each organizational context has underlying dynamics, 
they found that “…the significant association between role ambiguity and board member 
performance warrants attention to individuals’ degree of understanding of their 
responsibilities” in a nonprofit context (Doherty & Hoye, 2011, p. 120). 
This ambiguity points to a greater problem in nonprofit leaders’ inability to 
perform their fiduciary responsibilities. Miller (2002), who interviewed 58 board 
members to learn about how boards perform their monitoring function, found that 
“although board members clearly recognized their fiduciary responsibility to oversee the 
organizations financial picture, many had no idea how to execute this function” (p.  441). 
This suggests that not only is there ambiguity about what their roles are, but also 
ambiguity exists about how to carry out their duties. Therefore, the application of 
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knowledge impacts performance. But, how might ambiguity affect board members and 
executives differently? The following provides a brief overview of what we know about 
nonprofit leader performance at the board and executive levels. 
What We Know About Nonprofit Leaders 
The level of engagement is typically the dividing line between board members 
and executives. Boards maintain oversight of the entire organization at a broader, more 
strategic level, whereas executives are responsible to manage the day-to-day operations 
and support the board with information and guidance. Despite the differences, all 
nonprofit leader responsibilities are founded in the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and 
obedience of which they are legally accountable to the state and federal regulators. What 
this means is that the fiduciary duties are the basis for accountability and are related to 
overall performance since the duties are connected to the use of organizational resources 
(financial, human, physical, and intellectual) in fulfilling the mission. 
Boards. Some scholars have attributed composition of the board as a predictor of 
organizational performance that includes demographics such as age, gender, and ethnicity 
as well as professional and educational background (Bradshaw, et al., 1992; Herman & 
Renz, 2000; 2006; Jackson & Holland, 1998). Brown (2007) suggests that having “highly 
capable board members should coincide with better overall board performance” (p. 306). 
Given the variety of skills and backgrounds that board members may bring to the table, 
there is no consensus as to what matters most, again because of the contextual nature of 
nonprofits. Although it might be helpful to have a sense of what may work in certain 
contexts, focusing only on the technical features of the board does not provide enough 
insight into what other factors may impact an organization’s ability to perform or meet 
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accountability such as geographic location, group dynamics, resources, and even donor 
relations. Finally, it does not matter if board members are “highly capable” or have the 
“right” background because the traditional demographics have little to do with fiduciary 
knowledge. 
Holland (2002), who interviewed 169 board members to explore board 
performance and accountability, highlighted the tension of boards knowing what they are 
responsible for but that the lack of accountability undermines their effectiveness. This 
resonates with Miller (2004) who found that in her study of 58 board members some 
respondents felt that they were accountable only to themselves, because they could not 
identify other stakeholders to whom they were accountable. Miller (2004) also found that 
although board members had a very good understanding of their fiduciary 
responsibilities, what they did not understand how to actually execute or perform their 
fiduciary function. Given the gap between knowledge and application (as presented in 
chapter three), inherent challenges exist that may prevent board members from fulfilling 
their ownership role and meeting not only legal accountability demands, but also in 
performing their governance duties effectively. 
Executives. Although board members are often thought of as the primary 
governing body, in truth, they operate in tandem with the most senior executive. Even 
though both board members and executives are held accountable for organizational 
oversight, executives have different ideas than board members when it comes to what 
matters for organizational performance. Some research shows that executives often rate 
board performance much lower than board members rate their own performance 
(BoardSource, 2017; Bradshaw, et al., 1992; Brown, 2007; Brudney & Murray, 1998; 
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Heimovics & Herman, 1999; Herman & Renz, 2000; 2008, Stanford, 2017). Yet, 
referring back to Miller’s study (2004) of 58 board members, for the most part, board 
members deferred to the chief executive with regards to oversight, bestowing a great deal 
of trust to the chief executive by the board. So, although the executive feels that their 
boards are low performers, it is the executive that is relied upon by the board. So, one 
might question… is performance is a reflection of the executive? In the same vein, 
Holland (2002) offered that, “even when the nonprofit board addresses accountability, it 
seems to focus attention on the executive, seldom on the board itself” (p. 412).  
BoardSource (2017) and Stanford (2017) have been conducting longitudinal 
studies for the past few decades of more than 4,000 board members and executives across 
the nation. These studies provide some insight into the differences between board 
member and executive perceptions of organizational performance and each other. 
BoardSource (2017) reported that overwhelmingly both the chief executives and the 
board members agree that the board has an impact on organizational performance, 
particularly in knowledge of their roles and responsibilities. Eighty percent of executives 
and 73% of board chairs believed that understanding roles and responsibilities has a 
positive impact on organizational performance (BoardSource, 2017, p. 46).  
In contrast however, understanding roles and responsibilities was found to have a 
weak relationship between perception of board impact on organizational performance by 
both executives and board chairs; Executives ranked understanding roles and 
responsibilities as the fifth most important and board chairs ranked it fourth (out of five) 
(BoardSource, 2017, p. 45). Furthermore, the report (BoardSource, 2017) showed that 
while executives emphasize positive board culture, the board chairs emphasize the 
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board’s functional roles as the basis for performance. In terms of specific fiduciary duty 
performance, both the executives and the board chairs agreed that board preparation for 
meetings is lacking, which is a function of the performance of the duty of care that 
focuses on active participation and engagement of the governing body (BoardSource, 
2017). 
Fishman, Schwarz, and Mayer (2015) made a distinction between having the 
appropriate governance structures and practices in place and actually engaging in those 
practices for the oversight and management of nonprofits. If engagement was measured 
in terms of satisfaction, most nonprofits would be in a sorry state. The Stanford Survey 
(2017) reported that only 55% of the executives and 57% of the board members who 
responded were satisfied or very satisfied with the way their organization is managed 
day-to-day (p. 45). Because managing the day-to-day is typically the responsibility of the 
executive (unless the organization is run by a working board where all board members 
manage the day-today operations) these results are interesting given that most executives 
typically score themselves higher than their boards.  
The dissatisfaction could be related to the finding that just over half of the 
executives and board members are satisfied or very satisfied with the overall performance 
and significant impact of the organization (Stanford, 2017). If the nonprofit leaders as a 
whole are dissatisfied in the day-to-day operations, which is the executive responsibility, 
this might point to both the executives and board members inability to perform their duty 
of care. An aspect of the duty of care focuses on the board’s responsibility to review the 




Application of Knowledge Results 
Jackson and Holland (1998) concluded, “if nonprofit boards are to fulfill their 
fiduciary and leadership responsibilities, boards must be able to assess the effectiveness 
of their performance” (p. 159). What this study provides is a means to assess how 
nonprofit leaders fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities in the performance of their 
governance activities. The following presents the results of how nonprofit leaders apply 
their fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their governance duties, as a means to 
fulfill accountability to whom. In terms of measuring performance, the study focuses on 
how frequently nonprofit leaders carry out their fiduciary duties during their governance 
activities, specifically focused on the duties of care, loyalty, and obedience. First, the 
questions used in the survey are presented then reliability where appropriate, followed by 
the results by all roles. 
Survey Questions 
Respondents were given a four-point Likert scale option for answering. Because 
of the use of skip logic in the survey and the questions were organized, executives were 
given the option to answer “disagree to agree” and board members were given “never to 
always.” However, to get at application, all questions began with the stem, “as a board 
member I…” or “as an executive I…”. The questions were developed to align with the 





List of Survey Questions Categorized by Duty and Measurement 
Fiduciary Duty “As a Board Member, I…” 
4-point Likert: Never to Always 
“As an Executive, I…” 







 Review materials in advance of the 
board meeting 
 Pay attention to the organization’s 
resources (e.g. financial, physical, 
and human) 
 Exercise independent judgment (i.e. 
comparing, evaluating, and 
considering possible outcomes and 
possibilities) 
 Frequently review the organization’s 
finances and financial policies 
 Attend board meetings 
 Am aware of the executive's 
performance 
 Participate in the review, discussion, 
and/or approval of financial policies 
(e.g. annual budget, audit) 
 
 Exercise Independent Judgment 
 Pay attention to how the 
organization’s programs and 






 Make decisions that are in the best 
interest of the organization 
 Disclose conflicts of interest 
 Avoid the use of organizational 
resources/connections for personal 
gain 
 Maintain confidentiality of sensitive 
organizational information 
 





 Pay attention to how the 
organization uses its resources 
(financial/physical/human) to fulfill 
its mission 
 Understand the Bylaws 
 Refer to the organization’s internal 
policies and procedures when 
needed 
 Refer to the mission statement when 
discussing potential programs and 
services 
 Consider how new and existing 
programs support our mission 
 Refer to the mission statement 
when discussing potential 
programs and services 
 Pay attention to how the 
organization uses its resources 
(financial/physical/human) to 
fulfill its mission 







Boards. A four-point Likert option for board member responses was given 
(Never, Sometimes, Most of the Time, and Always) to understand the frequency with 
which knowledge of the fiduciary duties was applied in the performance of governance 
duties, which allowed for Cronbach’s alpha to test reliability. The duty of care scale 
consisted of eight items and was found to be very reliable (α = .88) with each item in the 
same direction. The duty of loyalty scale consisted of four items and was found to be 
moderately reliable with a Cronbach’s alpha of .514 (α = .51) with each item in the same 
direction. The duty of obedience scale consisted of five items and was found to be very 
reliable with a Cronbach’s alpha of .794 (α = .79) with each item in the same direction. 
Table 5.3 presents descriptive data for the application of each fiduciary duty for board 





Descriptive Data for Frequency of Application of Duty of Care for Board Members 
 
Duty Questions N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Care       
Pay attention to how the organization’s 
activities (e.g. programs and services) 
fulfill its mission 
96 3.7 4 .509 1 4 
Review materials in advance of the board 
meeting 
96 3.4 4 .723 1 4 
Pay attention to the organization’s 
resources (e.g. financial, physical, and 
human) 
96 3.5 4 .665 1 4 
Exercise independent judgment (i.e. 
comparing, evaluating, and considering 
possible outcomes and possibilities) 
96 3.8 4 .543 2 4 
Frequently review the organization’s 
finances and financial policies 
96 3.4 4 .837 1 4 
Attend board meetings 96 3.7 4 .513 2 4 
Am aware of the executive's performance 93 3.4 3 .616 1 4 
Participate in the review, discussion, and/or 
approval of financial policies (e.g. annual 
budget, audit) 
93 3.7 4 .592 1 4 
Loyalty       
Make decisions that are in the best interest 
of the organization 
91 3.9 4 .360 2 4 
Disclose conflict of interest 92 3.9 4 .370 1 4 
Avoid the use of organizational 
resources/connections for personal gain 
93 3.9 4 .368 1 4 
Maintain confidentiality of sensitive 
organizational information 
92 3.9 4 .305 2 4 
Obedience       
Pay attention to how the organization uses 
its resources (e.g. financial, physical, and 
human) to fulfill its mission 
96 3.7 4 .567 1 4 
Understand the bylaws 96 3.1 3 .796 1 4 
Refer to the organization’s internal policies 
and procedures when needed 
96 3 3 .917 1 4 
Refer to the mission statement when 
discussing potential programs and services 
96 3.3 4 .874 1 4 
Consider how new and existing programs 
support our mission 




Executives. Because of the small number of items included in the executive’s 
application of the duties, Cronbach’s alpha was not deemed fit. Table 5.4 presents the 
descriptive data for the fiduciary duties for executives.  
Table 5.4 
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Application of Fiduciary Duties for Executives 
 
Duty Questions N Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Care       
Exercise independent judgment 82 3.9 4 .241 3 4 
Pay attention to how the organization’s 
programs and activities fulfill its mission 82 4 4 .268 2 4 
Loyalty       
Disclose conflict of interest 82 3.9 4 .404 1 4 
Obedience       
Pay attention to how the organization uses 
its resources (e.g. financial, physical, and 
human) to fulfill its mission 82 3.9 4 .287 2 4 
Read the bylaws 81 3.9 4 .494 1 4 
Refer to the mission statement when 
discussing potential programs and services 82 3.9 4 .500 1 4 
 
Application Results 
By role. Board members and executives were asked about how frequently they 
fulfilled the fiduciary duties in the performance of their governance responsibilities using 
a four-point Likert scale. Board members were given never, sometimes, most of the time, 
and always while executives were given disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, 
and agree. The results for board members are presented in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 for 
executives. 
Board members applied their fiduciary knowledge to the duties of care, loyalty, 
and obedience most of the time or always (Care: N = 96, M = 3.6, SD = .473; Loyalty: N 
= 93, M = 3.9, SD = .370; Obedience: N = 96, M = 3.3, SD = .552). Executives somewhat 
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agree or agree that they perform their fiduciary duties (N = 82, Care: M = 7.9, SD = .385; 
Loyalty: N = 82, M = 3.9, SD = .404; Obedience: N = 82, M = 11.6, SD = 1.074).  
Table 5.5 
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Application of Duties of Care, Loyalty, and Obedience 
for the Board 
Application of Duty N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Care (8 questions)  96 3.6 3.8 .473 1.6 4 
Loyalty (4 questions) 93 3.9 4.0 .370 1.2 4 
Obedience (3 questions) 96 3.3 3.4 .552 1.4 4 
Note. Questions were 4 Point Likert scale options of Never to Always. 
 
Table 5.6 
Descriptive Data for Frequency of Application of Duties of Care, Loyalty, and Obedience 
for Executives 
Application of Duty N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Care (2 questions) 82 7.9 8 .385 6 8 
Loyalty (1 question) 82 3.9 4 .404 1 4 
Obedience (3 questions) 82 11.6 12 1.074 5 12 
Note. Questions were 4 Point Likert scale options of Disagree to Agree. 
 
Application of Duties and Actual Knowledge 
Pearson’s r correlation. Using knowledge data from chapter three, a Pearson r 
correlation was performed to explore any relationship with the frequency of application 
of duties of care, loyalty, and obedience by those who were assessed as having a passing 
score of fiduciary knowledge (see chapter three). The results show that actual knowledge 
is not correlated with nonprofit leader application of any of the fiduciary duties (care: r= 
.076, p = ..450, loyalty: r= .001, p =.991; obedience: r= .117, p = .247) in the 
performance of fiduciary responsibilities as presented in Table 5.7. Further results 
indicate that application of care, loyalty, and obedience are moderately correlated with 
each other (care and loyalty: r= .665, p = .000; care and obedience: r= ..622, p =.000; 




Summary of Pearson’s r Correlation for Nonprofit Leaders with Passing Fiduciary 













1 .076 .001 .117 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .450 .991 .247 










Sig. (2-tailed) .450  .000 .000 










Sig. (2-tailed) .991 .000  .000 










Sig. (2-tailed) .247 .000 .000  
N 100 186 186 186 
Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Passing score based on 70%, 
14 out of 19 possible points. 
 
Application of Duties and Actual Knowledge 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the comparison of the frequency with which nonprofit 
leaders say they apply their fiduciary knowledge and their actual knowledge of specific 
aspects of the fiduciary duties for board members and Figure 5.4 presents the comparison 
the frequency with which nonprofit leaders say they apply their fiduciary knowledge and 
their actual knowledge of specific aspects of the fiduciary duties for executives. 
Familiarity of each duty is presented by the means based on a 4-point Likert scale (Not at 
All Familiar, Slightly Familiar, Moderately Familiar, Very Familiar) and the actual 
knowledge score is based on the percentage who received a passing score of at least 70% 
for the 11 legal responsibilities and the eight bylaws questions. Overall, For board 
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members and the duty of care, %, loyalty, and obedience received a passing score For the 
executives received a passing score for actual knowledge. 
  
Figure 5.3. Means of application of duty of care, loyalty, and obedience compared to the 
percentage of actual knowledge of overall fiduciary care, loyalty, and obedience for 
board members.  
Note: The dotted line represents the percentage (41%) of board members (care N = 96, 
loyalty, N = 93, and obedience, N = 96) who received a passing score of 70% or better for 
the 19 questions about legal responsibilities and bylaws. Percentage for plotting was 
determined by calculating the proportion of 41% with each duty maximum mean (care: 
32 = 13.12, loyalty: 16 = 6.56, and obedience: 20 = 8.2). 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Means of application of duty of care, loyalty, and obedience compared to the 
percentage of actual knowledge of overall fiduciary care, loyalty, and obedience for 
executives. 
Note: The dotted line represents the overall percentage (70%) of executives (care N=82, 
loyalty, N=82, and obedience, N=82) who received a passing score of 70% or better for 
the 19 questions about legal responsibilities and bylaws. Percentage for plotting was 
determined by calculating the proportion of 70% with each duty maximum mean (care: 8 
































This chapter presents the results of frequency with which nonprofit leaders apply 
their knowledge in the performance of their fiduciary responsibilities to demonstrate legal 
accountability. The study highlights the need for a greater awareness of fiduciary 
responsibility knowledge. What follows is a discussion about the gaps between 
application of fiduciary knowledge and actual knowledge, first by the executives then by 
the board members. 
The Gaps: Application of Duties and Actual Knowledge 
Executives. For the executives, they somewhat agreed or agreed that they apply 
their fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their governance duties of care (N = 82, 
M = 7.9), loyalty (N = 82, M = 3.9), and obedience (N = 82, M = 11.6). In terms of actual 
knowledge, overall 70% of executives surveyed received a passing score for their actual 
knowledge of their legal responsibilities. Overall, these results support a sense of 
ownership and the executive’s ability to satisfy legal accountability. But, the results about 
specific aspects of each duty may tell a different story. 
Duty of care. The duty of care focuses on paying attention and being engaged by 
making informed decisions. Regarding individual questions in the duty of care construct, 
we see that executives agreed they exercise independent judgment (N = 82, M = 3.9) and 
all of the executives pay attention to the how the organization’s programs and activities 
fulfill its mission (N = 82, M = 4.0). These results are not surprising given that executives 
play a critical role in governance by monitoring the day-to-day operations of the 
organization. Likewise, because most of their work informs the board, they develop 
program strategy usually in isolation or with other senior staff if the organization is large 
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enough. This process requires that they make decisions based on their own best 
judgment.  
Duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty focuses on conflict of interest and putting the 
interests of the organization above the interests of the individual. Executives nearly 
always agreed they disclose conflict of interest (N = 82, M = 3.9). This result is not 
surprising given that as the chief executive they are under more scrutiny than the board. 
Because they are in the community as the face of the organization, they may have a 
greater awareness of how their actions impact those they serve. 
Duty of obedience. The duty of obedience focuses on compliance and ensuring 
that the mission is fulfilled. Again, we see that nearly all of the executives agreed that 
they apply their fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their governance activities by 
paying attention to how the organization uses its resources to fulfill the organization’s 
mission (N = 82, M = 3.9), reading the bylaws (N = 81, M = 3.9), and referring to the 
mission statement when discussing potential programs and services (N = 82, M = 3.9). 
Again, these results are not surprising given that most of the day-to-day decisions that 
executives make are related to the organization’s programs and services and that they 
bylaws are an important governance document.  
However, only 68% of the executives correctly identified that executive staff roles 
and responsibilities were included in the bylaws based on the results of chapter three. 
This is surprising given that the bylaws outline overall authority of the executive related 
to signing contracts, finances, and bank access. For executives, it would be imperative to 
know how much formal authority they have and how their relationship with the board is 
legally defined in the performance of their fiduciary duties. 
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Boards. For board members, they agreed that they apply their fiduciary 
knowledge in the performance of their governance duties of care (N = 96, M = 3.6), 
loyalty (N = 93, M = 3.9), and obedience (N = 96, M = 3.3). In terms of actual 
knowledge, overall 41% of board members surveyed received a passing score for their 
actual knowledge of their legal responsibilities. Overall, these results support a sense of 
ownership and the executive’s ability to satisfy legal accountability. 
Something interesting to note with regards to the board results is that they scored 
lower than the executives in terms of applying their fiduciary knowledge in the 
performance of the duties of care and obedience. These results build on previous studies 
that note executives typically score themselves higher than their boards (BoardSource, 
2017; Stanford, 2017).  
Duty of care. The duty of care focuses on paying attention to the work and being 
engaged by making informed decisions. Board members indicated that they apply their 
fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their responsibilities most frequently when 
exercising independent judgment (i.e. comparing, evaluating, and considering possible 
outcomes and possibilities) (N = 96, M = 3.8) and least frequently in reviewing materials 
in advance of the board meeting (N = 96, M = 3.4) and in reviewing the organization’s 
finances and financial policies (N = 96, M = 3.4).  
It is not surprising to find that preparation for board meetings is lacking given the 
results of a national survey (BoardSource, 2017) that reported both the executives and the 
board chairs agreed that preparation for board meetings is lacking (p. 49). Additionally, 
based on results from chapter three only 50% of the board members correctly identified 
regular attendance of board meetings as a legal responsibility and only 34% correctly 
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identified reviewing board meeting materials prior to the board meeting as a legal 
responsibility. What this means is that board members may not take as much ownership 
in the actual decision making process as they need to be, because they need to be more 
informed about the organization’s resources. This would indicate that they are not 
fulfilling their duty of care.  
Duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty focuses on conflict of interest and putting the 
interests of the organization above the interests of the individual. Board members 
indicated that they apply their fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their 
responsibilities nearly always in all areas of the duty of loyalty. These results are 
surprising given that board members assessed themselves with such a high degree of 
frequency when only 65% of the board members correctly identified the need to use 
independent judgment when making decisions about organizational resources as a legal 
responsibility as presented in chapter three. This would point to role ambiguity and a 
potential breach of duty of loyalty if board members are swayed by influential 
stakeholders such as funders, the executive, or dominant board personalities. 
Duty of obedience. The duty of obedience focuses on compliance and ensuring 
that the mission is fulfilled. Board members indicated that they apply their fiduciary 
knowledge in the performance of their responsibilities most frequently when paying 
attention to how the organization uses its resources (N = 96, M = 3.7) and when 
considering how new and existing programs support the organization’s mission (N = 93, 
M = 3.7), but least frequently in understanding bylaws (N = 96, M = 3.1) and referring to 
the organization’s internal policies and procedures when needed (N = 96, M = 3.0). These 
results were surprising given that board members scored very high in their actual 
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knowledge of specific aspects of the duty of obedience as presented in chapter three. The 
bylaws are a critical piece in governance and if bylaws are not read, board members make 
decisions about organizational resources without knowledge of how the organization 
itself has decided how it will make decisions. Thus, board members would be in breach 
of the duty of obedience and not satisfy legal accountability if they do not have 
knowledge of their organization’s bylaws. 
Implications 
Holland (2002) sums up nonprofit accountability as “practices and processes of 
clarifying expectations agreeing on goals and criteria for assessing progress toward them, 
and the providing information by which to assess performance” (p.  426). My study 
supports not only clarifying legal expectations, but the development of an assessment tool 
with which to assess legal aspects of governance, bounded by the fiduciary duties of care, 
loyalty, and obedience. Although there is no scholarly consensus as to what performance 
measurements are the most useful, I offer that we must continue to dig deeper into how 
boards actually behave to establish more generalizeable data. As nonprofit leaders 
improve their performance, by default they will improve organizational effectiveness and 
accountability.  
This study highlights the need for greater awareness of fiduciary knowledge in the 
performance of governance duties amongst nonprofit leaders. Overall, nonprofit leaders 
can use these results to identify areas that may impact board members’ and executives’ 
performance of their fiduciary duties. As such, my results contribute to the development 
of nonprofit leader trainings that frequent board service may negatively impact 
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performance and that additional research needs to be done to better understand the 
discrepancies between board and executive application of knowledge.   
The results of this study can be used to significantly impact the area of 
performance and effectiveness. Although I used the concepts slightly different than the 
literature does, there is something about nonprofit leaders being able to perform their 
duties with the appropriate fiduciary knowledge. As indicated in chapter three, because 
the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience are expectations for all nonprofit 
leaders, regardless of organizational size, purpose, or location, they can be used as a basis 
to develop a standardized process that assesses a nonprofit leader’s readiness for service. 
In turn, the assessment can be used during the orientation process to ensure that their 
board is made up of leaders that know their legal responsibilities. Furthermore, an 
assessment would help organizations use their resources to address specific gaps to deter 
mismanagement and wrong doing, whether negligent or willful.  
Future Research 
This chapter reveals a gap between how frequently nonprofit leaders apply their 
fiduciary knowledge and their actual knowledge. While this study is exploratory, in that it 
pilots an assessment tool and seeks to establish baseline data for future research, it 
highlights the need for greater awareness of fiduciary responsibility knowledge and 
competence. Additional empirical use of the assessment tool developed for this study will 
add not only to the nonprofit literature but also to the nonprofit law literature. 
Additionally, future qualitative research may help to uncover the underlying reasons why 
the level of knowledge varies amongst nonprofit leaders.  
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Furthermore, there is a need for research that explores individual nonprofit leaders 
as the unit of analysis, rather than the board as a whole. Specifically, my study builds on 
the idea that individual nonprofit leader knowledge is important for organizational 
performance in by addressing legal accountability as a means to dispel role ambiguity 





CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
Collectively, this dissertation addresses the issue of accountability and nonprofit 
governance by focusing on legal accountability. Separately, each article explores the 
means by which nonprofit leaders satisfy the different facets of legal accountability as 
they relate to the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and obedience.  
The study began by setting the stage and describing how over time, nonprofit 
governance has evolved. With increased competition for resources and demand for 
services, nonprofit leaders are being asked to fill additional responsibilities that go 
beyond the basic fiduciary duties. Nonprofit leaders of today are expected to engage at 
greater levels than their predecessors as highlighted by the tensions of the voluntary 
nature of board service, the need for professionalization, and the need to meet the 
accountability demands of multiple stakeholders. Using an accountability framework that 
focuses on what, how, and to whom (Ebrahim, 2010), this study establishes that what 
nonprofit leaders are legally accountable for is knowledge of their fiduciary duties, how 
they meet legal accountability by accessing appropriate sources to learn about their 
fiduciary duties, and to whom they are legally accountable to is the regulators by 
demonstrating application of their fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their 
governance duties.  
Knowledge 
The first study focused on what nonprofit leaders were accountable for: 
knowledge of their fiduciary duties. In assessing nonprofit leader knowledge of fiduciary 
duties, the majority agreed that they were very familiar. However, when tested for actual 
knowledge, only 41% of board members and 70% of executives passed the test. When 
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analyzed by the number of boards served, 56% of nonprofit leaders who have served on 
one to four boards and 71% of those who have served on five or more boards passed. 
Although nonprofit leaders believe they understand their fiduciary responsibilities, in 
reality they do not, suggesting that they may be stretched too thin. Because nonprofit 
leaders are asked to fill multiple roles, they lack the knowledge of their basic 
responsibility: to oversee organizational resources so that they are used in a manner that 
fulfills the mission. 
When looking at these results through a legal accountability lens, it is glaringly 
evident that nonprofit leaders cannot demonstrate accountability because they do not 
understand their basic responsibilities. Without the proper knowledge of what is required 
nonprofit leaders are at a disadvantage when making important decisions related to how 
resources will be used to fulfill the mission. If nonprofit leaders lack understanding that, 
for example, reading materials and making informed decisions is based on the fiduciary 
duty of care, they may govern in a haphazard manner. Furthermore, this study highlights 
that nonprofit leaders are unaware that they “don’t know that they don’t know” given that 
such a high percentage of respondents scored with a high degree of familiarity and 
understanding.  
Source of Knowledge 
The second study focused on how nonprofit leaders demonstrate legal 
accountability: accessing appropriate sources to learn about their fiduciary duties. This 
strand of research was theoretical in that it applied institutionalism in order to explain 
why nonprofit leaders would want to be informed about their legal responsibilities, 
specifically in response to isomorphic coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms. In 
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order to explore what sources nonprofit leaders accessed to learn about their fiduciary 
duties, best practices were used as socially constructed proxies in the absence of widely 
accepted standardized assessments.  
When looking at the results through a legal accountability lens, nonprofit leaders 
utilized a variety of best practices available to them both internal and external to the 
organization, to learn about their legal responsibilities. Despite the availability of 
formalized internal sources, such as a board manual or orientation, nonprofit leaders 
accessed informal means the most regardless of role or board service. Thus, nonprofit 
leaders are learning about their fiduciary responsibilities from other board members or 
executive directors. However, this knowledge may or may not be accurate. Building on 
the first study, many nonprofit leaders did not pass the test in their actual knowledge. 
Therefore, it can be said that bad knowledge is being passed on from leader to leader and 
from board to board. 
In terms of external sources, nonprofit leaders rely most on websites, regardless of 
role or board service. Rather than relying on more formalized sources such as 
professional publications or certification and degree programs, nonprofit leaders look to 
the world wide web, a socially constructed source of knowledge. And, similar to informal 
means, there is no way of ensuring that the information is credible, legitimate, or truthful. 
This study did not measure institutionalist pressures, but the results do suggest 
some link with best practices and mimetic mechanisms. What is interesting is that most 
nonprofit organizations behave in a mimetic fashion with the use of the same types of 
best practices intended to help nonprofit leaders understand the organization and their 
roles, such as board manuals, board orientations, and educational opportunities. Yet, how 
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might isomorphism explain the use of informal means of learning? More research would 
help to understand this better. 
Application of Knowledge 
The third study focused on to whom nonprofit leaders demonstrate legal 
accountability: the application of fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their 
governance duties. This strand of research was conceptual in that it applied performance 
in a non-traditional way. Rather than relying on the usual performance metrics such as 
organization size, age, board composition and backgrounds, performance was discussed 
in terms of ownership. In offering nonprofit leaders as owners, legal accountability is 
demonstrated as they apply fiduciary knowledge in the performance of their governance 
duties. This strand of research included the idea of role ambiguity and the confusion that 
nonprofit leaders have about what they are supposed to do in their roles. 
When looking at the results through a legal accountability lens, we see similar 
results as in the first study as nonprofit leaders frequently apply their fiduciary 
knowledge in the performance of their governance duties. However, given the low levels 
of actual knowledge, it is evident that nonprofit leaders perform their governance duties 
based on a lack of understanding of their legal responsibilities. What this means is that 
although nonprofit leaders may believe that they are engaged in their role, they do not 
fully understand what that role actually is, pointing to role ambiguity. As “owners”, 
nonprofit leaders are making decisions based on ignorance, which may hinder success.  
Furthermore, these results open up the possibility that the traditional measures of 
performance, such as organizational age, revenue types, board composition and 
background are less important when it comes to fulfilling the mission. I would offer that 
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nonprofit leaders who have an understanding of their basic fiduciary duties are more 
engaged and therefore have more investment in the performance of the organization. 
However, more research is needed to explore this. 
The “So What?” 
So, how does this dissertation contribute? As a whole, it reveals the gap in what 
nonprofit leaders believe they know and how they carry out their fiduciary duties based 
on lack of fiduciary knowledge. Separately, each study highlights the need for awareness, 
understanding, and performance of fiduciary duties in order to meet legal accountability 
demands. 
The current legal accountability structure is woefully inadequate and for the most 
part, is non-existent. Enforcement is reactive and when negligence or wrongdoing is 
suspected, depending on the resources available at the state and federal levels, 
investigation is minimal. Furthermore, there is no incentive for nonprofit organizations to 
ensure that their leaders have accurate fiduciary knowledge and an understanding of what 
their role is and what it is not. Finally, even when nonprofits are found lacking in the 
performance of their fiduciary duties, they face little to no consequences because of the 
voluntary nature of nonprofits. 
As a consultant I have met with numerous nonprofit leaders who are not familiar 
with the term “the fiduciary duties”, so it is not surprising to learn that many board 
members and some executives do not get a passing score. And, as a consultant, I have 
helped several nonprofits regain their tax exempt status after being revoked for lack of 
knowledge of their fiduciary duties. In all cases, most nonprofit leaders were unaware of 
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their responsibilities and they were eager to learn what their responsibilities were in order 
to avoid future breaches. 
This study is relevant to funders, regulators, and nonprofit organizations 
themselves since they are all interested in the success of nonprofits. This study provides 
actual data that stakeholders can use to work together in order to strengthen nonprofit 
governance. Funders could provide resources for trainings and regulators can work with 
national and state nonprofit associations and coalitions to create standards to assess 
fiduciary knowledge. Organizations can address the need for qualified board members 
and executives by ensuring that any person responsible for making decisions about 
organizational resources understands that it is a legal responsibility, not just a fun hobby. 
As much as these ideas have potential for success, the real challenge is the 
contextual nature of nonprofits. What works for one organization may not work for 
another. And, given the voluntary nature of board service and the pluralistic aspect of 
nonprofits, the nonprofit sector has adopted a “come one, come all” mantra which may be 
sacrificing quality for quantity. However, at the end of the day, when an organization is 
suspected of wrongdoing, they will be measured against how they went about their 
governance activities according to the standards outlines in the fiduciary duties of care, 
loyalty, and obedience. So, although nonprofits come in many different shapes, sizes, and 
colors, they are all held to the same standard of governance: did they use organizational 
resources to fulfill the mission and did they go about their decision-making process with 




The “Now What?” 
So, what’s next? As an academic, there are several ways I can move my research 
forward. Additionally, as a practitioner, I have ideas about how to turn my research into 
practical, relevant tools for those working in the sector on a daily basis. In both cases, I 
see opportunities to add to the literature in empirical and applied ways. My plan is to use 
this dissertation by developing each of the three strands of research into stand-alone 
submissions for academic and practitioner publications and share the collective data with 
students, nonprofit organizations, and funders. 
Connecting Research to Practice 
With regards to nonprofit academics, some may have experience volunteering for 
a nonprofit, but very few have worked in a nonprofit. Given the lack of “on the ground” 
experience, much of their research relies on publicly available data, unless they are 
fortunate enough to have funding for a study that allows them to engage with nonprofit 
organizations. What this means is that most people who research nonprofits do not 
interact with the nonprofit. In fact, their interaction is non-existent, because they rely on 
data from other sources. While data is helpful in that it points to trends, it is just one 
dimension of an organization that focuses on the numbers. What it lacks is insight about 
the people doing the work. This really hit home for me when I attended a workshop about 
nonprofit governance at one of the premiere nonprofit research conferences. After the 
presenters shared the results of their studies, they answered questions from the audience. 
As the question and answer period came to a close, one of the presenters concluded with, 
“we really don’t know what goes on in these boardrooms”. If we are to understand those 
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who govern nonprofits, we must be where they are: in the boardrooms and in the 
organizations.  
Another reason to “get inside the boardrooms” is to engage and bridge the divide 
between research and practice. This is particularly true for sharing data and research. 
Only a small portion of the research on nonprofit organizations is accessible to nonprofit 
practitioners. Journal publications require subscriptions that are too costly for the 
majority of nonprofits around the country and based on the results of this study, many do 
not even access those that are readily available. Furthermore, when studies are 
completed, researchers are already on to the next study and do not share findings with the 
participating organizations.  
I say all of this with the hope that I use my study as a means to encourage fellow 
researchers to interact with the organizations they wish to study and for practitioners to 
invite researchers into their organizations.  
Challenges and Opportunities 
Over the years, I have seen many challenges and opportunities in my travels in the 
nonprofit sector. It seems that the biggest challenge I have witnessed is the relationship 
between the board and the executive. Boards do not understand or appreciate the 
executive and the executive looks at their board as a burden. And, over the years, I have 
found that the executives and boards who do work well together understand their 
individual roles and responsibilities. This leads me to focus on the fiduciary duties as a 
critical piece in leading and managing nonprofit organizations. The duties provide 




Another challenge in the sector is the mindset of quantity, not quality. The fact is 
some people will join boards without any intention of doing the work and organizations 
accept these “dead weights” because they need to fill board vacancies (and sometimes the 
executive position). Yet, in satisfying quotas, organizations find that they spend the 
majority of their time trying to get board members to do their jobs and to engage which 
negatively impacts the mission. There is an opportunity for organizations to set the bar 
high for the requirements for board service and the executive. When expectations are 
outlined up front, performance will follow. When board members and executives know 
what their legal responsibilities are, they will be more inclined to carry out their roles in 
an intentional manner. Furthermore, when potential board members and executives know 
what they are legally responsible for, those who do not want to commit to the work are 
weeded out, saving the organization from troubles later on.  
I am a practitioner at heart, having spent more than 20 years as a professional in 
the nonprofit sector. And, because of my positionality, I can see how this study could 
make an impact. Because of my position as a practitioner, and now as an academic, my 
goal is to be a bridge to connect academics with practitioners to address the critical issues 
in a way that provides practical use. As such, I am committed to sharing the findings with 
nonprofits and using the assessment tool further.  
In my work as a consultant I have the opportunity to bring organizations back to 
the basics, their legal responsibilities, as a means to get everyone on the same page that 
asks: Why are they there and what are they required to do? As I continue to use the 
survey, my hope is that it can become a standardized assessment that nonprofits can use 
in their on-boarding and orientation process to ensure that their leaders are making 
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decisions based on their legal responsibilities. My dream would be to work with 
regulators to create a standardized process that includes best practices and an assessment 
that eventually could be a requirement for board service.  
Final Thoughts 
In many ways this study is the pinnacle of more than 20 years of practice. It has 
been a scholarly and personal journey that has changed me in many ways. What has not 
changed, is my passion and belief in the nonprofit sector and my belief that organizations 
who thrive are those who focus on good governance. 
The 40
th
 President of the United States of America, Ronald Reagan, was quoted as 
saying, “Trust, but verify”. For me, I hope that we can not only trust nonprofit leaders to 
be accountable for their performance, but also that we can verify that they are fulfilling 
their fiduciary duties. Whether through standardized assessment, trainings or resources, 
nonprofit leaders have the opportunity to access the right knowledge to use at the right 
time so that they are positioned to support their organizations to carry out their missions 
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Appendix A Survey Instrument 
 








Appendix B Email Invitation to Participate in Study 
Dear Nonprofit Leader, 
 
My name is Crystal Trull and I am a doctoral student at the University of San Diego as 
well as a long-time San Diego nonprofit practitioner and consultant.  In my work in the 
nonprofit sector, I meet boards of all shapes and sizes that want to do their jobs well, but 
are often confronted with an uncertainty as to what their actual duties are.  As I ventured 
into the world of academia, I found that that there is an amazing opportunity to strengthen 
nonprofit boards and executives using academic research that would be relevant and 
useful for nonprofit organizations.  In response, I am embarking on an ambitious, ground-
breaking study for my doctoral dissertation and I would be honored to have your 
participation. 
 
The purpose of the study is to understand how much nonprofit board members and 
executives know about their fiduciary responsibilities and how they apply that knowledge 
to their governance activities.  My hope is that this study will not only provide useful data 
that nonprofit leaders can use to strengthen their boards, but that also informs funders, 
academics, and governments to engage their support of board development and training. 
 
This study is intended for two types of nonprofit leaders who govern nonprofit 
organizations that are located in San Diego County:  1) Individuals who serve as a 
voting member of a board of directors and 2) the most senior executive staff (e.g. 
Executive Director, Chief Operating Officers, Chief Development Officer, etc.).  If none 
of this criteria fits you, please forward this request to someone in your organization, or 
others in your networks, who might meet the criteria.  If you are one of the leaders that 
meet the criteria, then please let me know if you would be willing to participate in this 
study by emailing me at ### or by calling/texting me at ###. 
 
The survey will take about 15 minutes and you can exit at any time.  All of your answers 
are confidential and will only be reported in aggregate.  At the end of this survey, you 
will be asked for your name and email just in case I need to follow up with you for 
clarification or if you would like to receive the results of this study. 
 
Your participation is vital to better equip nonprofit leaders.  Should you have any 
questions, I can be reached via email or cell/text as indicated above.  I will follow up with 
you in week or so, if you haven’t responded, to confirm that you received this request and 
if you are interested in participating. 
 
Many thanks in advance for your participation. 
Sincerely, 
Crystal Trull, M.A. 
Institutional Review Board #2018-181 
  





Jan 3, 2018 9:27 AM PST 
 
Crystal Trull 
School of Leadership & Education Sciences 
 
Re: Expedited - Initial - IRB-2018-181, Nonprofit Governance: Board and Executive 
Knowledge and Application of Fiduciary Duties 
 
Dear Crystal Trull: 
 
The Institutional Review Board has rendered the decision below for IRB-2018-181, Nonprofit 




Selected Category: 7. Research on individual or group characteristics or behavior (including, 
but not limited to, research on perception, cognition, motivation, identity, language, 
communication, cultural beliefs or practices, and social behavior) or research employing 
survey, interview, oral history, focus group, program evaluation, human factors evaluation, or 








Note: We send IRB correspondence regarding student research to the faculty advisor, who 
bears the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of the research. We request that the faculty 
advisor share this correspondence with the student researcher. 
 
The next deadline for submitting project proposals to the Provost’s Office for full review is N/A. 





Dr. Thomas R. Herrinton 
Administrator, Institutional Review Board 
Office of the Vice President and Provost  
Hughes Administration Center, Room 214 5998 Alcalá Park, San Diego, CA 92110-2492 
Phone (619) 260-4553 • Fax (619) 260-2210 • www.sandiego.edu 
